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SURVEY OF NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
[The "Survey of North Carolina Case Law" is designed to review cases decided by the North CarolinaSupreme Court during the
period covered* and to supplement past and future "Surveys" in
presenting developments in North Carolinacase law that are deemed
of particularimportance; it is not the purpose of the "Survey" to
discuss all the cases that were decided during the period of its
coverage. The North CarolinaSupreme Court will be referred to as
the "Courts" or the Supreme Court. The United States Supreme
Court will be designated only by its full name. North Carolina
General Statutes will be signified in text and textual footnotes by
"G.S." THE EDITOR.]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Frank W. Hanft*
LICENSING-WHEN CERTIFICATE TO PRACTICE
ARCHITECTURE NOT REQUIRED

The statute requiring a certificate from the North Carolina
Board of Architecture in order for one to be entitled to practice
architecture provides by way of exception, "Nothing in this chapter
shall be construed to prevent any individual from making plans or
data for buildings for himself .

. .

."' In Board of Architecture v.

Lee' the Court held that the preparation by an individual of plans
for an automobile sales and service building on his own property
comes within the exception, even though after construction of the
building was under way he conveyed a part interest and the owners
then rented the building to an automobile agency. The Court declined to read exceptions into the exception when such are not made
by the legislature. In another case the Lee decision was held to
* The period covered embraces the decisions reported in 264 N.C. 1
through 266 N.C. 403.
* Graham Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 83-12 (Supp. 1965).
2264 N.C. 602, 142 S.E.2d 643 (1965).
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apply in favor of an individual who constructed from plans prepared by himself eleven different apartment buildings, ranging in
cost from 36,000 dollars to 100,000 dollars, on his own property. 8
These decisions disclose a weakness in the statute. Assuming that
the requirement of a certificate does "safeguard life, health and
property" as the statute recites, 4 then perhaps an exception to the
exception should by amendment be added to the statute where the
plans made by an individual are for a building to be sold or leased
to others.
JUDICIAL REVIEW

Direct Appeal to the State Supreme Court
In 1963 the General Statutes Commission submitted to the General Assembly a bill rewriting the laws of the state concerning
public utilities. With some amendments the General Assembly enacted the bill.5 One of the amendments was the addition of a section6 which provided that appeals from an order or decision of the
Utilities Commission approving or authorizing an increase in the
rates of a public utility shall be made directly to the State Supreme
Court without intermediate review in the superior court. 7 In State
ex rel.. Util. Comm'n v. Old Fort Finishing Plant"the Court held
this provision for direct appeal to the Supreme Court to be unconstitutional. The Court pointed out that article IV of the Constitution of North Carolina was rewritten in 1961, and that the rewritten article, adopted at the general election in 1962, governed
the case. Section 10(1) of article IV provides, "The Supreme
Court shall have jurisdiction to review upon appeal any decision
of the courts below .

. . ."'

The Court accordingly concluded that

' Board of Architecture v. Cannon, 264 N.C. 614, 142 S.E.2d 651 (1965).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 83-12 (Supp. 1965).
The provisions of the rewritten law are in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 62-1
to -325 (1965), as amended, N.C. G, . STAT. §§ 62-32 to -262 (Supp. 1965).
ON.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-99 (Supp. 1965). Orders of the Commission
awarding or denying a certificate of convenience and necessity for construction of any facility for the generation of electricity for furnishing
public utility service were added by amendment in 1965. This addition, of
shares the fate of the rest of the section as brought out hereinafter.
course,
7
Review of cases other than rate cases is by the superior court, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 62-90 (1965), with appeal to the Supreme Court. N.C. GEN.
STAT.

§ 62-96 (1965).

8264 N.C. 416, 142 S.E.2d 8 (1965).
oEmphasis added.
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its appellate jurisdiction relates solely to appeals from "courts be0
low," not from administrative agencies.'
In some jurisdictions appeals from particular administrative

agencies are direct to the supreme court of the state." In the federal
system review of numerous administrative agencies is by inter-

mediate appellate courts, namely the United States Courts of Appeals. 1 2 If the General Assembly establishes an intermediate appel13
the question may arise whether
late court for North Carolina,

the General Assembly could validly provide for appeals from any
state administrative agency to such court. A negative answer would
seem to follow from a decision in 1898 that hearing appeals from
the Railroad Commission was original jurisdiction and, therefore,
could not be placed in the Supreme Court since it exercises only

appellate jurisdiction save for claims against the state.'4 Under the
constitutional amendment authorizing an intermediate court of ap-

peals in this state that court also is to exercise only appellate jurisdiction.' 5
However, in a more recent North Carolina case the Court held
that the superior court, reviewing on certiorari a decision of a city
board of adjustment concerning zoning of a tract of real estate, was
sitting as an appellate court.' 6 In 1964 that case was followed in
a decision to the effect that a superior court judge was sitting as
an appellate court in reviewing hearings before a city planning and
is true that N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 3, authorizes the General Assem10 It
bly to vest judicial powers in "administrative agencies," but this recognizes
that they are still administrative agencies, not courts.
'125 MicH. L. Rnv. 178 (1926). At that time fifteen states provided
for review of public utilities commission decisions by the state supreme
court, but such review provisions had been held invalid by some courts
under constitutional provisions limiting the supreme court to appellate jurisdiction. However, in seven states constitutional provisions expressly allowed
direct appeals from decisions of the utilities commission to the supreme
court.
70 HARv. L. REV.
123 DAvis, ADmINISThATIVn LAW § 23.03 (1958);
827, 903 (1957).
" N.C. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 877, provides for amendments to N.C.
CONsT. art. IV to create an intermediate court of appeals when established
by the General Assembly.
ex rel. Bd. of R.R. Comm'rs v. Wilmington & W. R.R., 122
1" State
N.C. 877, 29 S.E. 334 (1898).
"N.C. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 877, § 1, at 1173, provides that the intermediate court of appeals "'shall have such appellate jurisdiction as the General Assembly may provide.'" No mention is made of any original jurisdiction.
1" In the matter of Pine Hill Cemeteries, Inc., 219 N.C. 735, 15 S.E.2d 1
(1941).
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zoning commission and the city council." These cases afford a basis
for holding that the intermediate court of appeals would be exercising appellate jurisdiction in reviewing decisions of administrative
agencies.
Sound policy might dictate that the state follow the federal
example and make the intermediate court of appeals the body to
review the decisions of some of the state agencies. Bodies like the
Utilities Commission and the Industrial Commission might well be
placed on a parallel with trial courts, so that their decisions would
8
go to an appellate court for review rather than to a trial court.'
One obvious advantage of such procedure would be that the intermediate appelate court would develop expertise in reviewing decisions in these specialized fields.
Review of Industrial Commission-JurisdictionalFacts
In Askew v. Leonard Tire Co. 9 the Court discussed many of
its previous holdings as to whether the superior court in reviewing
decisions of the Industrial Commission must make independent findings of jurisdictional facts and concluded that there was conflict in
"Armstrong v. Mclnnis, 264 N.C. 616, 142 S.E.2d 670 (1965).
It would probably be undesirable to burden the intermediate court of
appeals with the taking of additional evidence, but it is already provided
that in appeals from the Utilities Commission no evidence shall be received
at the hearing on appeal. If there is newly discovered evidence, the superior
1

court may remand the case to the Commission to take the evidence. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 62-93 (1965). However, in cases of alleged irregularities in
procedure before the Commission not shown in the record, testimony thereon
may be taken in the court. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-94(a) (1965). In the
case of the Industrial Commission the reviewing court may not receive
or consider any evidence not introduced before the hearing commissioner
or the full Commission. Huffman v. Douglass Aircraft Co., 260 N.C. 308,
132 S.E.2d 614 (1963). The superior court may remand to the Commission to hear newly discovered evidence. Byrd v. Gloucester Lumber Co.,
207 N.C. 253, 176 S.E. 572 (1934). The general judicial review statute
for administrative agencies, applicable unless adequate procedure for judicial
review is provided by some other statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-307 (1964),
likewise provides for remand to the agency to hear additional evidence.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-313 (1964). However in cases of alleged irregularities in procedure before the agency not shown in the record, testimony
thereon may be taken by the court, and where no record or an inadequate
record was made, the judge in his discretion may hear the matter de novo.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-314 (1964). The statutory provisions for review
of decisions of certain licensing boards state that the judge shall not take
evidence not offered at the hearing except for alleged omissions or errors
in the record. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150-27 (1964). The case may be remanded to the board to hear additional evidence. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150-29
(1964).
1264 N.C. 168, 141 S.E.2d 280 (1965).
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the cases. The Court noted that the question whether an employeremployee relationship exists is jurisdictional."0 It cited cases in
which it had nevertheless held that the Commission's findings of
fact relating to this question are conclusive on appeal if supported
by substantial evidence,2 ' which is the rule applicable to findings of
nonjurisdictional facts. The Court accounted for those cases by
stating that it had perhaps been "unmindful of the jurisdictional
22 On the other hand the Court disnature of the question ...
23
cussed Aylor v. Barnes and pointed out that this case also raised
a jurisdictional question, this time whether the employee was a
resident of North Carolina; that the Commission decided that he
was and made an award; that the superior court affirmed all the
findings of fact, conclusions of law and award and recited that the
entire record had been examined and considered; and that the
Supreme Court held that this was not enough and remanded the
case to the superior court for independent findings of jurisdictional
facts by the judge.
Having from these and other cases pointed out the conflict in
its decisions, the Court in Askew said, "We are not disposed to
draw fine distinctions in an effort to harmonize our former decisions, and thereby add confusion to uncertainty."24 Upon taking
this highly commendable view the Court set out to clarify its present
position. It declared to be settled law the rule that the superior
court has both the power and duty to consider all the evidence in
the record and find therefrom the jurisdictional facts without regard to the Commission's finding of such facts. These latter are
not conclusive even though supported by competent evidence. The
Court then stated how the rule would apply in certain specific situations.
If the superior court judge is of the opinion from the evidence
in the record that the Commission's findings of jurisdictional fact
" What matters are to be regarded as jurisdictional wil not be discussed here. "Apparently no one has ever succeeded in ascertaining the
difference between fundamental or jurisdictional facts and other facts." 4
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 29.08, at 158-59 (1958).
" This view, which the Court repudiated, has support.

Bellini v. Great
Am. Indem. Co., 299 N.Y. 399, 403, 87 N.E.2d 426, 428 (1949); 4 DAvis,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 29.08, at 162 (1958).
22 264 N.C. at 171, 141 S.E.2d at 283.
23242 N.C. 223, 87 S.E.2d 269 (1955), discussed, 264 N.C. at 172, 141
S.E.2d at 283.
2'264 N.C. at 173, 141 S.E.2d at 284.
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led to an improper assumption or rejection of jurisdiction, it is his
duty to make independent findings of jurisdictional facts and set
them out in his judgment.
If a party requests the judge to make independent findings of
jurisdictional facts, it is error to refuse, and such facts found by
him must be set out in the judgment or incorporated herein by
reference. However, if his findings are in agreement with those of
the Commission, he may by reference adopt the latter as his own.
But it is error for him to proceed on the theory that he is bound
by them.
Where no party requests the judge to make independent findings of jurisdictional facts, and he makes none but affirms the Commission's findings, then if the jurisdictional aspect of the findings
is first suggested and the findings challenged in the Supreme Court,
it will be presumed that the superior court judge reviewed the evidence and his findings were in accord with those of the Commission. His overruling of exceptions to the Commission's findings
and affirmance of them will be deemed an adoption of them as his
own, unless it clearly appears from the record on appeal in the
Supreme Court that he proceeded on the mistaken view that the
Commission's findings of jurisdictional facts were binding on him
and that he was without authority to make independent findings.
Applying its declared guides to the case before it, the Court
held that the superior court did not err in failing to set out independent findings of jurisdictional facts. The Supreme Court noted
that there was no request in the superior court for independent
findings of jurisdictional facts, that the judge reviewed the evidence
in the record, that he struck out certain findings, that he overruled
exceptions to the material findings of jurisdictional facts by the
Commission and affirmed them. There was nothing in the record
and judgment to indicate that he considered the Commission's findings to be conclusive. The Court bolstered its conclusion that the
judge was aware of his authority and duty by pointing out that
he was the same judge who, in a recent case appealed to the Supreme
Court 25 found independently facts on the employer-employee relationship and reversed the Commission.
This application to the principal case of the guides the Court
laid down may create confusion of the sort the Court sought to
"5Richards v. Nationwide Homes, 263 N.C. 295, 139 S.E.2d 645 (1965).

1966]

SURVEY OF NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW

895

allay. Granted that the superior court judge overruled exceptions
to the findings of jurisdictional facts by the Commission and affirmed them, on what basis did he do so? The statement of the
procedure below in the report of the case recites, "[T]he [superior]
court held that these findings of fact are supported by competent
evidence." 2 6 The Supreme Court in its opinion stated that the
superior court judgment "holds that the material findings of the
Commission as to the employer-employee relationship are supported
by competent evidence; it overrules appellants' exceptions and assignments of error."2 The Supreme Court pointed out that there
was a conflict in the testimony bearing on the question whether the
claimant was an employee or an independent contractor. It would
seem, then, that the superior court judge affirmed the Commission's
findings of jurisdictional facts on the basis that there was competent evidence to support them. But this, the Supreme Court said in
the same opinion, is not the test. It said that the Commission's
findings of jurisdictional fact are not conclusive even though supported by competent evidence.
Moreover, in a later case, Burns v. Riddle,"8 the Commission
made a finding that an employer sawed and logged more than sixty
days during a six-month period and therefore came under the Workmen's Compensation Act.29 The superior court treated this as a
finding of jurisdictional fact. The Supreme Court affirmed and recited in its judgment, " '[T] he Court finds as a fact that there is
competent evidence in the record to support the findings of
fact . ... , ,30 Although this was substantially the same recital as
that by the superior court in Askew, this time the Supreme Court
reversed on the ground that this recital showed clearly that the
superior court judge was proceeding on the mistaken premise that
the Commission's findings of jurisdictional facts were binding upon
him if supported by any competent evidence. The Supreme Court
remanded the case to the superior court to make independent findings of the jurisdictional facts. As in Askew there was evidence
both ways on the disputed jurisdictional facts.
Apparently the Supreme Court's statements in the Askew and
20264 N.C. at 170, 141 S.E.2d at 282.
27 Id. at 171, 141 S.E.2d
at 282.
28265 N.C. 705, 144 S.E.2d 847 (1965).
See the definition
"employment," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(1) (1965).
80265 N.C. 705, 706,of 144
S.E.2d 847, 849 (1965).
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Burns cases are to be reconciled in the following fashion. Even
though the superior court affirms the Commission's findings of
jurisdictional facts on the ground that they are supported by competent evidence, still the Supreme Court will affirm the superior court
on this point if from the total situation the Supreme Court is convinced that the superior court judge was aware that he was not
bound to affirm for this reason but had authority to find the other
way if that contrary finding also had support in the evidence.
To avoid possible reversal it would seem that where the superior
court judge agrees with the Commission's findings of jurisdictional
facts, it would be good policy for him to adopt the findings as his
own rather than affirm them on the basis that they are supported
by competent evidence.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND RES JUDICATA

The proprietor of a tavern, according to the testimony of two
officers, sold them whiskey by the drink, and on another occasion
W sold them whiskey by the drink in the proprietor's presence.
For this the proprietor was tried and found not guilty in the superior court. A nolle pros. was taken in the prosecution of W. For
the same violations of law the State Board of Alcoholic Control
revoked the proprietor's permit. The Supreme Court held that this
did not constitute double jeopardy. The rules of evidence in criminal cases, said the Court, require proof of guilt beyond reasonable
81
doubt. The result of the criminal trial did not bind the Board.
The court cited no authority on the double jeopardy point and
entered into no extended discussion, but the decision is in accord
with the leading case of Helvering v. Mitchell,"2 as well as what has
been called the modern tendency."3 In the Helvering case Mitchell
was prosecuted for a felony for willfully attempting to evade an
income tax. He was acquitted. The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue found that he had made a fraudulent deduction and also
had fraudulently failed to return certain income, found a deficiency
1Freeman

v. Board of Alcoholic Control, 264 N.C. 320, 141 S.E.2d

499 (1965).
8 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
" Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 634, 639 (1955). This note collects and discusses numerous cases holding that a defendant's former acquittal or conviction of a criminal charge does not bar a civil action for a statutory
penalty for the same conduct. A lesser number of cases previous to 1938,
the date of the Helvering decision, are cited for the opposite view.

1966]

SURVEY OF NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW

897

of 728,709.84 dollars, and pursuant to statute, added fifty per cent
because of the fraud. The deduction and the failure to return above
mentioned had been the basis for the criminal prosecution. The
United States Supreme Court held that Mitchell's acquittal in the
criminal prosecution did not by the doctrine of res judicata bar the
fifty per cent addition for fraud, since the burden of proof in civil
and criminal cases is different. The acquittal was merely an adjudication that there was not proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Acquittal on a criminal charge is not a bar to a civil action by the
government remedial in nature. The United States Supreme Court
further held that double jeopardy did not preclude the fraud addition since the latter was not designed as punishment but as a safeguard for the protection of the revenue and to reimburse the government for the expense of investigation and the loss resulting from
the taxpayer's fraud and is therefore remedial. The Court also
pointed to the civil nature of the procedure for the collection of the
additional fifty per cent and listed many rules and guaranties governing trial of criminal prosecutions which do not apply where
civil procedure is prescribed.

CIVIL PROCEDURE (PLEADING AND
PARTIES)
Henry Brandis, Jr.*
VERIFICATION

In Sisk v. Perkins'- the Court, quoting from an earlier case,'
reiterated the rule that, except when verification is made an essential
part of the pleading, the requirement of G.S. § 1-144 (that all
pleadings subsequent to a verified pleading must also be verified)
may be waived. In both cases failure to verify an amendment to
the answer was involved. In the earlier case plaintiff's attorney did
not raise the question until after the filing of an adverse referee's
report-at which time a request by defendant's counsel to be allowed
* Graham Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill.
'264 N.C. 43, 140 S.E.2d 753 (1965).
Calaway v. Harris, 229 N.C. 117, 47 S.E.2d 796 (1948).
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to have the amendment verified was denied. In Sisk the attorney
for an additional defendant moved to strike an amendment to the
original defendant's answer, pleading as res judicata the judgment
in another action between the two. This motion, not based upon
lack of verification, was denied. A subsequent, but undated, motion
to strike was based upon lack of verification. The Supreme Court,
in the preliminary statement of facts and in the opinion, assumed
that this second motion was not passed upon by the court below
and that the moving attorney made no effort to secure a ruling on
it. This assumption was erroneous, as, after the jury was impaneled
but before the actual trial began, it was denied.8 At the same time
the judge ruled that the prior judgment was not res judicata and
that the amendment pleading it could not be read to the jury. He
refused to receive it in evidence. Since these latter rulings produced a result identical to that which would have been produced by
granting the motion to strike, and since the additional defendant
won at the trial, it is understandable why he did not appeal.
The Supreme Court held that the prior judgment was res judicata and should have been admitted in evidence. Since it believed
that lack of verification had been raised only by a motion that a
non-appealing party had never brought to decision below, the Court
said that the merits of the motion to strike were not before it.
Nevertheless, the inference is clear that the Court believed that lack
of verification had been waived.
Had the Court realized that the motion had been denied below,
the absence of a cross-appeal might have been regarded as determinative. However, since the Court was inadvertent to that decision,
the waiver must be found either in (a) failure to move to strike
for lack of verification until after or during the trial;4 or (b)
failure to bring the motion to timely decision, even if timely made;
or (c) failure to include this objection as a ground for the first
motion to strike; or (d) some combination of these. Of the first
three, only (c) is sustained by the record, but the case may not be
read as finding that alone to be a waiver. Yet a decision to that
effect would make good sense. To the extent that a pleading in'Record on Appeal, p. 40; Sisk v. Perkins, 264 N.C. 43, 140 S.E.2d 753
(1965).
' The Court points out that the second motion to strike was undated, and
since the Court failed to realize that it was decided immediately before the
actual trial began, it might have assumed that the motion came later.
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corporates the record in a prior action, a-verification adds little, if
anything, to its probable veracity, and the absence of verification
is more exclusively a technicality than it might be in some other
situations. Therefore, a motion to strike on some other ground
might well be regarded as a waiver of this objection.
PLEADING SPECIFIC MATTERS

Mistake
The Court held that a demurrer should not be sustained to that
part of an answer seeking reformation for mutual mistake when
the allegations sufficiently show (a) the terms of an oral agreement
between the parties; (b) a subsequent written agreement intended
by the parties to incorporate the oral agreement, but in fact differing from it; and (c) their mutual but mistaken belief that the writing incorporated the oral agreement.' It is not necessary to allege
how and why the mistake occurred. While couched in terms of
necessary allegations, the same decision would seem to follow as to
the proof required. Hence, in essence, the case involves substantive
law rather than merely pleading. However, whether regarded as
substantive or procedural, the decision seems clearly sound.
Mutual Agreement
In Dixon v. Bank of Washington' the issue was whether plaintiff could recover the reasonable value of services rendered to a
decedent more than three years prior to his death. This, in turn,
depended upon whether the decedent had agreed to compensate plaintiff by will, as, though the contract would be void under the Statute
of Frauds, the statute of limitations would not have begun to run
until decedent's death. The complaint alleged that plaintiff's services
were rendered "upon the understanding" that the decedent would
compensate plaintiff by will. It was held that, in context, this was
a sufficient allegation of mutual understanding or agreement; and,
since the evidence of mutual agreement was sufficient to justify a
finding for plaintiff, the judgment in her favor in the court below
was affirmed. The decision is a good one.7
'Matthews v. Shamrock Van Lines, Inc., 264 N.C. 722, 142 S.E.2d 665
(1965).
6265 N.C. 322, 144 S.E.2d 57 (1965).
7 Cf. Grossman v. Schenker, 206 N.Y. 466, 100 N.E. 39 (1912),
where
the court accepted, as a sufficient allegation of consideration on plaintiff's
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Negligence and Proximate Cause
The Court again made it clear that the pleader must allege facts
which, if proved, will justify findings of negligence and proximate
cause, that the conclusions need not be alleged, and that when alleged
they are to be disregarded.'
Fraud
It was also again made clear that there must be factual allegations which would justify a finding of fraud, a mere charge of
fraud being insufficient.9
INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE
In the last-mentioned case it was also held that when, in an action for alimony without divorce, a prior separation agreement was
attached to the answer and incorporated by reference, it was proper
to make the agreement the basis for judgment on the pleadings for
defendant, since the exhibit was part of the pleadings for this purpose.
It has repeatedly been held that when recovery is predicated
upon the terms of a contract, the terms may be alleged by attaching the contract and incorporating it by reference.'" Obviously the
same rule should apply to pleading a contract in bar of recovery.
Indeed, there is no reason why any document, so attached and incorporated, should not be treated as an integral part of the pleading.
However, it should be recalled that, because the Court refuses to
allow the allegations of one cause of action to be incorporated by
reference into another part of the same pleading," the Court has
held that allegations from a pleading in another suit may not be
repleaded by attachment and incorporation.'
Presumably this does
part, an allegation that it was "mutually agreed" that defendant would pay
plaintiff $500 for certain work, despite the absence of an express allegation
that plaintiff agreed to perform the work (which, in fact, he never performed, because defendant refused to allow him to do so).
' Dixie Fire & Cas. Co. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 265 N.C. 121, 143
S.E.2d 279 (1965).
'Van Every v. Van Every, 265 N.C. 506, 144 S.E.2d 603 (1965). Such
factual allegations as were present were regarded as insufficient to justify
a finding of fraud.
"oCharlotte City Coach Lines, Inc. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen,
254 N.C. 60, 118 S.E.2d 37 (1961); Moore v. W 0 O W, Inc., 253 N.C. 1,
116 S.E.2d 186 (1960); Sherrill v. Western Union Tel. Co., 109 N.C. 527,
14 S.E.
94 (1891).
"1N.C. Sup. CT. (Civ.) R. 20(2).
" Hill v. Hill Spinning Co., 244 N.C. 554, 94 S.E.2d 677 (1956).
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not prohibit attachment and incorporation in support of a defense
of res judicata or prior action pending.'3 This latter, of course, is
the common and accepted practice.
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST

In Shambley v. Jobe-Elackley Plumbing & Heating Co.' 4 insureds brought action against the wrongdoer for damages that had
been paid in full by their insurer. By subrogation the insurer had
become the sole real party in interest. It was held that the lower
court was without power to allow the insurer to be made an additional party and to adopt the complaint, since, in effect, this would
be a substitution of parties and would introduce a new and independent cause of action. Concededly this result is supported by
the cases on which the opinion relies,' 5 but there are other North
Carolina cases in which, through some beautifully sensible aberration, a contrary result was reached. Thus, where a partially subrogated insurer attempted to sue alone, though the insured was the
real party in interest, the Court upheld the lower court's authority
to add insured as a party, saying:
As a general rule the trial court has the discretionary power to
make new parties, especially when necessary in order that there
may be a full and final determination and adjudication of all
matters involved in the controversy. G.S., sec. 1-73, 163 ...
That the plaintiff alone, without the joinder of the owner, is
not entitled to maintain the action does not alter the rule or limit
the discretionary power of the judge.' 6
It may be argued that, despite the breadth of the quoted language, this case is not in conflict because the original plaintiff was
entitled to part of the fruits of the action and hence was a proper
party. However, where a rental agent sued to collect rent and it
was held that the landlord was the sole real party in interest, the
lower court brought in the landlord and the Supreme Court ap1" Cf. Sale v. Johnson, 258 N.C. 749, 129 S.E.2d 465 (1963), relied upon
by the Court in the Van Every case.
1,264 N.C. 456, 142 S.E.2d 18 (1965).
' Graves v. Welborn, 260 N.C. 688, 133 S.E.2d 761
(1963); Orkin
Exterminating Co. v. O'Hanlon, 243 N.C. 457, 91 S.E.2d 222 (1965);
Bailey v. McPherson, 233 N.C. 231, 63 S.E.2d 559 (1951).
1" Service Fire Ins. Co. v. Horton Motor Lines, Inc., 225 N.C. 588, 590,
35 S.E.2d 879, 880 (1945).
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proved, saying simply that the court has power to make additional
parties plaintiff or defendant."
In both cases it was recognized that the statute of limitations
would run against the new party until he became such, but that
involves a question quite distinct from the question of power to
add a party. This writer believes that, at least where the original
plaintiff had some rational connection with the events in litigation,
those cases sustaining the power are completely sound and that the
more restrictive cases represent an unfortunately technical judicial
policy not required by-and, indeed, virtually in defiance of-the
controlling statutes.18
In another case involving subrogation,'0 the answer pleaded that
plaintiff had been fully compensated by insurance and, therefore,
was not the real party in interest. Contending that this was factually incorrect, plaintiff's attorney moved to strike the defense. The
Court held that denial of the motion was proper, since it was the
equivalent of a speaking demurrer; that the factual issue, upon motion and in the lower court's discretion, could have been determined
prior to trial or, in the absence of such procedure, would present a
jury question. Probably the case should not be interpreted as meaning that the lower court could, in advance of trial, make findings
upon conflicting evidence as to whether plaintiff had been fully
compensated, dismissing the case if it found for defendant or eliminating the defense if it found for plaintiff. Wherever resolution
of a real party in interest question turns upon a factual dispute,
there would seem to be an issue for the jury.
In First Union Nat'l Bank v. Hackney," a case of first impression in North Carolina, a wife died from injuries received in a car
crash allegedly caused by her husband's negligence. The husband
"' Home Real Estate, Loan & Ins. Co. v. Locker, 214 N.C. 1, 197 S.E.2d
555 (1938). The Court relied on C.S. § 547, which is now N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-163 (1953).
"8"[W]hen a complete determination of the controversy cannot be made
without the presence of other parties, the court must cause them to be
brought in." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-73 (1953). "The judge or court may
amend any pleading, process or proceeding, by adding or striking out
the name of any party. . . ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-163 (1953). The prohibition in the latter statute against an amendment changing substantially a
claim
or defense is confined to amendments conforming to the proof.
1
University Motors, Inc. v. Durham Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 266 N.C.
251, 146 S.E.2d 102 (1966).
2 266 N.C. 17, 145 S.E.2d 352 (1965), 44 N.C.L. REv. 1169 (1966).
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survived her only a short time. The wife's administrator sued the
husband's executor for wrongful death. Four minor children of
the marriage would take any proceeds of the wrongful death action,2 1 and they were also the sole beneficiaries of the husband's
estate. It was held that, despite loose expressions in prior opinions
to the contrary, the children were not the statutory real parties in
interest in the wrongful death action ;2 that, in the absence of a
showing that the husband had no insurance, it was not a litigation
between the same parties on both sides; and, that, the underlying
reasons for the policy being absent, the action was not barred by
the judicial policy against allowing an unemancipated minor child
to recover against a parent for negligence. The opinion contains an
extensive, enlightening review of cases from other jurisdictions.
While in part couched in terms of real party in interest, it is clear
that the basic issue here is whether enforceable rights will be recognized as a matter of policy-not whether concededly enforceable
rights are enforceable by A or by B.
Other cases held that (a) under the circumstances presented it
was not reversible error to include medical expenses in a recovery
by an unemancipated minor child whose next friend was his
father ;23 and (b) where an insured changed the beneficiary under
his life policy from his wife to his "executors, administrators or
assigns," and the wife, as executrix, sued for the proceeds, she
would not, thereafter, be allowed to sue in her individual capacity
for the proceeds, attacking the change of beneficiary on the ground
that insured lacked mental capacity to make it.24
21 Recovery would be reduced by any share otherwise going to the husband as a survivor, because of his negligence.
2" There has never been any doubt about the fact that N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 28-173 (Supp. 1965) vests the wrongful death action in the decedent's
personal representative, and such representative is the sole real party in
interest in the sense of having the exclusive right to bring the action. Prior
opinions describing the beneficiaries as the real parties in interest meant
only that they are entitled to the fruits of the action-which may, indeed,
have meaningful consequences, as in connection with the husband's share
recovery in the principal case.
of any
2
Richardson v. Rockingham R.R., 264 N.C. 367, 141 S.E.2d 619 (1965).
2" Moore v. New York Life Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 440, 146 S.E.2d 492 (1966).
In this case the executrix successfully attacked the beneficiary's surrender
of the policy for its cash value, without attacking the change of beneficiary,
made one day earlier. For a discussion of the insurance aspects of the case,
see Dameron, Insurance, North Carolinaz Case Law, 44 N.C.L. R51. 1022
(1966).
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AMENDMENT 25

It was held that the denial of a motion for leave to amend is
not res judicata and the party may move again for such leave.20
More precisely, what seems to be involved is the law of the case,
rather than res judicata 2I Even so, and particularly considering
the mandatory peregrinations of our superior court judges, one
wonders at what point, if ever, it becomes legally impermissible to
re-proffer the same amendment. Perhaps the three-strike rule could
be borrowed from baseball, though the turn at bat should not be
prolonged by a foul ball on the third strike.
SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

In Crew v. Thompson s it was held that, to the extent the allegations of a supplemental complaint are in conflict with those of the
original complaint, the latter are superseded (just as if replaced by
an amendment). This, of course, is good common sense as well as
good law.
ELECTION OF REMEDIES

In one case the lower court granted a motion to require plaintiff
to elect between tort and contract theories of recovery."9 The Su5 See Shambley v. Jobe-Blackley Plumbing & Heating Co., 264 N.C.
456, 142 S.E.2d 18 (1965), discussed in text accompanying notes 14-18
supra.
8
" Dixie Fire & Cas. Co. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 265 N.C. 121, 130,
143 S.E.2d 279, 286 (1965). The matter is disposed of in a short paragraph,

citing and quoting Overton v. Overton, 260 N.C. 139, 132 S.E.2d 349 (1963),
which is almost equally succinct: "[R]es judicata does not apply to ordinary
motions incident to the progress of the trial." Overton, in turn, is based
upon Revis v. Ramsey, 202 N.C. 815, 164 S.E. 358 (1932), where the
amendment sought and allowed differed to some extent from the earlier
amendment sought and denied. The Overton opinion also states that the
ruling on a motion to amend is "not necessarily" res judicata.
.,Cf. Guilford Realty & Ins. Co. v. Blythe Bros., 266 N.C. 229, 145
S.E.2d 838 (1966) (prior rulings striking a defense and overruling a demurrer referred to as law of the case); Perfecting Serv. Co. v. Product
Dev. & Sales Co., 264 N.C. 79, 140 S.E.2d 763 (1965) (same as to prior
ruling on demurrer to a counterclaim). See also Dixie Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Esso Standard Oil Co., 265 N.C. 121, 143 S.E.2d 279 (1965), where the
Court refrained from ruling on the power of a superior court judge to
sustain a demurrer after it had been overruled by another judge.
"266 N.C. 476, 146 S.E.2d 471 (1966).
"Dixie Fire & Cas. Co. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 265 N.C. 121, 143
S.E.2d 279 (1965). Since the judge thereupon denied plaintiff's motion to
amend the elaborate the tort theory, it seems that he was not overly sympathetic to plaintiff's case.
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preme Court carefully pointed out that the propriety of this ruling
was not before it, and it expressed no opinion on the matter. Since
the Court does at times express an opinion on matters not technically before it, one could wish that the Court here had indicated its
strong disapproval. The granting of such a motion seems little
more than an anachronistic resurrection of common-law procedure,
now supposedly buried for practically a century.
COMMINGLING CAUSES

°

OF ACTION

In Monroe v. Dietenhoffer the Court followed its more recent
rule that where several causes of action are not separately stated, a
demurrer on this ground must be sustained, as the causes are "improperly united" (the opinion using the quotation marks). This is
expressly made a ground of demurrer by G.S. § 1-127, but, properly interpreted, the statute would seem to apply only where joinder
is improper whether or not the causes are separately stated. Failure
to state separately causes otherwise properly joined should be treated
merely as a matter of form, open to attack only by motion to make
more definite and certain. 31 However, our rule now seems definitely
to be settled to the contrary.
There is no practical difference between granting a motion to
make more definite and certain and sustaining a demurrer if plaintiff is allowed to amend after the demurrer is sustained. However,
as the Monroe opinion indicates, sustaining the demurrer relegates
the plaintiff to moving for leave to amend under G.S. § 1-131, and
the granting or denying of the motion is discretionary. While, in
this writer's view, refusal to grant leave to amend in this situation
should ordinarily be regarded as abuse of discretion, nothing indicates that it would be such in the eyes of the Supreme Court; and
even if it were, an appeal would be required. Conceding that commingling causes of action is professionally sloppy, it still seems questionable to convert a sloppy defect of form into a potentially fatal
error of substance. In the present state of the rule, any attorney
faced by a demurrer on this ground should rush to file an amended
complaint within five days after the demurrer is filed and before
decision on it. Under G.S. § 1-129, though the language is none
8o264 N.C. 538, 142 S.E.2d 135 (1965).
8 See 1 McINTOsH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1168
(2d ed. 1956).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

too clear, such an amendment seems to be a matter of right rather
than of discretion. s2
DEFENSES

Statute of Limitations
3 3 plaintiff sought to recover
In Jewell v. Price
against a contractor for destruction of a house by fire allegedly caused by improper installation of the furnace. The action was begun less than
three years after the fire, but more than three years after delivery
of the house for plaintiff's occupancy. The Court held that, whether
the action be considered as for negligence or for breach of contract, it accrued on the date of delivery and was properly nonsuited
because barred by the statute of limitations.
As to the negligence theory the Court's reasoning was (a) when
there is a tortious invasion of a right justifying recovery of even
nominal damages, the statute then begins to run; (b) nominal damages may be recovered in a negligence action; and (c) it is unimportant that "the actual or the substantial" damage does not occur
until later if the whole injury results from the original tortious
act. Unfortunately, this reasoning is in one respect defective.
Actual damage is a necessary element of a cause of action for negligence. 34 The cases cited by the Court for the proposition that
nominal damages may be recovered in negligence actions3 5 do not
mean that proof of negligence, without proof of consequent actual
damage, will justify recovery. They mean that when actual damage
is proved, but there is no proof of monetary amount (as where the
evidence clearly shows plaintiff's car was damaged, but there is no
proof of dollar amount), nominal damages may be recovered.
Thus, however tough on plaintiffs it is, it might be legally permissible to say that if actual damage, however slight, had occurred
at the time of delivery (a factual question), the cause of action
accrued at that time, despite failure to discover the damage until
later, and even though no substantial damage occurred until later.
The Court might possibly have assumed from the evidence in the
See Upchurch v. City of Raleigh, 252 N.C. 676, 114 S.E.2d 772 (1960).
264 N.C. 459, 142 S.E.2d 1 (1965). The case also holds, conventionally, that, while the legislature may extend the time on a cause not yet
barred, it may not revive one already barred.
See PROSSER, TORTS, § 30 (3d ed. 1964).
, Clark v. Emerson, 245 N.C. 387, 95 S.E.2d 880 (1957); Lieb v. Mayer,
244 N.C. 613, 94 S.E.2d 658 (1956).
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principal case that some actual damage did exist at the time of
delivery. But, since no cause of action for negligence can exist
until there is actual damage, the Court is manifestly in error in
stating that the cause may accrue even though actual damage does
not occur until later. 38
In Fulp v. Fulp 7 plaintiff had contributed to the cost of improvements on land owned by her husband in return for his oral
promise to convey her a half interest. In 1952, after completion
of the improvements, he repudiated his promise. In 1959, after
they had separated, she sued him. The Court held (a) there was no
resulting or constructive trust, since no title was acquired with
plaintiff's funds, and hence the ten-year statute did not apply; (b)
plaintiff could recover on the theory of money had and received
and, because of the confidential relationship, she acquired an equitable lien; (c) the confidential relationship did not preclude or suspend the running of the statute of limitations; and (d) the threeyear statute applied and the action was so clearly barred that nonsuit
was affirmed.
The opinion concedes that refusal to allow the marital relationship to affect the running of the statute is a minority view and that
the precise point was one of first impression in North Carolina, as
the earlier authority s dealt with a note of the husband acquired
by the wife after the statute had begun to run.
In Bennett v. Anson Bank & Trust Co."9 it was alleged that
plaintiff's intestate died in 1936. He and his brother had been in
partnership. The brother died in 1944 without ever accounting
for the partnership assets, and the brother's widow (also his
executrix and sole beneficiary) died in 1963, without having so
accounted. The action was then brought by the intestate's "reappointed administratrix" and heirs against the estates of the brother
and his widow, demanding an accounting and impression of a trust,
alleging that the brother had diverted partnership assets to himself
and his wife and that both he and his widow had misrepresented
"Probably a more accurate statement would not have changed the result of the principal case. The evidence tended to show that, at the latest,
some actual damage occurred to the house and its furnishings at a time
several weeks after delivery, but still slightly more than three years prior
to the commencement of the action.
"264 N.C. 20, 140 S.E.2d 708 (1965), 44 N.C.L. REv. 197 & 202 (1965).
"Graves v. Howard, 159 N.C. 594, 75 S.E. 998 (1912).
" 265 N.C. 148, 143 S.E.2d 312 (1965).
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the situation to conceal such diversion and had induced plaintiffs
to believe that an accounting would be futile. The Court, recognizing that the intestate's administratrix could have demanded an accounting in 1936, held that if the jury believed plaintiffs' version
of the facts, the action would not be barred by the statute because,
under the circumstances, plaintiffs could bring their action within
three years after they discovered, or ought to have discovered, the
fraud of the brother and his widow. The confidential relationship
could be an excuse for failure to discover it.
The Fulp and Bennett cases are not in conflict. While a confidential relationship existed in both (and the Fulp opinion recognizes
that the marital relation is the most confidential of all relationships), in Fulp, even if it be assumed that there was fraud on the
part of the husband, it was discovered (not merely discoverable)
in 1952 when, by plaintiff's own testimony, he repudiated his promise. The issue there was whether the relationship prevented the
running of the statute on a cause of action clearly accrued. In Bennett the issue was whether the relationship delayed the accrual of
the cause.
In another unusual case40 the complaint alleged that plaintiff had
advanced money to decedent during her life in return for a promise
to repay during life or by will; that, not having repaid during life,
she left a will devising to plaintiff realty of sufficient value to repay
him; that the will had been offered for probate but its validity was
contested by the heirs; that plaintiff had filed his claim with defendant administrator, who denied it; and that the clerk had ordered
defendant to suspend further proceedings in relation to the estate
until the will controversy was concluded. On demurrer the court
below dismissed the action on the ground that the cause had not
yet accrued, noting that the dismissal was without prejudice to a
new suit if plaintiff eventually lost in the will contest. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that G.S. § 28-112 required plaintiff to
bring action within three months after denial of his claim by the
administrator, that the running of the statute was not suspended
by any of the above described events, and that not allowing the suit
at this time might eventually cause plaintiff to lose his claim entirely. The result was not changed by the fact that, pending the
appeal, the clerk had ordered the will probated, since a caveat re-

" Hargrave v. Gardner, 264 N.C. 117, 141 S.E.2d 36 (1965).
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mained to be tried. (The Court pointed out that it might be inappropriate to bring the case to trial prior to final determination on
the caveat).
Finally, with reference to the statute of limitations, in Security
Nat'l Bank v. Educators Mut. Life Ins. Co.4 an issue was whether
the three-year or ten-year statute applied, and the answer depended
upon whether a seal had been adopted. Both the referee and the
superior court concluded that the contract was under seal (a matter
on which plaintiff had the burden of proof), but neither made findings of fact with respect to that issue. The Supreme Court remanded, stating that the lower court could make the findings or send
the case along to the referee for such purpose.
Release or Settlement
Prior settlement is not available as a defense unless pleaded.4 2
Payment
In two cases the Court reiterated the rule that payment is an
affirmative defense upon which defendant has the burdens of pleading and proof. In the first4 3 the rule was applied in a county's
action to foreclose a property tax lien, thus indicating that our
Court draws no distinction between a simple action on the debt and
an action to enforce a lien predicated upon the debt. In the second
case44 the rule was invoked to reverse a nonsuit apparently based
upon defendant's evidence of payment.45
Facts Peculiarly Within Party's Knowledge
Where defendant was being sued for loss of and damage to
goods stored in its warehouse, and defendant had also packed and
carried the goods to the warehouse, and plaintiff's evidence showed
loss and damage while the goods were in defendant's exclusive
possession, the burden was on defendant, if it relied on such a
"-265 N.C. 86, 143 S.E.2d 270 (1965).

"Bongardt v. Frink, 265 N.C. 130, 143 S.E.2d 286 (1965). For further
discussion in this case, see text accompanying notes 92-95 infra.
"Iredell County v. Gray, 265 N.C. 542, 144 S.E.2d 600 (1965).
"Lett v. Markham, 266 N.C. 318, 145 S.E.2d 907 (1966).
"Such facts as are recited indicate that the judge might properly have
charged that if the jury believed the defendant's evidence, it should find for
defendant.
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defense, to show loss and damage prior to the beginning of storage.

46

Defenses of Insurers
While reiterating that filing of proof of loss is a condition
precedent, the Court held that the defense of failure to file such
proof as required by the policy was waived where, though the answer denied that proper proof was filed, the course of the trial
demonstrated that whether insured's death was accidental was the
only issue litigated, defendant insurer not having tendered any issue
or requested any instructions regarding proof of loss.4 1
Three cases involved defenses under motor vehicle liability policies. In one,48 plaintiff, having recovered against the insured, was
seeking to collect from the insurer. Insurer contended that insured
had neither given proper notice nor cooperated as required by the
policy. (For reasons in controversy, insured did not attend the trial
in the action against him.) 49 The court below submitted a single
issue whether, by defending the case, insurer waived these two
potential defenses. The Court held this to be error since, particularly in the light of the charge, no proper account was taken of the
difference in the conduct required to waive the two. Judgment for
plaintiff was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial involving a new look at whether insured's absence was justified and, if it
"Jordan v. Eastern Transit & Storage Co., Inc., 266 N.C. 156, 146
S.E.2d 43 (1966). The case also involved an ineffectual attempt by the
warehouseman to limit liability by the fine print in the contract.
" Horn v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 265 N.C. 157, 143 S.E.2d 70 (1965).
(Nonsuit was ordered for failure of plaintiff to prove that death was accidental.) Though it is not clear, it seems possible if not probable that
defendant had denied liability on the merits during the time allowed for
filing proof of loss; and this would clearly be a waiver, standing alone.
Dameron, Insurance,North CarolinaCase Law, 44 N.C.L. REv. 1022 (1966).
In Gorham v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 214 N.C. 526, 200 S.E. 5 (1938),
the majority opinion may imply that the mere filing of answer denying
liability on the merits waives failure to file proof of loss, pleaded as a
defense in the same answer; but this could hardly be sound. The Horn
opinion clearly does not go that far. Cf. Fleming v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 261 N.C. 303, 134 S.E.2d 614 (1964).
"' Connor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 265 N.C. 188, 143 S.E.2d
98 (1965). As pointed out by the Court, interpretation of the policy depended upon Virginia law, but since no Virginia authority was cited on the
critical question involved, it may be assumed that the case is a valid precedent for future North Carolina cases.
'°His driver likewise failed to attend, it appearing that, for reasons
unspecified, she was incarcerated at Goochland, which, upon neither knowledge nor information, the writer assumes to be in Virginia.
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did constitute failure to cooperate, whether insurer's continuation of
the defense constituted a waiver.
In the second case50 it was held that an insurer's undertaking to
defend an action against the insured, but notifying insured and
another interested insurer that it reserved all of its defenses and
rights, including its prior denial of coverage, did not waive the
latter by conducting the defense. Of course, if this is true of denial
of coverage, it would seem to follow that it is true of other defenses also. 1
In the third case52 plaintiff proved defendant's issuance of a
policy to insured, injury to plaintiff within the stated terms of the
policy, recovery of judgment against insured, and return of execution unsatisfied. Defendant's evidence proved cancellation of the
policy prior to plaintiff's injury, and there was no rebuttal evidence
as to this. The lower court nonsuited the case. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that it was improper to nonsuit on the defense
of cancellation, on which defendant had the burden of proof, when
it was not shown by plaintiff's evidence. The value of this appellate
victory to plaintiff must be somewhat discounted since, on a new
trial with the same evidence, the only charge to the jury should be,
"If you believe all the evidence, you must find for the defendant."
In view of the convincing nature of defendant's evidence of cancellation, if the jury nevertheless found for plaintiff, the verdict should
be set aside.
Contributory Negligence

When there is evidence that the driver of plaintiff's vehicle was
on his own personal mission, G.S. § 20-71.1 (ownership as prima
" Jamestown Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 430,
146 S.E.2d 410 (1966). Actually the status of the "defenses" was involved
in an action for a declaratory judgment.
" In the Conner case, note 48 supra, insurer and insured agreed in writing that insurer might investigate, negotiate, settle, deny or defend any
claim without waiver; and thereafter insurer employed counsel to defend.
The Court said that this was not a waiver of any prior failure of insured
(presumably applying to failure to give proper notice). However, as the
discussion in the text indicates, this did not preclude consideration of whether
insurer's subsequent conduct of the defense constituted waiver. The reason
is found in the Court's statement that when an insurer undertakes to defend
it must do so diligently and in good faith and if it fails in this, insured's
prior failure to give proper notice becomes immaterial.
.2 Griffin v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 265 N.C. 443, 144 S.E.2d 201

(1965).
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facie evidence of agency) merely gets the agency issue to the jury
and does not justify a nonsuit on the ground of contributory negligence, even if the driver's negligence be conceded, defendant having
the burden of proof on that issue. 3
Defendant Acting Under Contract With City
In an action for damages caused by defendant's use of explosives
in constructing a sewer outfall line, defendant properly pleaded as
in affirmative defense that it was acting under a contract with a
city and as directed by the city, but upon defendant's failure to
offer evidence in support, it did not become an issue for the jury. 4
Defenses in Divorce Actions
In Hinkle v. Hinkle5 5 the husband first sued in superior court
for divorce from bed and board and custody of the children. The
parties entered into a separation agreement, embracing a property
settlement and award of custody to the wife. It was intended that
the divorce action, in which no orders had been entered, be nonsuited, but this was not done. Thereafter the husband sued in the
same superior court for absolute divorce, alleging that custody of
the children was not involved. The answer denied this allegation
and asked for an award of custody to the wife. Thereupon plaintiff
moved that custody be awarded to him. After hearing, plaintiff's
motion was granted. Defendant then attacked the order on the
ground of prior action pending. The Court, after pointing out that
the wife first introduced the custody question into the second suit
and did not object until after losing on the merits, held that the
matter was a mere technicality and would be disregarded, particularly since both actions were in the same superior court.50
" Moore v. Crocker, 264 N.C. 233, 141 S.E.2d 307 (1965). This, of
course, reflects the same basic rule as to the effect of the statute as is
applied when plaintiff is relying on it to prove agency of defendant's driver.
"Guilford Realty & Ins. Co. v. Blythe Bros. Co., 266 N.C. 229, 145
S.E.2d 838 (1966).
266 N.C. 189, 146 S.E.2d 73 (1966).
The Court said that if the first action had been in another county and
the court there had ruled on custody, a different question would be presented, citing Blankenship v. Blankenship, 256 N.C. 638, 124 S.E.2d 857
(1962), where both factors were present (though the award of custody in
the prior action was temporary) and it was held that jurisdiction over
custody was still in the first court. It is apparent that four factors present
in the Hinkle case might possibly be regarded as contributing to the result:
(a) the intention of the parties to nonsuit the first action; (b) estoppel or
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In O'Brien v. O'Brienlr the parties entered into a separation
agreement and thereafter the wife brought action for alimony without divorce. More than two years after the separation agreement,
the husband sued for absolute divorce. In the latter action it was
held (a) since there was no attack on the separation agreement,
any misconduct of plaintiff prior thereto could not be a defense;
and (b) since, not having been pleaded, they could not constitute
defenses, the lower court properly excluded from evidence (1) contempt orders entered in the alimony without divorce action and
(2) a judgment obtained by the wife in a third action for child
support under the separation agreement.
NECESSARY PARTIES

Where one partner solicited plaintiff to purchase the other partner's interest, but did not participate in the negotiations, he was
not a necessary party to the vendor-partner's action for breach of
the sale contract.58 And in a pupil assignment case, when the school
unit to which assignment was being sought had indicated in writing
its willingness to accept the child, it was not a necessary party. 59
JOINDER OF CAUSES AND PARTIES

In two cases misjoinder of causes and parties was found, in
both because the Court held that all causes did not affect all parties.
The first60 involved an action by members of a church (a) to enjoin
the minister from serving as such; and (b) to have plaintiffs, as
distinguished from defendant members, declared to be the true and
rightful congregation, exclusively entitled to run the affairs of the
church and to enjoin the defendant members from holding themwaiver; (c) a single court involved; and (d) no award of custody entered
in the first action. However, the explicit reference to Blankenship, which
makes it a matter of jurisdiction over the subject matter (which cannot
be conferred by consent), makes it reasonably clear that the Court would not
regard (a) or (b) or both combined as sufficient to justify the result.
Further, if the question is one of jurisdiction and not of res judicata, then
(d) would not seem to be controlling, because if exclusive jurisdiction is
in the other court, whether or not it has entered an order would seem to be
unimportant. By this analysis, the most important factor is the identity of
the court. And, even if the county is the same, would there be a different
result if the courts were different?
"266 N.C. 502, 146 S.E.2d 500 (1966).
:'Vernon v. Reheis, 266 N.C. 351, 145 S.E.2d 914 (1966).
'it re Varner, 266 N.C. 409, 146 S.E.2d 401 (1966).
SoEastern Conference of Free Will Baptists v. Piner, 264 N.C. 67, 140
S.E.2d 721 (1965).
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selves out as the congregation. The result is consistent with prior
North Carolina authority, though there is a most plausible argument
to be made, particularly since equitable relief is sought, that the
complaint presents a connected story encompassing but a single
cause of action.
In the second case"' plaintiff alleged that decedent died owing
him money; that after decedent's death, and before her qualification as executrix, decedent's widow continued to operate his sole
proprietorship and made payments to other creditors which, the
estate being insolvent, constituted unwarranted preferential payments; that she also opened a special bank account in the name of
decedent's business and made unauthorized payments from it; and
that a bank honored unauthorized checks on decedent's account after
his death and on the special account. The suit was against the
widow, individually and as executrix, and the bank, the prayer for
relief seeking joint and several judgment against them. The Court
reasoned that the facts alleged did not show joint and several liability and that there were separate and distinct causes against the widow
individually and the bank. No prior North Carolina case was cited
-and this writer knows of none-so similar on its facts as to
require the result reached. In essence the case involved an attempt
by a creditor to secure a meaningful judgment against an estate,
the claims against the bank and the widow individually being ancillary to that basic purpose. Had the Court so construed it, the approach to joinder reflected in some earlier estate litigation cases
(though none is precisely in point) would certainly have justified
sustaining the joinder. 2
ALTERNATIVE JOINDER

Conger v. Travelers Ins. Co., in its earlier version,0 3 sustaining
alternative joinder of parties, was the subject of a student note in
this Review.' A further footnote may now be added. Its second
journey to the Supreme Courte 5 reflects the fact that plaintiff lost
on both alternatives-on one in the court below and on the other in
the Supreme Court.
Monroe v. Dietenhoffer, 264 N.C. 538, 142 S.E.2d 135 (1965).
See Brandis, Permissive Joinder of Parties and Causes in North Carolina, 25 N.C.L. REv. 1, 22 (1945).
260 N.C. 112, 131 S.E.2d 889 (1963).
8442 N.C.L. REv. 242 (1963).
266 N.C. 496, 146 S.E.2d 462 (1966).
61
0
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CROSS-CLAIMS (INCLUDING THIRD PARTY PRACTICE)

The Court reiterated previously announced rules to the effect
that (a) while, when plaintiff sues two defendants as joint tortfeasors, one may not cross-claim against the other for contribution,
when plaintiff sues only one, the one may bring in the other as an
additional defendant and make such a cross-claim ;66 (b) an original
defendant may not cross-claim against another original defendant
or an additional defendant for indemnity based on a contract between them;67 (c) an original defendant may cross-claim against
another original defendant or an additional defendant for indemnity
8
based upon primary-secondary liability arising by operation of law.1
This writer has, ad nauseam, huffed and puffed against the restrictive aspects of these rules as overly technical, illogical, unrealistic,
not required by statute, and in defiance of more modern and efficient
notions now well accepted in many other jurisdictions, most notably
in the federal courts. Since the huffing and puffing began, the rules
have become more and not less restrictive.6" Foolish as the writer is,
he yet does not believe that one more huff or puff will have any
effect. And for lawyers there is, quite literally, a silver lining.
Whatever the cost in litigation fragmented, public money wasted
and judicial manpower squandered, the rules of the game as so
intricately and exquisitely played in North Carolina contribute substantially to the economic welfare of the legal profession.
Other cases in the cross-claim area held: (a) Since an original
defendant may bring in an additional defendant only if plaintiff
could have sued the additional defendant, when the accident took
place in a state in which the wife may not sue her husband for
negligent injury, the original defendant in an action in North Caro"aWise v. Vincent, 265 N.C. 647, 146 S.E.2d 462 (1965). And the
additional defendant may cross-claim against the original defendant for additional defendant's own injuries and damage, though an original defendant
may not cross-claim against either another original defendant or an additional defendant for his injuries and damage. See 1 McINTOsHr, NoRTH
CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§§ 722, 1244.5 (Supp. 1964).

" Gibbs v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 265 N.C. 459, 144 S.E.2d
(1965). This case involved additional complications as to insurance
the Workmen's Compensation Act.
"' Hildreth v. United States Cas. Co., 265 N.C. 565, 144 S.E.2d
(1965).
"9See, e.g., Greene v. Charlotte Chem. Lab., Inc., 254 N.C. 680,

393
and
641
120

S.E.2d 82 (1961), where the Court held improper a cross-action theretofore
clearly allowable.
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lina may not bring in plaintiff's husband for contribution." (b)
Where an original defendant brought in an additional defendant
for contribution and the two had previously litigated between themselves over the same occurrence as was involved in plaintiff's action,
both having been found negligent, the prior judgment was res judicata on the cross-action-that is, when the original defendant was
held to be liable to plaintiff, he was automatically entitled to judgment over against the additional defendant. 71 (c) When two defendants in a prior action had been held liable, but no cross-action was
there litigated and there was no subsequent litigation between them,
the one paying the judgment but claiming to be only secondarily
liable could not proceed for indemnity against the other's insurer.2
In the absence of waiver or an admission by the insurer, an actual
adjudication of the primary-secondary liability issue was a necessary
preliminary to suit against the insurer; and a showing that, in the
prior case, the paying defendant was the vehicle owner and the
other was the driver was not sufficient. 73
In Clemmons v. Kin 4 the Court considered the allegations and
proof necessary for a cross-action for contribution. The complaint
alleged that the original defendant's conduct in crossing the center
line of the highway caused the collision. The answer (a) denied
the allegation that defendant crossed the center line; (b) alleged
that the collision was caused solely by the negligence of the driver
of the car in which plaintiff was riding75-- such negligence being
,oPetrea v. Ryder Tank Lines, Inc., 264 N.C. 230, 141 S.E.2d 278
(1965). This is simply a procedural reflection of substantive law. This
case is considered from the point of view of conflict of laws elsewhere in
this Survey. Wurfel, Conflict of Laws, North Carolina Case Law, 44 N.C.L.
REv. 923 (1966).
" Sisk v. Perkins, 264 N.C. 43, 140 S.E.2d 753 (1965).
" Ingram v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 404, 146 S.E.2d 509
(1966). The plaintiff was a trustee to whom the judgment had been assigned. For the earlier version of the case, see 258 N.C. 632, 129 S.E.2d
222 (1963). See also Dameron, Insurance, North Carolina Case Law, 44
N.C.L. REv. 1022 (1966).

,'In several cases not mentioned in the text, cross-claims were apparently interposed without objection. See, e.g., United States Leasing Corp. v.
Hall, 264 N.C. 110, 141 S.E.2d 30 (1965); Dixie Fire & Cas. Co. v. Esso
Standard Oil Co., 265 N.C. 121, 143 S.E.2d 279 (1965).
"265 N.C. 199, 143 S.E.2d 83 (1965).
" It seems to be customary in North Carolina to make an express plea
of sole negligence of the third party. Of this it may be observed: (a) the
characterization of the third party's conduct as sole negligence or sole
proximate cause is a conclusion of law and of no consequence in the absence
of factual allegations; and (b) analytically, if there are appropriate denials,
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the crossing of the center line by that driver; and (c) on a conditional basis alleged a cross-claim for contribution, requesting that
plaintiff's driver be brought in as an additional defendant-which
was done. The opinion makes it clear that no notions about consistency furnish a valid objection to such a tripartite answer per
se. 7' However, there must be a factual basis for the contribution
claim, and where the facts alleged, if true, do not involve conduct
which could have concurred with any negligence charged against
the original defendant to produce plaintiff's injury, there is no valid
claim for contribution, and the claim is not saved by expressly adding a conclusion of law in terms of joint and concurring negligence.77 In this case, in the view of the Court, both allegation and
proof of original defendant were to the effect that the original
defendant was on the right side and the additional defendant on
the wrong side. Since there was no allegation or proof that original
defendant was negligent unless on the wrong side, there was neither
allegation nor proof indicating concurrent negligence. 7
"CONTRIBuTIoN"

BETWEEN INSURERS

In last year's Survey, footnote mention was made of two cases
involving this subject. 79

A note on the matter has now appeared

in the Review.8 0
particularly of the complaint's allegations designed to show that defendant's
conduct was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury, all evidence defendant
may have of sole negligence of a third party may be introduced under the
denials without any special plea. Indeed, if there is no claim for contribution, such allegations do not justify bringing in the third party as an additional defendant and might well be stricken as surplusage. Of course, if
there is a claim for contribution, as the principal case demonstrates, there
must be factual allegations as to the additional defendant's negligence.
"' To the same effect is Wise v. Vincent, 265 N.C. 647, 144 S.E.2d 877
(1965). Indeed, in that case, a special plea of insulating negligence was
also included.
"'The specific decision was that the cross-claim should have been nonsuited, but it seems clear that a demurrer for failure to state a cause of
action would also have been sustained.
"The jury, nevertheless, found both negligent. By the Court's analysis
of the facts, this verdict was inconsistent and, on the surface nothing indicates which defendant the jury would have preferred had it been directed to
find against one or the other, but not both. As to the cross-claim this made
no difference, because the Court held that it should never have gone to the
jury.
,DBrandis, Civil Procedure (Pleadings and Parties), North Carolina Case
Law, 43 N.C.L. Rxv. 884 n.44a (1965).
so44 N.C.L. Rav. 142 (1965). See also Thorpe, Torts: Part Two, North
CarolinaCase Law, 44 N.C.L. Rv. 1047 (1966).
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RELATION OF PLEADINGS TO PROOF (INCLUDING VARIANCE)

Bunton v. Radford"' presented a most curious situation. The
complaint alleged that plaintiff's vehicle was traveling west and the
defendant's east on a certain street. These allegations were admitted in the answer, but in a counterclaim, while the directions of
travel remained the same, a different street was named. The findings of the trial judge, sitting without a jury, accepted the street
named in the counterclaim, but made the directions north and south.
The Court sensibly held that this geographical and directional disorientation in no way misled defendant to his prejudice and that
the variance was immaterial.
In Moore v. Hales, 2 in which defendant introduced no evidence,
plaintiff's evidence (actually, as to this part, brought out by defendant's attorney on cross-examination) disclosed some facts which
conceivably might have justified a finding of contributory negligence. The answer had pleaded contributory negligence, but its
factual allegations, as construed by the Court, did not encompass
anything covered by plaintiff's evidence. Hence it was held to be
error for the lower court to send the issue of contributory negligence to the jury (which, in fact, found for defendant on this
issue). Of course, it is well settled that defendant has the burden
of proof on contributory negligence. It is also well settled that a
complaint is demurrable if contributory negligence is, as a matter
of law, shown on its face. The present case falls between the two
and might be described as holding that, even if contributory negligence has been pleaded and is shown by plaintiff's evidence, such
evidence will not take the issue to the jury unless it supports the
specific allegations of the plea. In view of this decision, a defendant's lawyer, finding himself in such a situation, should obviously
seek leave to amend to conform his answer to plaintiff's proof.
While permission to amend would be discretionary, plaintiff could
hardly claim surprise or undue prejudice if permission were
granted. s
81265 N.C. 336, 144 S.E.2d 52 (1965).
82266 N.C. 482, 146 S.E.2d 385 (1966).

Cf. Robinette v. Wike, 265 N.C. 551, 144 S.E.2d 594 (1965), where the
Court found no material variance between plaintiff's evidence and the specification of plaintiff's negligence in defendant's counterclaim and commented
that plaintiff could hardly contend that he had been misled.
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EVIDENCE

s4

In Edwards v. Hamil it was held that where allegations in an
answer are not responsive to allegations in the complaint, plaintiff
cannot use them to repel a nonsuit unless they are introduced in
evidence. While there is some prior authority for this, its validity
is doubtful, to say the least.8 5 Even if sound, its limits are open
to doubt. One way of interpreting it is that anything in the answer
that is not an admission must be introduced in evidence. Thus
introduction would be required for allegations in a counterclaim
or an affirmative defense and for those allegations (technically improper but commonly used in North Carolina) tacked on to or
commingled with denials, setting forth facts inconsistent with the
complaint's version. Yet, while the parallel is far from perfect, the
same allegations may be used to supply a deficiency in the complaint
under the doctrine of aider by answer.8 6 Further, if allegations in
an answer amount to a counterclaim or an affirmative defense, their
sufficiency for that purpose may be tested by a demurrer or motion
7
to strike.1
It seems certain that if Edwards faithfully reflects North Carolina law, its rule, in practice, has been honored more in the breach
than the observance. Indeed, on the same day as the Edwards
opinion was filed, the Court filed another opinion which, without
discussing the matter, seems quite flatly contrary in result. 8
84266 N.C. 304, 145 S.E.2d 884 (1966).
' See the very cautious treatment of it in STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA
EVIDENCE, § 177 (2d ed. 1963).
80

See 1 MCINToSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1193

(2d ed. 1956). This doctrine is apparently recognized in North Carolina in

its broadest form. A complaint omitting a critical allegation may be ren-

dered sufficient by an answer which denies the existence of the fact. See
Mizzell v. Ruffin, 118 N.C. 69, 23 S.E. 927 (1896).
87
Cf. Van Every v. Van Every, 265 N.C. 506, 144 S.E.2d 603 (1965),
where, on the basis of the allegations in a reply to an affirmative defense,
which was apparently a voluntary reply the Court affirmed a judgment on
the pleadings for the defendant.
S.Guilford Realty & Ins. Co. v. Blythe Bros. Co., 266 N.C. 229, 145
S.E.2d 838 (1966). There the complaint alleged that defendants were en-

gaged in a joint venture. At the close of plaintiff's evidence defendants
moved for nonsuit for failure to prove this allegation. The Court quoted
from the further defense in defendants' joint answer, stated in effect, that
these allegations showed a joint venture, and held that the motion for non-

suit was properly overruled. As of this writing, the record has not become
available to this writer, but if the answer's allegations were introduced in

evidence there is no mention made of that fact. In the Edwards case employer and employee were sued jointly. The defendants' joint answer ad-
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WITHDRAWAL OF REPLY

In the 1965 Survey there was discussion of Keith v. Glenn,"
where plaintiff sued for personal injuries and defendant counterclaimed for his own injuries, crediting on his counterclaim demand
the amount he had received in a settlement allegedly made by or on
behalf of plainfiff. Plaintiff later moved to strike the counterclaim
on the same ground as was alleged as a defense in a reply-that,
while plaintiff had not consented to the settlement made by his insurer, it was nevertheless a bar to the counterclaim. Subsequently
plaintiff moved for permission to withdraw the reply and, in his

discretion, the judge denied the motion. Upon demurrer to his
pleadings, plaintiff's action was then dismissed. It was said in the

1965 Survey:
Implicit in the Keith opinion is the proposition that when insured, by reply, or motion, simultaneously attempts to assert the
bar of settlement and his continuing objection to the settlement,
the inconsistency is resolved by giving effect to the former and
disregarding the latter.90

In a footnote of the Survey it was said:
As indicated in the text, plaintiff moved for permission to
withdraw the reply, but this was denied by the judge in his discretion and plaintiff took no exception to the denial. Further, plaintiff had simultaneously pending a motion to strike the counterclaim. Therefore, the case did not present the question which
would be presented if a reply pleading the settlement were filed
but, before any further proceedings were had, permission to withdraw the reply, or to amend it to delete the plea in bar, was
sought and granted. The writer suspects that the filing of the
mitted that at the critical time the employee was acting in the course and
scope of his employment. Plaintiff's only evidence that the employee lighted
the acetylene torch which started the fire was evidence of an extrajudicial
declaration by the employee, which was admitted against the employee but
not against the employer. The Court held that if the same paragraph of
the answer contained recitals which might justify the inference that he
lighted the torch, such recitals, not having been introduced in evidence,
could not be considered on the nonsuit motion. The two cases seem virtually
indistinguishable, except in result, and this writer believes that the Guilford
Realty case is to be preferred. However, if the Court believes there is merit
in having parts of the pleadings appear in the record twice instead of once,
trial attorneys should conduct themselves accordingly.
-*262N.C. 284, 136 S.E.2d 665 (1964).
'o Brandis, Civil Procedure (Pleadings and Parties),North Carolina Case
Law, 43 N.C.L. Rlv. 873, 879 (1965).
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original reply would be considered a binding election to ratify, at
least in the absence of a showing by plaintiff that he had no
understanding of the significance of pleading the settlement and
had no intention of ratifying.91
In Bongardt v. Frink9 a personal injury action, defendant
counterclaimed 93 and plaintiff replied, alleging that defendant had
accepted settlement, which settlement was pleaded as a bar to the
counterclaim. Subsequently plaintiff moved for permission to withdraw the reply and defendant countered with a motion for judgment on the pleadings dismissing plaintiff's action. In his discretion, the judge granted plaintiff's motion and thereupon denied defendant's motion, since the pleadings no longer contained allegations
that would have justified granting it. At the trial, plaintiff won a
substantial verdict and judgment.
It is apparent that Bongardt presented the case suggested in the
1965 Survey footnote. It is also apparent that the Court did not
regard the mere filing of the reply as a binding ratification of the
settlement by the plaintiff. Neither, apparently, did it require an
affirmative showing that plaintiff had no intention of ratifying,
though the opinion states that there was no evidence in the record
that plaintiff consented to the settlement.94 This writer certainly
approves the Bongardt result under the circumstances there presented, but reconciliation of Bongardt and Keith nevertheless presents some problems.
In Bongardt the Court distinguished Keith as follows:
Keith v. Glenn, supra, presents a different factual situation.
In that case plaintiff replied to the counterclaim. In his reply he
denied any negligence on his part, and alleged as a further defense to the counterclaim his insurance carrier, against his wishes,
paid defendant $1,250 in full settlement of defendant's claim
91 Id. at 879, n.25.
265 N.C. 130, 143 S.E.2d 286 (1965).
"The counterclaim was interposed by amendment. The motion for leave
to file it recited that as the result of misrepresentations by a person originally
unknown to defendant, but now believed to be a representative of plaintiff's
insurer, defendant settled for a grossly inadequate amount.
" The reply, in addition to being signed by counsel representing the
plaintiff throughout, was signed also by a law firm not otherwise appearing
in the case. The Court surmised, with a high probability of accuracy, that
this firm represented plaintiff's insurer. This, of course does not affirmatively show that plaintiff did not ratify the settlement, but it does have some
tendency to show that the reply was not necessarily filed with the idea of
enhancing plaintiff's chances of recovery.
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against plaintiff. Notwithstanding his allegation that settlement
was made contrary to his wishes, he specifically alleges it bars
defendant's right to claim damages from plaintiff. Later plaintiff
sought permission to withdraw the reply he had filed. Judge
Hall in his discretion declined to permit plaintiff to withdraw
his reply.9 5
This does not place any emphasis on the motion to strike, present
in Keith and absent in Bongardt, or on the failure of plaintiff in
Keith to except to denial of his motion to withdraw. In both cases
the reply denied negligence on the part of the plaintiff. The fact
that in Keith the reply specifically alleged lack of consent would
seem, as of the time of filing the replies, to put the plaintiff in a
stronger position than that of the plaintiff in Bongardt, where the
explicit plea in bar was unaccompanied by such allegation. There
is no parallel in Keith to the fact in Bongardt (not brought out in
the above quotation, but mentioned elsewhere in the opinion) that
the counterclaim came in by amendment, and only after defendant
indicated he regarded the settlement as fraudulent; but that hardly
furnishes a sound basis for distinction. In both cases the reply came
only after defendant had made a decision to plead a counterclaim
rather than to plead the settlement in bar of plaintiff's action; and
defendant's motives for the decision would seem to be immaterial.
And both cases accept the proposition that if plaintiff elects not to
ratify the settlement, defendant is not precluded by it either and
is free to counterclaim.
This leaves, as a basis for distinguishing the two cases, that
one judge refused permission to withdraw and the other granted
it. In both cases the Court treats this as a matter of discretion;
and certainly the general rule is that permission to withdraw a pleading is discretionary. But here the real issue is whether plaintiff has
ratified the settlement. Bongardt demonstrates that merely filing the
reply containing the plea in bar is not a binding ratification, because,
if it were, plaintiff could not recover even after withdrawing it.
On the other hand, if the judge refuses permission to withdraw
merely as a matter of discretion and not on the basis of a finding
that plaintiff has in fact ratified the settlement, this exercise of
judicial discretion should not be converted into a ratification by
plaintiff. In other words, it seems that the question of ratification
"*265 N.C. 130, 137, 143 S.E.2d 286, 291-92 (1965).
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should be investigated on its merits, regardless of how the judge
exercises his discretion.

CONFLICT OF LAWS
Seymour W. Wurfel*
The year 1965 brought no innovations to North Carolina conflicts law. It did bring concise reaffirmations of three fundamental
conflicts principles in the substantive areas of torts, contracts and
family law.
TORTS
lex loci delicti, i.e., the law of the
the
substantive
that
rule
The
place of the wrong, governs tort actions was applied at least
four times. In Conard v. Miller Motor Express, Inc.' the Court
said:
This cause grew out of a rear-end motor vehicle collision in
South Carolina. The substantive law of that State controls. The
[W]e hold the
procedural law of North Carolina controls ....
plaintiff's evidence fails to make out a case of actionable
negligence 2under South Carolina law. The judgment of nonsuit
is affirmed.
In Cobb v. Clark3 the degree of care due to a house guest was
involved. In affirming a judgment for defendant, sustaining a demurrer, the Court held:
Plaintiff [a North Carolina resident] was injured in Georgia.
Her right of action, if any, is determined by the law of Georgia.
When she seeks to enforce those rights in courts outside of
Georgia, procedural questions arising in the enforcement are4
determined by the laws of the state where enforcement is sought.
In a guest case where the accident occurred on the Blue Ridge
Parkway in Virginia,' plaintiff was granted a new trial because
the instructions given the jury failed to distinguish between "gross
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
1265 N.C. 427, 144 S.E.2d 269 (1965).
2
Id. at 429, 431, 144 S.E.2d at 271, 272.
8265 N.C. 194, 143 S.E.2d 103 (1965).
"Id. at 196, 143 S.E.2d at 105.
8 Crow v. Ballard, 263 N.C. 475, 139 S.E.2d 624 (1965).
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negligence" and "willful and wanton disregard of the safety ...

of

the person." The Virginia guest statute permits recovery under
either circumstance. The Court wrote:
Since the automobile accident complained of occurred in the
State of Virginia, liability or the lack of it must be determined
according to the substantive laws of that State. . . "In Thomas
v. Snow, 162 Va. 654, 174 S.E. 837, the court said: '. . . It is

important to mark the distinction between acts or omissions
which constitute gross negligence and those which are termed
willful or wanton, because it is usually held that in the former
contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff will defeat recovery, while in the latter it will not.'"6
Of particular interest is the terse per curiam opinion rendered
in Petrea v. Ryder Tank Lines, Inc.' Plaintiff, a North Carolina
resident, riding with her North Carolina resident husband, was injured in West Virginia in a collision with defendant's tractortrailer. Defendant denied negligence, alleged negligence of the husband and by cross-action sought contribution from him under G.S.
§ 1-240. In sustaining a dismissal of the cross action upon demurrer, the Court used these words:
A defendant who has been sued for tort may bring into the
action for the purpose of enforcing contribution .

.

. only a joint

tort-feasor whom plaintiff could have sued originally in the same
action.... The law of West Virginia does not permit one spouse
to sue the other in tort ....

North Carolina applies the lex loci

delicti.
"We have in previous decisions held claimant's right to recover and the amount which may be recovered for personal injuries must be determined by the law of the state where the
injuries were sustained; if no right of action exists there, the
injured party has none which can be enforced elsewhere." Shaw
v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 610, 129 S.E.2d 288, 288.
Original defendant . . . argues . . . that we should overrule

Shaw v. Lee, supra, and thus abandon our well-established conflicts rule, in order to apply the law of the state which has had
"the most significant relationship or contacts with the matter
in dispute"--in this case, appellant contends, North Carolina.
Such an approach is referred to as the "center of gravity" or
"grouping of contacts" theory. .

.

. Not withstanding that ap-

° Id. at 477, 478, 139 S.E.2d at 626.
"264 N.C. 230, 141 S.E.2d 278 (1965).
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pellant's counsel in his brief and in his oral argument presented
his case to this court in the best possible light, the same reasons
which dictated our decision in Shaw v. Lee, supra, constrain us
to adhere to it....
Affirmed.8
It is significant that the practical consequence of the Court's
adhering to the lex loci delicti rule in the Petrea case was to deny
the trucker's insurance carrier a defense and to leave the "deep
pocket" wide open. Most advocates of "the most significant relationship" approach extol it as a "deep pocket" opener. In fact it is
double edged and susceptible of being used both ways.
In New York, up to now the principal exponent of "the most
significant relationship" doctrine, 1965 brought new limitations to
its pocket opening scope. In diversity of citizenship cases federal
courts sitting in New York in at least three instances refused to
apply New York tort law. Where airline passengers' tickets read
for round-trip "international transportation" from United States
points to cities in Europe and return, the limitation of liability to
8300 dollars each, under the Warsaw Convention, to which both
the United States and Belgium were parties, was held applicable to
claims arising from a crash near the Brussels airport.' The residences of the various plaintiffs were in the United States but in the
opinion were not pinpointed to New York.
The law of Italy was applied as to limit damages in a wrongful
death case arising from a crash in Italy of a plane on an international flight from Brussels to Rome. The decedent worked in New
York and resided in New Jersey. After the accident his widow and
children moved their residence to Belgium. A jury found defendant
guilty of willful misconduct rendering the Warsaw Convention
limitation inapplicable. The parties did not, at the trial in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York, contest
the applicability of Italian law."
In Ciprariv. Servicos Aereos Cruzeiro, the federal court, sitting in diversity, found that the New York Court of Appeals would
8

Id. at 231, 141 S.E.2d at 279 (1965). Shaw v. Lee is noted in 41
N.C.L. REv. 843 (1963); Wurfel, Conflict of Laws, North Carolina Case
Law, 43 N.C.L. REv. 895, 899 (1965).
'Kelley v. Societe Anonyme Belge D'Exploitation, 242 F. Supp. 129
(E.D.N.Y. 1965).
" LeRoy v. SABENA Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 878 (1965).
"1245 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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apply the law of Brazil to limit liability in a case in which the
plaintiff was a resident of New York. Here the plaintiff, a Honeywell employee, purchased a ticket in Rio de Janeiro for a flight to
Sao Paulo and was injured in the landing at Sao Paulo. Defendant
was a Brazilian corporation wholly owned by residents and nationals of Brazil. The court said: "[T]he only relationship or contact of New York is the fact that plaintiff is a resident of New
York. Surely this is not enough, standing alone, to warrant the
application of New York law to the issue of measure of damages."'"
By a four-to-three decision the New York Court of Appeals
refused to apply New York law even where both the plaintiff and
defendant were New York residents.' 3 Defendant drove his New
York licensed, insured and based automobile to Boulder, Colorado,
to attend summer school. While there he took plaintiff, also a summer school student from New York, for a ride; a collision occurred,
and plaintiff was injured. Colorado law denies recovery to automobile guests against the driver except where willful and wanton
disregard for the guest's safety is present. The court applied Colorada law and denied recovery, saying the accident "arose out of
Colorado based activity" and thus the place of the accident was not
'
This they felt distinguished it from their previous
"fortuitous." 14
decision in which they refused to apply an Ontario guest statute
when a New York resident guest was injured by a New York resident host in a one-car accident in Ontario during the course of a
short trip from New York. There they allowed recovery under
New York law since it was a case "affecting New York residents
and arising out of the operation of a New York based automobile. . .. "I'
In a jurisdiction in which "greatest concern with the specific
issue raised in the litigation" 6 is its conflicts rule in tort choice-oflaw questions, there is never a dull moment, no cloying certainty, no
stuffy predictability.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has made it abundantly
clear that it intends to follow its traditional lez loci delicti rule.
u Id. at 825.
" Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463

(1965).
"16
N.Y.2d at 125, 209 N.E.2d at 794, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
5

' Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 482, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284, 240
N.Y.S.2d 743, 750 (1963).

"Id. at 481, 191 N.E.2d at 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
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This rule possesses the merits of certainty, predictability, simplicity
and objectivity, all handmaidens of "justice." Also it comports with
the great weight of judicial authority in the United States. It is
an area in which the legislature could intervene, but has not seen
fit to do so. It is likely that counsel, ever-questing the "deep pocket,"
will with amaranthine hope further litigate the point. It is probable that the Court will continue to apply the doctrine of stare
decisis to this issue.
CONTRACTS

Two new cases involve whether the law of the state of making
of a contract, absent an express choice-of-law clause, controls not
only the contract's initial validity but also questions of performance
or breach where these occur in another state.
7
In Arnold v. Ray Charles Enterprises1
the pertinent substantive
law was the same in the three states, celebrationis, solutionis and
fori, respectively. The court, sua sponte, raised the issue and was
able to leave it unresolved, in this posture:
The contract involved in this case was made in New York, it
was to be performed in Virginia, and the action for its breach
is brought in North Carolina. Unquestionably the law of the
forum . . . governs all matters of procedure ....
The only question of substantive law ... involves the proper measure of damages.... Throughout, neither party has made any reference to
the law of New York or that of Virginia, yet we are required to
take judicial notice of foreign law. G.S. 8-4. It appears that the
law of New York, lex loci celebrationis, and that of Virginia,
lex loci solutionis, are no different with reference to the substantive question here involved. There would be no profit, then, for
us to exercise ourselves here to determine which law is to be
applied, for to do so would take us into a "highly complex and
confused part of conflict of laws."18
The Court then proceeded, relying primarily on North Carolina
law, to say: "Ordinarily the law of the forum controls as to the
burden of proof . . . and the burden is on defendants to exculpate
themselves from liability for their nonperformance."' 9 In resolv17264 N.C. 92, 141 S.E.2d 14 (1965). For a more extended discussion
of this case, see Navin, Damages, North Carolina Case Law, 44 N.C.L.
REv. 993 (1966).
isId. at 96, 97, 141 S.E.2d at 17.
10 Id. at 98, 141 S.E.2d at 18,
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ing the-measure of damages issue North Carolina, New York and
Virginia cases, all in harmony, were cited by the Court.
The case is a caveat to the bar that the Court will carry out
the legislative mandate" to take judicial notice of foreign law where
conflict rules make it applicable, even though the point is not raised
by counsel. It also seems to indicate that the question whether the
law of the place of contracting or that of the place of performance,
where the two are not the same, is to govern as to matters of performance is not finally settled in North Carolina.
The other recent conflicts contract case appears, in part at least,
to resolve this uncertainty. In Connor v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 21 the defendant in Virginia issued an assigned risk auto-

mobile liability insurance policy to Auton, whose car thereafter
collided in North Carolina with plaintiff's car, injuring plaintiff.
In the suit for damages brought by Connor against Auton in North
Carolina, Auton failed to appear as a witness. The policy provided:
"[I]nsured shall cooperate with the Company and . . . shall attend
hearings and trials and shall assist in . .. giving evidence ... and

in the conduct of suits.""2 Connor's suit against State Farm Mutual
was to collect the judgment obtained against Auton, the insured,
and the defense asserted was breach of this policy provision. In
granting defendant a new trial the Court held that the issue of
waiver by the defendant of this duty of the insured as it had been
submitted to the jury was confusing, would not determine the rights
of the parties and was error. Only North Carolina authority was
cited for this ruling, presumably on the assumption that since it
pertained to instructions, it was procedural.
On the substantive contract law issue the Court stated:
The contract on which plaintiff relies was issued in Virginia
to a resident of that state. The rights and obligations of insured
and insurer are fixed by the laws of Virginia. Roomy v. Insurance Co. 256 N.C. 318, 123 S.E.2d 817.
' '**The[se] policy provisions . . .may be incorporated in
Assigned Risk policies issued in Virginia and will there be en-

forced as those provisions are interpreted by the courts of that
state. Virginia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Saccio.
204 Va. 769, 133 S.E.2d 268.23
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-4 (1953).
21265 N.C. 188, 143 S.E.2d 98 (1965).

Id. at 189, 143 S.E.2d at 99.
at 190, 143 S.E.2d at 100.

20Id
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In Roomy defendant issued in New York to a New York resident an automobile liability policy that was silent as to whether
claims between husband and wife were covered. In a suit to collect
a North Carolina judgment obtained by one spouse against the
other for injuries resulting from an accident in North Carolina,
the Court applied New York law that the insurer is not liable for
interspousal torts unless the policy affirmatively so states. It seems
clear that in North Carolina as far as insurance contracts are concerned, at least where the insured is a resident of the state in which
the contract is issued, the law of the state of contracting controls
questions of performance even where performance is required in
24
another state.
On the broader issue of what law in general governs contracts
as to performance to be accomplished outside of the state of contracting, the Court said in Roomy:
'Matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation and
validity of a contract are determined by the law of the place
where it is made.' . . . 'The interpretation of a contract and
rights and obligations under it . . . are to be determined in accordance with the proper law of the contract. Prima facie the
proper law of the contract is to be presumed to be the law of the
country where it is made.' .. . 'the law of the place where the
contract is made is prima facie that which the parties intended,
or ought to be presumed to have adopted, as the footing upon
which they dealt, and that such law ought, therefore, to prevail in
the absence of circumstances indicating a different intention.' 25
Prima facie, all performance is to be controlled by the law of
the place of contracting. However one may speculate from the
dictum of the Court in Arnold quoted above that in a noninsurance
policy case the Court might "exercise" itself "to determine which
law is to be applied" to questions of performance where the contract is made in one state and to be performed in another and
where the contract itself is silent as to what law governs. This is
2'A contrary result was reached on this question in Goulding v. Sands,
237 F. Supp. 577 (W.D. Pa. 1965). This was a diversity case and Pennsylvania for conflict purposes is a "center of gravity" or "points of contact"
jurisdiction in both tort and contract cases. A wife was permitted to recover
from the insurer, for injury in a Pennsylvania accident caused by the husband, under a policy issued in New York that was silent as to interspousal
recovery.
.. Roomy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 256 N.C. 318, at 322; 123 S.E.2d 817, at

820 (1962).
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not to imply that the Court would adopt the highly flexible New
York "points of contact" rule in contract cases, 26 but rather that
effective advocacy might cause it to find, at least in some cases,
that the lex loci solutionis controls matters pertaining to perfor27
mance, rather than the lex loci celebratiolis.
FAmILY LAW

Rural settings plus a mobile society produced the raw material
that called forth an application of the ultra-modern rule that possession constitutes all points of the law as far as jurisdiction to award
child custody is concerned. The factual situation in In re Craigo28
developed in one action-packed year. A mother and father with
two small children separated in late 1963. The mother and a man
whom she later married took the children to Reno. The father and
the maternal grandparents went to Reno and brought the children
to North Carolina where they lived with the grandparents until
July 1964. The father then took the children to his residence in
Georgia, commenced a divorce action, asked for custody of the children and was awarded temporary custody by a Georgia Superior
Court order that included this language, [The order] "is not an
adjudication of said matter ...

upon the merits. 29 Shortly there-

after the father learned that the mother had obtained an absolute
divorce in Florida which decree contained no custody provision.
The father took no further action in his pending Georgia divorce,
married again and settled on a farm near Ellijay, Georgia. Nine
days later the mother and her new husband went to the home of
the father, and in his absence forcibly took the children and brought
them to North Carolina where the mother then lived. Soon the
"Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
"'The original RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 358 provides:
The duty for the performance of which a party to a contract is
bound will be discharged by compliance with the law of the place of
performance of the promise with respect to: the matter of performance; the time and locality of performance; the person or persons
by whom or to whom performance shall be made or rendered; the
sufficiency of performance; excuse for non-performance.
However, RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) CONFLICT oF LAWS § 346(b) (Tent.
Draft No. 6, 1960) provides "the law applicable to minute details of performance of a contract is the local law of the place of performance," and
refers all other questions of performance to a "points of contact" solution.
This change seems to raise more questions than it answers.
28266 N.C. 92, 145 S.E.2d 376 (1965).
Id. at 95, 145 S.E.2d at 378.
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maternal grandparents, residents of Buncombe County, petitioned
for habeas corpus to have the children removed from the custody
of the mother in North Carolina and to have them awarded to the
grandparents. The father intervened contending that the Georgia
temporary custody decree was binding on the North Carolina courts
under the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution. As to jurisdiction the Court said, "In this setting the court
had jurisdiction of the children and the parents.""0 Regarding the
father's contention, the case held:
"The constitutional provision, Article IV, Section 1, requiring full faith and credit to be given to judicial proceedings in
sister States does not require North Carolina to treat as final and
conclusive an order of a sister State awarding custody of a minor
when the Courts of the State making the award can subsequently
modify the order or decree." Cleeland v. Cleeland, 249 N.C. 16,
105 S.E.2d 114.31
The Court had already cited Graham v. Graha: 2 as holding
that under Georgia law such an order as was here involved was
interlocutory. It would seem that no custody decree ever becomes
final in the sense that it may always be altered upon proof of change
of material circumstances. In Craigo the Court approved trial court
findings that the grandparents were proper custodians and that
neither parent was a suitable custodian. It did not say whether
there was evidence of change of circumstances occurring subsequent to the Georgia decree, nor whether findings to this effect
were necessary to comply with the full faith and credit clause.
Possibly the transcript was replete with such new evidence, but this
cannot be gleaned from the decision. The end result is the one
reached by practically all courts. From a sense of compassion, where
the unfortunate children are physically present in court, judges seek
to do whatever at the moment seems to offer the greatest promise
of improving their lot.
With this almost complete fluidity of custody awards generally
accepted at the interstate level, it is a bit ironical to find that the
multifarious judicial scramble to help children victimized by parental divorce is not tolerated at the intrastate level. On the same day
20 Ibid.
8'
Ibid.
"219
Ga. 193, 132 S.E.2d 66 (1963).
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it decided In re Craigo, the Court in Stanback v. Stanback83 prohibited custody award competition between superior court judges.
In that case a factual "domestic conflict" gave rise to a relative
rarity, a legal "domestic conflict."
In Stanback the father commenced an action in Rowan County
for divorce from bed and board and for exclusive custody of two
children. A custody hearing was held on April 22, 1965. Based
on the pleadings, forty-three affidavits for plaintiff and four for the
defendant, Judge Walker found that the mother, by reason of alcoholic consumption, was not a fit and proper person and awarded
exclusive custody to plaintiff "until reversed or amended by the
court." On May 8, 1965, defendant filed a motion that "the court
...consider.., the custody ...of [the] ... infant children.... 2 4

On June 19, 1965, this motion was heard by Judge Gwyn, who
considered all the material previously passed upon by Judge Walker,
plus oral testimony by both the plaintiff and defendant and eighteen
new affidavits filed by plaintiff and thirty-eight by defendant.
Plaintiff challenged Judge Gwyn's jurisdiction "upon the ground
that Judge Walker had decided the controversy and that a change
in condition was not alleged and had not taken place." 85 Judge
Gwyn proceeded to find that since the first order "conditions have
substantially and materially changed in that . . .defendant ...no
longer indulges in the use of alcoholic beverages . . .is practicing

sobriety and has regained her normal emotional equilibrium." 0 He
then awarded custody to both parents, "to be divided equally between the two." Plaintiff appealed, and the Court in reversing
Judge Gwyn said:
A fair analysis of the evidence before Judge Walker emphasizes its sharply conflicting character. The affidavits of the three
doctors from New York, on the basis of their single examination,
do not disclose that any change had taken place in the defendant's
condition between April 22, 1965 and the date of their examination on May 27, 1965. The tenor of those affidavits follows that
expressed by Dr. Green and Dr. Corpening which were considered by Judge Walker. There is no evidence the fitness or
unfitness of either party had changed between the hearings.
8'266 N.C. 72, 145 S.E.2d 332 (1965).
"Id. at 74, 145 S.E.2d at 333.
Id. at 76, 145 S.E.2d at 334.
31 Id. at 74, 145 S.E.2d at 333.
'-
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There is no evidence the needs of the boys had changed during
that time, or that they were not properly cared for by the father.
This controversy illustrates the difficulty of determining disputed facts from ex parte affidavits. When this case is heard on
the merits, where the witnesses are before the court and subject
to cross-examination, the findings thus established will, or may,
justify a change in the order. Judge Gwyn's finding of changed
conditions is not supported by the evidence. Absent evidence of
change he was without authority to modify Judge Walker's
order. A famous Civil War Cavalry hero, asked to explain his
successful battle tactics, replied, "Git thar fust." In this case
'8 7
Judge Walker "got thar fust."
One wonders whether the Supreme Court would have so assiduously reviewed the "disputed facts" if both the original and modifying custody orders had been made by Judge Walker. Yet since the
decision is based on the absence of evidence of "changed conditions," the person of the second judicial officer should be immaterial.
Even more intriguing is the speculation as to what the decision
would have been if, all the other facts remaining the same, the
original custody order had been made by a Georgia Superior Court,
the mother had forcibly removed the children from Georgia and
commenced the North Carolina action, the father had appeared and
Judge Gwyn had proceeded as he did. All will agree with a statement made in the Stanback opinion that custody proceedings "are
matters of grave concern that the courts, both trial and appellate,
may not view lightly."3 8
In summary, as of now, the North Carolina Supreme Court
apparently stands foursquare for three conflicts principles. First, in
tort cases the lex loci delicti controls. Second, in contract cases the
lex loci celebrationis controls. Third, in child custody cases as far
as jurisdiction is concerned, almost, but not quite, anything goes.
17 Id. at 76, 77, 145 S.E.2d at
335.
" Id. at 77, 145 S.E.2d at 335.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Frank R. Strong*
CIVIL RIGHTS

Litigation in the Supreme Court of North Carolina for the
period under review was skimpy as regards substantive civil rights.
Comment will be limited to the one case of consequence.
State v. Leary' involved the right of peaceable assembly. Three
Negroes had been indicted and convicted of participation in what
both grand and petit juries officially found to have been a "riot."
The incident occurred on August 29, 1963, following upon thirtytwo nights of "demonstrations" involving Negro protest marches,
apparently from a church to the business district and return. On
the night in question some 200 Negroes, many with placards,
marched to the business district. One or more requests by police
officers that the crowd "break up and go home" were disregarded,
the press of the marchers forced the officers to yield ground, and
police reinforcements were called. Upon the arrival of these reinforcements, the "mob, ' 2 already "yelling" and "hollering," resorted
to physical violance. "Bricks, bottles and other missiles were repeatedly thrown at the officers by members of the crowd. Members
of the crowd threw missiles and broke the windows at the service
station ...

and [the offices of the Gas Co.] "" Defendants' convic-

tions were affirmed by the Court in an opinion that made no express
reference to constitutional bounds between state power and the civil
rights of individuals.
With the absorption of the first amendment into the fourteenth
amendment of the Constitution of the United States, freedom of
assembly has become a federally protected constitutional right.
Moreover, in the area of civil rights, unlike that of property rights,
the federal level of constitutional protection tends to be higher than
that found by state courts in state constitutions, California ex* Professor of
1264 N.C. 51,
2 So described

Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
140 S.E.2d 756 (1965).
by Sheriff Rawls, thus indicating that reinforcements
included other than city police. A further fact statement in the opinion is
that defendant Leary "threw a brick at Sheriff Rawls."
8264 N.C. at 53-54, 140 S.E.2d at 758.
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cepted.4 Finally, and very significantly, the stricter federal standard
is the controlling one, by operation of the supremacy clause, for the
reason, as earlier observed, 5 that the United States Constitution sets
minimum constitutional guarantees. Although Shepard's Citator
discloses no attempt on defendants' part to secure review in the
Supreme Court of the United States, many civil rights decisions of
state courts are "going up" where funds permit and the federal
question has been properly raised in timely fashion. In any litigation the federal standard constitutes the measuring rod of constitutional power and limitation.
At first blush, the Court's basis of affirmance in Leary seems
easily to "measure up." Declared the Court: "The State does not
controvert the right of its citizens to assemble peacefully for a lawful purpose. On the other hand, lawful original purpose for an
assembly cannot excuse subsequent mob action, resulting in wanton
destruction of property, and deliverate [sic] injury to officers seeking merely to preserve peace. ' Violence did erupt in the town of
Williamston, thus seeming to distinguish such United States Su7
preme Court cases as Edwards v. South Carolina and Cox v.
Louisiana,8 where state court convictions in "marching" litigation
were overturned for absence of "clear and present danger." Yet in
each of those cases police officers permitted the Negroes to march
to their destination and to stage for a brief period their desired
demonstration. Here the officers resisted the march from the outset. At the time this resistance manifested itself, the only offense
of the Negroes lay in the fact that the crowd was blocking a street
and its sidewalks and overflowing into the yards of private property
owners. The first physical violence occurred only after the marchers
had reached the business district, police reinforcements had been
called, and the crowd had started its "yelling" and "hollering."
Given these circumstances, is it so clear that the North Carolina
holding can be squared with the federal standard as interpreted in
Cox and Edwards? If it can, the saving factor lies in the fact that
this episode occurred after many nights of demonstration marching.
'Time, Jan. 21, 1966, p. 48.
"See the discussion of Property Rights in text accompanying notes 4276 infra.
8264 N.C. at 52, 140 S.E.2d at 757.
372 U.S. 299 (1963).
8379 U.S. 536 (1965).
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The testimony of Sheriff Rawls would be near determinative:
"There was a mob of them, they were all over the street and the
sidewalks. It is my best knowledge that feeling was running high.
For 32 nights I walked in between the two races, spoke on the
loud speaker, got on top of cars and did everything I know of to
keep from having a riot in this town. I personally know because
for 32 nights, I was out there."' Assuming this was the situation,
there would appear to have existed clear and present danger of a
breach of the peace, which the state was entitled to control.
PERSONAL RIGHTS

The recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
in Aptheker v. Secretary of State'" and Griswold v. Connecticut
greatly strengthen the evolving substantive right of the individual
to considerable freedom from governmental intervention in his personal affairs. Individual rights of a personal character were in
origin largely procedural, and many so remain. The North Carolina Court's concern with these latter, for the period under review,
is discussed elsewhere.' 2 Considered here are the few decisions of
the Court concerned with what has become essentially a substantive
personal right.
Incarceration for crime of which the individual has been duly
convicted is the most recognized form of limitation on physical
freedom of the individual.' 3 Yet due process and more specific constitutional provisions protect the rights of the accused, and there is
some indication of a developing limit on what government can constitutionally designate a crime.14 Beyond these facets of protection
of the accused are the guarantees of the eighth amendment of the
federal constitution, now also applicable to the states,"3 and of the
Bill of Rights of the North Carolina Constitution, 16 against exces9264 N.C. at 53, 140 S.E.2d at 758.
1 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
1 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
1 See Penegar, Criminal Law and Procedure, North Carolina Case Law,
44 N.C.L.
REV. 970 (1966).
"2U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 33.
" Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), considered by Packer,
Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, in SUPREME COURT REVIEW 107, 127-37

(1962).
" Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Reseweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
1"The
wording of N.C. CONST. art I, § 14 is all but identical to that
of the eighth amendment of the federal constitution.
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siveness in bail or fine and cruelty or unusualness in punishment.
In State v. Stubbs, 7 defendant invoked the eighth amendment in
challenge of a seven-to-ten year sentence for the crime against nature. The Court found the contention untenable. "When punishment does not exceed the limits fixed by the statute," as concededly
was true in this instance, "it cannot be considered cruel and unusual punishment in the constitutional sense."18
Undoubtedly, the Court reached the correct result. Although
presumably a sentence could be so lengthy in relation to the crime
as to be cruel or unusual, the guarantee has been concerned with
type, as opposed to length, of sentence." However, the Court's
reasoning could constitute a trap for the unwary. Of the three
decisions cited in support, the earliest is State v. Stansbury.2" To
the same contention, in a case analogous to Stubbs, justice Ervin
was careful to explain that "since the sentence in issue finds complete sanction in a valid legislative enactment, it cannot be deemed
violative of Article I, Section 14 of the [North Carolina] Constitution, forbidding the infliction of 'cruel or unusual punishments.' "21
A year later, on the other hand, the Justice was not as careful with
his language. For violation of the state's Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, defendant received what he felt to be a sentence overly
severe in length although within the statute.22 Now the Court
deemed it sufficient to observe that, since the "punishment imposed
upon the defendant by the judgment of the court is within the limits
authorized by the statute . . . it does not offend Article I, Section
14, of the Constitution, forbidding the infliction of 'cruel or unusual punishment.' "23 It is not nitpicking to challenge this formu17266 N.C. 295, 144 S.E.2d 262 (1966), 44 N.C.L. REv. 1118.
SA similar contention was made and rejected in State v. Hunt, 265
N.C. 714, 144 S.E.2d 890 (1965).
"The opinion of Chief Justice Warren in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
(1958), emphasizes this point in an unusual context. In issue was the
validity of federal legislation imposing loss of citizenship after dishonorable
discharge for wartime desertion from the armed forces. The opinion conceded that the penalty of denationalization was "not excessive in relation
to the gravity of the crime," yet insisted that the eighth amendment established "standards of decency" in criminal punishment with which this
"penalty" is inconsistent because in leaving a former citizen stateless, it
imposes a "condition deplored in the international community of democracies."
20230 N.C. 589, 55 S.E.2d 185 (1949).
1Id. at 591, 55 S.E.2d at 187.
",State
Welch,
N.C.
2
Id.at v.
82-83,
59 232
S.E.2d
at 77,
204.59 S.E.2d 199 (1950).
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lation of the law, which is now given further weight by the principal
case under review. For by such formulation, the statute rather than
the state and federal constitutions is made the measure of personal
right. The judicial assertion is in direct conflict with the basic
doctrine of American constitutional law that legislation, no less than
executive or judicial action, is subject to constitutional limitation.
Of course, the Court means to embrace no such unorthodoxy.
Perhaps the difficulty can be traced to confusion with another
24
line of cases of arguable constitutional dimension. State v. Slade,
decided during the period of this review, presents well the question
of the validity of longer sentence after retrial at defendant's request. Slade had been successful in upsetting his first conviction
by resort to Gideon v. Wainwright 5 in a post-conviction hearing.
But his "reward" was reconviction with a seven-to-nine year sentence contrasted with the original three-to-five years. To Slade this
appeared unfair to the point of unconstitutionality, although the
Court opinion does not indicate on what constitutional provision(s)
he relied. The Court's response was brief: "This assignment of
error is overruled upon authority of S. N. White, 262 N.C. 52,
136 S.E.2d 205, cert. den. (379) U.S. (1005), 13 L.Ed.2d 707 (1
February 1965); S. v. Williams, 261 N.C. 172, 134 S.E.2d 163.2"
In White, the North Carolina Court rejected the constitutional
argument on both due process and equal protection grounds, citing
much state court authority.
The problem posed in Slade differs from that presented by
Stubbs, although both are concerned with limitations imposed upon
individual freedom through criminal process." This being so, it
would seem wise to avoid cross-citation of the two types of cases
that commenced with State v. Whaley28 in early 1965 and is con-

tinued in the Stubbs opinion by citation of Whaley (resentence)
with Welch and Stansbury (both original sentence). Indeed, it
N.C. 70, 140 S.E.2d 723 (1965).
372 U.S. 335 (1963). This story of this famous litigation is excitingly
told by LEwis, GIDEON's TRUMPET (1964). Mr. (now Justice) Fortas successfully argued Gideon's contention in the Supreme Court of the United
States.
" 264 N.C. at 72, 140 S.E.2d at 725.
"Note should be taken in passing of a third type of question, that of
"credit" for time served under the original conviction. See 44 N.C.L. REv.
458 (1966), discussing State v. Weaver, 264 N.C. 681, 142 S.E.2d 633
(1965), wherein the court overruled prior holdings that the earlier time
served could not be counted.
28263 N.C. 824, 140 S.E.2d 305 (1965).
-'264
2-
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looks as though the sentence quoted above from Stubbs," and the
citations in support thereof, were lifted from the opinion in Whaley,
adding to the latter only the citation of Whaley itself. The constitutional issues differ in the two types of cases in response to their
difference in factual character. In the Stubbs type, there is the
possibility of a cruel and unusual punishment evolving from great
disparity between punishment and crime. With the Slade type of
contention, on the other hand, the constitutional prohibitions against
cruel and unusual punishment seem much less relevant than do due
process, equal protection and perhaps other guaranties.8" Whichever
the type of situation, the lawyer should be careful of the deceptively
easy assertion of the syllabi in all these cases to the effect that sentence within the statutory maximum cannot be cruel or unusual in
the constitutional sense. For the statute itself may be constitutionally inconsistent with one or another provision of the North Carolina or United States Constitutions.
POLITICAL RIGHTS
8

Baker v. Carr has made lawyer and politician alike acutely
conscious of the right of the populace to participate effectively in the
formulation of governmental policy. During the period under review two quite disparate litigations have dealt with this aspect of
constitutional right.
In Scarborough v. Adams,8 2 plaintiffs invoked the North Carolina due process clause in a challenge of the proposed sale of bonds
by the Metropolitan Sewage District of Buncombe County. Proceeds were to be used in the construction of an adequate sewage
disposal system for fourteen political subdivisions within Buncombe
County. The Metropolitan Sewage District was itself the creature
of the fourteen subdivisions, which had petitioned for its creation
pursuant to G.S. § 153-297. Action in each instance was by the
governing board of the political subdivision and therein the plaintiffs found their grievance; to them, failure to ground the authorization in a favorable vote of the resident freeholders of each suboSee note 14 Supra.
80 See the careful analysis of Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake, 74 YALE
L.J. 606 (1965). It is familiar constitutional learning that denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United States, as in the White case,
does not necessarily signify that Court's agreement with the lower court
decision.
81369 U.S. 186 (1962).
' 264 N.C. 631, 142 S.E.2d 608 (1965).
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division constituted a violation of sections 1 and 17 of article I of
the North Carolina Constitution. Dismissal of the injunctive action
was affirmed. The Court found the constitution satisfied because,
presumably, the freeholders had had their day when the separate
sanitary districts had been first created pursuant to G.S. § 130-124.
Few in North Carolina are unaware of the reapportionment
litigation of the past six months and its political impact. Drum v.
Sewell 3 is one of the few federal or state court decisions invalidating existing apportionment on all three major levels-congressional,
state house, and state senate. The special session of the North Carolina General Assembly of January, 1966, was a necessary consequence of the federal court ruling. The work of that special session
was before the same federal court, on retention of jurisdiction, in
February of the current year. The realignments of the two houses of
the North Carolina General Assembly passed the constitutional test,
but congressional redistricting flunked.34 The considerations contributing to failure were two. The General Assembly had by its deviations from the plan submitted by the joint select committee nearly
doubled the population variance ratio from 1.10-to-i to 1.19-to-1.
Even so the ratio was considerably lower than either that for the
state senate, 1.32-to-1 or that for the house, 1.33-to-1, both of which
gained the court's approval. The court justified its action, however,
on the basis of United States Supreme Court language, which it
paraphrased, to the effect that "stricter adherence to equality of
population between the districts may logically be required in congressional than in state legislative representation. 85 The second
factor contributing to the failure was the consequence of the legislature's conceded effort to protect sitting Congressmen, which forced
some gerrymandering and some loss of compactness. In combination, at least, these actions resulted in a failure to meet the test of
"as nearly as practicable to the equal population" which the United
State Supreme Court fashioned in its 1964 extension and refinement of the basic principle of population equality enunciated in
Baker v. Carr. 6
88249 F. Supp. 877 (M.D.N.C. 1965).
" Drum v. Sewell, 250 F. Supp. 922 (M.D.N.C. 1966).
Id. at 924.
"Comment on these cases has of course been legion. For one evaluation
see Strong, Toward an Acceptable Function of Judicial Review, 11 S.D.L.
REv. 1 (1966), which cites to much of the mushrooming literature.
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Despite the fact that the congressional redistricting flunked the
constitutional test, the federal court in its February holding stayed
its mandate to permit the congressional elections of 1966 to take
place under the legislative plan. Plaintiff Drum's first reaction was
one of disappointed acceptance. However, the United States Supreme Court's reversal of Swan v. Adams17 on February 25 led
him to petition the federal District court for relief from the stay,
because of the alleged similarity between the North Carolina and
Florida situations. On March 8, however, his petition was dismissed,8s and this action was affirmed in early April by the Supreme
Court of the United States."9
The political right of citizens to as much equality in representation "as is practicable" finds its constitutional bottom in the equal
protection clause of the federal constitution. On the other hand,
the contention of plaintiffs in the Adams case was that denial of
the right to vote was a violation of the North Carolina due process
clause. However, this does not suggest that these plaintiffs lost
because they misconceived the basic nature of the political right they
sought to vindicate. Many commentators are of the view that the
right of equal representation also sounds in due process from the
point of view of constitutional theory even though it is articulated
40
through the equal protection clause.
PROPERTY RIGHTS

Taking under Eminent Domain
In neither the United States nor the North Carolina Constitution is there a specific limitation on state power to "take" private
property by eminent domain. Yet, in both, the familiar requirements of "public use" and "just compensation" were early found
resident in their due process clauses. 41 Recurrent litigation in state
U.S. (1966).
's-Durham
Morning Herald, March 8, 1966, p. 1. The court found lack

of similarity in the two situations. Reapportionment litigation began in
Florida in 1962, in North Carolina in 1965.
" Drum v. Sewell, 250 F. Supp. 922 (M.D.N.C. 1966), aff'd sub nom.
Drum v. Austin, 34 U.S.L. WEEic 3339 (U.S. March 4, 1966).
40 See Strong, note 36, Supra. For background analysis, Tussbman &
Tenbroek, The Equal Protectionof the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949),
is invaluable.

"U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, by Chicago B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226 (1897); N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 17, by Johnston v. Rankin, 70 N.C.

550 (1874).
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and federal courts concerns the concept of "taking," the qualities
that make a use "public" in nature, the elements of "just" compensation, and the attendant question as to the body that is to have
the final determination in these constitutional issues. During the
period under review, the Court dealt with two of these five aspects. 42
Highway Comm'n v. Batts makes it clear that in North Carolina what uses are "public" remains a judicial question. After citing
four of its own decisions in support, the Court declares that Rindge
Co. v. County of Los Angeles4 4 is "to the same effect." Reliance
upon a holding of the unreconstructed Supreme Court of the United
States is hazardous business. United States ex rel. TVA v. Welch"
6 just about completed, the United
started, and Berman v. Parker"
States Supreme Court's withdrawal from this position. Technically, these are interpretations of the fifth amendment, but, to borrow
a phrase from Justice Holmes, to count on this distinction would
be to rely upon a slender reed. However, basic constitutional law
teaches that the federal constitution requires of the states only adherence to a prescribed minimum of protection of individual rights;
the states are free by constitution or statute to provide a higher level
of protection. The measure of the constitutional significance of the
Batts holding is to be judged from the holding of a badly-split
Court that a condemnation by the State Highway Commission pursuant to statute and resolution was not for a public use for the
reason that the projected road could be of meaningful benefit only
to one family.

7

There was no question in the Batts case as to the threat of a
"taking"; expropriation of an easement in land in perpetuity for
right of way is clearly taking by eminent domain. But other fact
situations are not so clear, for the concept is a technical one. In
three further cases decided in the period under review, plaintiff prevailed but once. This was in Glace v. Town of Pilot Mountain,"'
"2Other aspects of eminent domain, not directly involving the constitutional bases of its exercise, are treated in Dameron, Eninent Domain,
North Carolina Case Law, 44 N.C.L. REv. 1003 (1966).
42265 N.C. 346, 144 S.E.2d 126 (1965), 44 N.C.L. RIv. 1142 (1966).
"262 U.S. 700 (1923).
' 327 U.S. 546 (1946).

,348 U.S. 26 (1954).
47 Highway Comm'n v. Board of Educ., 265 N.C. 35, 143 S.E.2d
87
(1965) involving priorities in public use as between governmental agencies
of the state, is considered in the section on eminent domain.
' 265 N.C. 181, 143 S.E.2d 78 (1965).
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wherein evidence that noxious odors from a municipal sewage disposal system were diminishing the value of abutting real property
was held sufficient to support a jury verdict, and judgment thereon,
for compensation for an acquired easement. The State Highway
Commission, on the other hand, was successful in two suits against
it. Both cases involved assertions that highway construction was
such as to cause damage from the movement of water produced
by heavy rains. In neither case could the Court find the requisite
of permanent nuisance; in one because of inability to prove measurable damages,4 9 and in the other because the provable damage was
to personal property as distinguished from fixtures. 0
The Glace determination sounds in terms of the landmark case
of United States v. Causby,5 the twenty-year-old decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States involving a North Carolina
chicken farmer. There the High Court, with two dissents, found
the "taking" of an easement by the United States as a consequence
of "frequent and regular flights . . . at low altitudes" by Army and
Navy aircraft at a World War II military airport located near
Greensboro. But the narrow distinction between "taking" under
eminent domain and noncompensable damage, even where proof is
clear and the property real, is demonstrated by two later decisions
of the United States Supreme Court which also stemmed from
prosecution of the Second World War. 2 Each of these holdings
also provoked two dissents, but not by the same Justices. Especially indicative of judicial difficulties in these cases is the fact that
whereas Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas disagreed in
Causby, they joined in dissent in the first of the two later decisions.
Taking under Policy Power
As the cases just discussed illustrate, the line between "taking"
for which government must pay and that for which it need not is
fine indeed. The classic example is Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon '3 in which Holmes and Brandeis divided on the question
of the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute forbidding the
v. Highway Comn'n, 265 N.C. 373, 144 S.E.2d 121 (1965).
Lyerly v. Highway Comm'n, 264 N.C. 649, 142 S.E.2d 658 (1965).
U.S. 256 (1946).
(1958)
" United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155
(closing of gold mines in order to divert miners to more essential work);
United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952) (demolition of private
property to prevent capture by the Japanese).
'260 U.S. 393 (1922).
50Midgett

51328
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mining of anthracite coal in such manner as to cause the subsidence
of residential structures located on land in which the Coal Company
had retained mineral rights. The period under review includes
several instances, other than those already identified, in which the
Court faced the question whether "taking" was to be tolerated under
what Holmes liked to call "the petty larceny of the police power."
Citing prior authority, the Court in State v. Walker14 reaffirmed
that "it is within the police power of the General Assembly and of
a city, when authorized, to establish minimum standards, materials,
designs, and construction of buildings for the safety of the occupants, their neighbors, and the public at large ....

In case of con-

flicting interest the public good is and must be paramount."" Accordingly, both a Charlotte ordinance requiring building permits
and the empowering state statute were cleared of violation of the
North Carolina and the United States Constitutions. The Court's
language and reference to the fourteenth amendment of the federal
constitution suggest that in its collective mind was the case of Miller
v. Schoene56 from Virginia, a celebrated decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States which, in most casebooks on constitutional law, is set in juxtaposition with Pennsylvania Coal v.
5 7

Mahon.

"Both the North Carolina and the Federal Constitutions recognize the authority of the State, through its legislative branch, to
regulate the sale and distribution of intoxicating liquors. Zifrin,
Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, Boyd v. Allen, 246 N.C. 150, 97
S.E.2d 864." So asserted the Court in Lampros Wholesale, Inc.
v. ABC Board," involving revocation of a liquor permit, in reaffirming familiar constitutional law. But even businesses subject
to a high degree of governmental control enjoy constitutional protection against discriminatory legislation. Thus in State v. Smith,"0
the alternative ground for invalidity of a county regulation of
night clubs6" was found in spacial and temporal limitations on oper' 265 N.C. 482, 144 S.E.2d 419 (1965).

SId. at 484-85, 144 S.E.2d at 421.
U.S. 272 (1928).
"1260 U.S. 393 (1922).
"265 N.C. 679, 682, 144 S.E.2d 895, 897 (1965).
- 265 N.C. 173, 143 S.E.2d 293 (1965).
"°The empowering statute was found unconstitutional because violative
of N.C. CONST. art. II, § 29. See discussion of Riegel v. Lyerly in text accompanying notes 78-82 infra.
M276

1966]

SURVEY OF NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW

945

ation that were without reasonable relation to the legitimate objective of protecting public worship and public school education. In the
discriminatory character of the resolution of the Board of County
Commissioners, the Court found denial of substantive due process,
citing both section 1 of the fourth amendment of the federal constitution and section 17 of article I of the North Carolina Constitution.
Per contra, the state was found guilty, as it were, of attempted
grand larceny in two decisions involving 1963 legislation. Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co. v. Andrews6 ' was concerned with the interpretation of a testamentary trust that provided on certain contingencies
for the payment of portions of the trust income to testator's great
nieces and nephews. Subsequent to testator's death in 1946, four
children were adopted by one nephew and one niece, respectively.
Relying upon G.S. § 48-23 as rewritten in 1963, these four adopted
children asserted rights to share in the trust income with the twelve
natural born great nieces and nephews. The Court's conclusion that
testator intended to include only the natural born is bolstered by
its judgment that "Sec. 17, Art. I, of the Constitution of North
Carolina, and Sec. 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States forbid the Legislature from diminishing a
vested interest by artificially increasing the class in which the estate
has vested."6 2 Paradoxically enough, the greatest strength for the
Court's assertion that the federal constitution would preclude a construction favorable to the adopted children is to be found in Mr.
Justice Black's recent dissent in El Paso v. Simmons.6 3 For a
United States Supreme Court holding in support since judicial reconstruction circa 1937, one has to resort to Wood v. Lovett."
Within this twenty-four-year period the petty larceny of the police
power (and some not so petty) has had a field day as far as the
fourteenth amendment is concerned.
In the other case, Jewell v. Pricee5 plaintiffs themselves conceded that "if this action was already barred when it was brought
on January 12, 1962, it may not be revived by an act of the legisla01264 N.C. 531, 142 S.E.2d 182 (1965).
2The case is further discussed in text accompanying notes 85-86 infra.
o-379 U.S. 497 (1965).
"313 U.S. 362 (1941).
05264 N.C. 459, 142 S.E.2d 1 (1965).
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ture, although that body may extend at will the time for bringing
actions not already barred by an existing statute."0' No constitutional provision was cited but the headnoter assumed the assertion
had constitutional underpinnings. It is clear that the constitution
would have to be that of North Carolina, for Chase Sec. Corp. v.
Donaldson67 reaffirmed the holding in Campbell v. Holt', "that
where lapse of time has not invested a party with title to real or
personal property, a state legislature, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, may repeal or extend a statute of limitations,
even after right of action is barred thereby, restore to plaintiff his
remedy, and divest the defendant of the statutory bar."0 0 Armstrong v. Mclnnis"° suggests another point of differentiation between the due process clauses of the North Carolina and United
States Constitutions as regards the scope of state police power. At
issue was the constitutionality of the rezoning of vacant property
within the city of High Point. For the test of validity the Court
quoted at some length from In re Appeal of Parker,71 a zoning case
which had in turn quoted from Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 2 the

original decision of the United States Supreme Court on the constitutionality of zoning. But the requirement of substantial relationship to the public health, morals, safety, or welfare which Euclid
established had meantime undergone considerable judicial adulteration at the hands of the High Court. Now state and federal economic regulation satisfy federal due process if only a rational nexus
is shown.7" The pages of this Review7 4 and of other law journals"5
have ably developed the practical significance of this seeming play
" Id. at 461, 142 S.E.2d at 3.

U.S. 304 (1945).
" 115 U.S. 620 (1885).
69 325 U.S. at 311. Note the exception to the general rule. In the Jewell
case the suit was for damages for alleged negligent installation of a furnace.
10264 N.C. 616, 142 S.E.2d 670 (1965).
' 214 N.C. 51, 197 S.E. 706 (1938).
12272 U.S. 365 (1926).
78
The Carolene Products cases are among the leading decisions. Caro8'325

lene Products Co. v.United States, 323 U.S. 18 (1944); United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).

"Hanft & Hamrick, Haphazard Regimentation Under Licensing Statutes, 17 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1938).
" McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court, An Ex-

humation and Reburial, inSUPREmE

CouRT RE VIEW

34 (1962); Hethering-

ton, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of Law, 53
Nw.U.L. REv. 13, 226 (1958); Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive
Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L.REv. 91 (1950).
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on words.76 If, therefore, as seems to be intended, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina is adhering to the stricter test of substantial nexus, the fact that rezoning was validated in Armstrong
does not minimize the importance to the North Carolina litigant and
lawyer of the differing content given by it to section 17 of article I
of the state constitution.
SEPARATION OF POWERS

Issues of separation of powers, together with those involving
the related concept of delegation of powers, appear in the cases
decided during the period under review. These are largely considered elsewhere, 77 and only three will be discussed here.
In litigation over the construction of a will, Riegel v. Lyerly, 7s
defendants urged that the Rule in Shelley's Case should not apply to
personalty. To this contention the Court responded negatively on
two grounds: first, it is the settled common law of North Carolina
that the Rule is as applicable to personal as to real property; secondly, "If public policy requires a change, we think it should be made
by the Legislature." 9 American courts have not, as a general principle, found inconsistency between the constitutional principle of
separation of powers and their historic function of fashioning common law. On the other hand, they will on occasion decline to act
legislatively. Thus here the Court is unwilling "to change the law
of property by judicial fiat."8 0 Often it is difficult to determine
whether policy or doctrine explains the judicial reluctance. In
neither the case under review nor the sole North Carolina precedent
cited"' does the Court explicitly predicate its decision on a constitutional basis, yet each is headnoted to "Constitutional Law."
Policy orientation in the principal case is suggested by the observation made immediately after expression of refusal to alter the
7
The difference between the holdings of many state, courts and of the
Supreme Court of the United States, consequent upon the differing phrasing

of the constitutional test, is appraised in a larger frame in Strong, Toward

an Acceptable Function of Jiudicial Review, 11 S.D.L. REv. 1 (1966).
"' See Hanft, Administrative Law, North Carolina Case Law, 44 N.C.L.
REv. 889 (1966).

"265 N.C. 204, 143 S.E.2d 65 (1965).
"' For discussion of the Court's first ground of decision, see Aycock,
Real Property, North Carolina Case Law, 44 N.C.L. REv. 1027 (1966).
265 N.C. at 209, 143 S.E.2d at 68.
Williams v. Randolph Hosp., Inc., 237 N.C. 387, 75 S.E.2d 303 (1953).
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law. Said the Court, "[T]he change, if made, should apply to instruments thereafter executed." 2 This suggests judicial concern
over retroactive application of an overruling decision, the result required by the logic of the fiction that courts declare, rather than
make, the law. Yet, increasingly, American courts are overruling
prospectively in response to compelling arguments for such judicial
boldness. Great No. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co.

83

has left

American courts relatively free of federal constitutional control in
this aspect of law administration.8 4 On the other hand, the Court's
citation of the recent case of Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Andrews8 5 in support of its observation suggests that in the Court's
mind the due process clauses of the North Carolina and United
States Constitutions present an obstacle to retrospective application
where property rights are involved.8
In accordance with a long accepted principle of American constitutional law, the North Carolina Court deduces from the state
constitution's mandate for separation of legislative, executive, and
judicial powers" a limitation upon the extent to which the General
Assembly may constitutionally delegate its power to a coordinate
branch or to an agency of its creation. The familiar requirement
is that the legislature cannot delegate its full authority but only a
portion of its legislative power accompanied by standards under
which its delegate must exercise the limited authority given. These
standards must be sufficiently specific to canalize the delegation; in
the words of Cardozo, the delegation cannot "run riot." During
the period under review the issue of specificity of standards was
raised in a modem factual setting. By declaratory judgment pro265 N.C. at 209, 143 S.E.2d at 68.
8287 U.S. 358 (1932).
84The policy considerations involved are canvassed in Spruill, The Effect

of an Overruling Decision, 18 N.C.L. REv. 199 (1940); 28 ILL. L. REv.
277 (1933); 42 YALE L.J. 779 (1933). Only in criminal procedure is there
partial restriction of Eskridge v. Board, 357 U.S. 219 (1958). Gideon v.

Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Cf. Linldetter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618

(1965).
88264 N.C. 531, 142 S.E.2d 182 (1965). This late decision is discussed
in text accompanying note 61 supra.
8 The Andrews case concerned legislative power to diminish vested
rights in Property. Compare Wilkinson v. Wallace, 192 N.C. 156, 134 S.E.
401 (1926), applying in a situation involving real property the exception
to the traditional rule of retroactivity which forecloses impairment of vested
rights through retrospective application of decisions revising interpretations
and statutory provisions on which reliance has been placed.
of constitutional
8
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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cedure, the North Carolina Turnpike Authority sought judicial
validation of the legislative delegation made to it in G.S. § 13689.63. A unanimous Court in Turnpike Authority v. Pine Island8"
found the delegation valid. Little limitation remains on Congress
in delegating to the Executive Department or to federal administrative agencies. State courts have been more strict, yet decisions such
as the turnpike cases suggest increasing state-court liberalization in
the content of specificity. s9
Delegations of legislative power to the political subdivisions of
a non-home-rule state are not, for one reason or another, subjected
to the requirement of meaningful standards generally enforced in
attempted delegations to administrative bodies. ° However, state
constitutions may be freighted with other forms of limitation upon
delegation to political subdivisions. Such is section 29 of article II
of the North Carolina Constitution, which voids any "local, private
or special act or resolution" of the General Assembly "regulating
labor, trade, mining or manufacturing." This prohibition was held
in High Point Surplus Co. v. Pleasants9" to render nugatory G.S.
§ 153-9(55) as far as it purports to authorize nonuniform ordinances regulative of labor, trade, etc. In consequence a Wake County Sunday-closing ordinance was held to be without basis in law
and its enforcement amenable to injunction.9 2 Direct precedent for
both remedial and substantive holding was found in Treasure City,
Inc. v. Clark."3 That case, in turn, refers to the decision in Surplus
Store, Inc. v. Hunter, 4 which had invalidated an effort of the
General Assembly to forbid by state law Sunday sales of specified
8265 N.C. 109, 143 S.E.2d 319 (1965).
favorable to constitutionality from Indiana, Massachusetts,
Michigan and New Jersey are cited and relied upon by the Court.
90 For this recognized exception to the general rule and its various explanations, see STRONG, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1146 (1950).
"1264 N.C. 650, 142 S.E.2d 697 (1965).
02 Two paragraphs in the opinion are parenthetically noteworthy. In one,
264 N.C. at 656, 142 S.E.2d at 702, the Court gives a concise history of
art. II, § 29, demonstrating that it was the product of dissatisfaction with
nonuniform legislation respecting local government. The other paragraph,
264 N.C. at 657, 142 S.E.2d at 703, makes clear that in the Court's view
not all legislation unembracive of the entire State is invalid under art. II, §
29. Rather, the constitutional provision is viewed as directed at geographical classifications which are not reasonably related to the objective of Sunday observance legislation. Cf. discussion in text accompanying note 59 supra
of State v. Smith, 265 N.C. 173, 143 S.E.2d 293 (1965).
90261 N.C. 130, 134 S.E.2d 97 (1964).
"'257 N.C. 206, 125 S.E.2d 764 (1962).
80Decisions
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5

items.
Invalidation was predicated upon the "void for vagueness" principle embedded in the due process clauses of state and
federal constitutions. Thus the Hunter holding is not at odds with
the statement with which this paragraph opens, although it does
represent a stricter position on state power to enact Sunday-closing
laws than does the relevant decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States."'

CORPORATIONS
Ernest L. Folk, III*
The Survey period produced only one corporation law decision
of significance, a decision dealing with shareholder record-inspection rights. In addition, there have been several amendments to
the Business Corporation Law, noted elsewhere in this issue of the
Review.1
INSPECTION OF RECORDS
Cooke v. Outland2 is the most useful judicial analysis in this
state of the shareholder's statutory right to inspect books and records of the corporation, and its resolution and clarification of several
problems makes more definite and certain the scope of this right,
which as a matter of practice is often presented to attorneys whether
acting for shareholders seeking inspection or for corporations resisting such demands."
In Cooke v. Outland, a minority shareholder in a state bank
sought but was refused inspection of "the books, records, and statements of the [bank] in reference to the loans made by the
"5N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-346.2 (Supp. 1965).

"'McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). The Hunter Court
quotes from McGowan but fails to articulate its reasons for believing it
inapposite.
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
144 N.C.L. REv. 1106 (1966).
2265 N.C. 601, 144 S.E.2d 835 (1965).
'The most comprehensive discussion of stockholder inspection rights
appears in ROBINSON, NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 58-59 (1964). The statutory provisions governing inspection
rights, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-37 to -38 (1965), are further analyzed and
criticized in Folk, Revisiting the North CarolinaCorporationLaw, 43 N.C.L.

Rzv. 768, 829-33 (1965).
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Bank . . .- 4 from 1950 to date, including the deposit accounts of
the officers, directors and employees of the bank and also the loan
records. The shareholder's asserted purposes were multiple but related: to verify absence of preferential treatment and to determine
the bank's true financial condition, the present and potential value
of the shareholder's stock, the efficiency of its managers and their
good faith, and the extent of the possible assessment liability of his
shares.' On the bank's refusal to allow the inspection the shareholder brought a civil action in the nature of mandamus. The
superior court held, inter alia, that he had not stated a proper purpose for inspecting the bank records, and that in any event such
inspection would violate the "confidential relationship" between the
bank and its customers.' On appeal, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed (one judge not participating).
In reversing the denial of an inspection order, the Supreme
Court held that the inspection right provision of the 1955 Business
Corporation Law7 applied to state chartered banks.' This was foreshadowed, somewhat indirectly, by the decision several years ago
in White v. Smith9 recognizing that several cognate provisions of
the statute applied to building and loan associations, although that
case did not deal with shareholders' rights to inspect "books and
records of account." The Court's analysis in holding that inspection rights govern banking corporations is indisputably sound. As
the statute indicates, when Cooke v. Outland was decided there was
no express exception of banking corporations from the coverage
of the act, nor is there some other specific statutory provision par'265 N.C. at 604, 144 S.E.2d at 837.
Ibid.
Id. at 607, 144 S.E.2d at 839. The Court also held inapplicable the
familiar administrative law principle requiring exhaustion of administrative
remedies as a precondition to obtaining judicial relief. Here the bank argued
that the shareholder should have taken the matter to the North Carolina
Banking Commission under the vague statutory provision that the Commission may conduct hearings upon any matter or thing which may arise in
connection with the banking laws of this State. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-92
(1965). Quite properly, this was held not to oust the shareholder from
seeking and getting inspection of records through a court order. Cooke v.
Outland, supra at 616, 144 S.E.2d at 845.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-38 (1965).
8265 N.C. at 607-10, 144 S.E.2d at 839-42.
0256 N.C. 218, 123 S.E.2d 628 (1962). This case sustained the right of
shareholders of a state chartered building and loan association to obtain
inspection of the list of shareholders in preparation for a shareholders'
meeting pursuant to N.C. GEN, STAT. §§ 55-37(a)(3), -64 (1965).
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ticularly applicable to banks or inconsistent with some provision of
the corporation law.' 0 Subsequently, the corporation law has been
amended so as to restrict the inspection rights of a bank shareholder with respect to loan and deposit records." Since this statutory amendment was inapplicable to the present litigation, 12 it may
be ignored here, but its broader impact is discussed elsewhere."3
The Supreme Court has helpfully resolved the vexing question
whether the shareholder must affirmatively prove proper purpose,
or whether the corporation must establish absence of proper purpose (or wrongful purpose). The 'answer to this question cannot
readily be resolved from the relevant statutory provision, for G.S.
§ 55-38(b) merely says that a qualified shareholder 14 shall have
the right to inspect certain documents "for any proper purpose."
This could be construed either way on burden of proof without
violating statutory laiguage; and, indeed, the common law was
never completely settled on the issue, since courts were sharply
split on who bore the burden.' There is, under the statute, one
technical argument, not noted by the Court, that cuts in the direction of the result reached by the decision. Since G.S. § 55-38(f)
does expressly require a shareholder to prove proper purpose, there
is a negative implication that G.S. § 55-38(b) assumes that the
opposite rule applies-that the corporation must show an improper
purpose. For G.S. § 55-38(f) governs when other provisions of
G.S. § 55-38 are inapplicable, i.e., "notwithstanding the foregoing
provisions of this section," and therefore if G.S. § 55-38(f) must
declare a specific burden-of-proof rule, it logically indicates that a
different rule prevails as to the other provisions of the section.
N.C. GEN.
10 In such event, the more specific provision would apply.
STAT. § 55-3(a) (1965).
"1N.C. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 609, codified in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-38(i)
(Supp. 1965).
"The Court, in Cooke v. Outland, 265 N.C. at 607-610, 144 S.E.2d at
839-42 (1965), stressed this point.
"sSee note 1 supra.
1" One is a qualified shareholder if he has been a record holder for at
least six months preceding his demand, or if, without regard to time of
holdings, he is a record holder of at least 5% of any stock class. Voting
trust certificate holders may also be qualified for inspection. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-38(a) (1965). Cooke v. Outland involved no question under
this provision.
op. cit. supra note 3, § 58, at n.25, implies that the issue
1" RoBINso,
had not been resolved in North Carolina at the time of publication of his
work (1964).
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There is also a weak, but not to be ignored,, implication.in the-language of G.S. § 55-38(d) imposing certain monetary penalties on
a corporate officer or agent who refuses to allow a shareholder to
exercise his inspection right under G.S. § 55-38(b). In such event,
the shareholder sues to recover the penalty. One specific defense
is an affirmative proof by the defendants that the shareholder has
previously sold shareholder lists or misused information obtained
in prior inspections. In effect, the statute allows the defendants
to escape liability by proving, from past events, that this shareholder probably is seeking inspection for an improper purpose.
These technical arguments support the Court's desirable holding which reads into the statute the "liberal" common-law rule.
Stated more precisely, Cooke v. Outland indicates that the shareholder's written demand (and court petition) must indicate on its
face some "proper purpose."'8 - At that point, the corporation must
prove an improper or unlawful purpose. The Court observes that
a mere denial of proper purpose is insufficient; rather the corporation must "show by facts, if they can" the impropriety of the purpose." The Court's discussion also implies that the shareholder
must himself show a proper purpose by factual allegations and not
by a mere vague generalized statement. In the nature of things,
however, a shareholder seeking records to learn specific matters is
not in a position to allege facts with any great degree of specificity
and should not be held to too strict a standard.
This allocation of the burden of proof applies only to G.S. §
55-38(b), that is, the general statutory right of the shareholder to
examine and make extracts from the "books and records of account, minutes and 'ecord of shareholders." It is not applicable to
a shareholder's demand to inspect other books, e.g., minutes of the
board of directors' meetings or of meetings of director committees,
correspondence, contracts, intra-office memoranda, and the like. As
to these documents, under G.S. § 55-38(f) the shareholder has no
inspection as of right but only on court orders; here he bears the
burden of affirmatively proving proper purpose; and refusal by corporate officers to permit such inspection does not subject them to
G.S. § 55-38(d)'s statutory penalty, although disobedience to a final
order entails its own sanctions under G.S. § 55-38(h).
10 265 N.C. at 615, 144 S.E.2d at 845.
17 Ibid.
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Cooke v. Outland usefully clarifies the content of the proper purpose standard. In this context, "proper purpose" refers to the reason or need to inspect, and the Court approves at least three such
reasons: (1) to determine the value of the shareholder's stock, (2)
to ascertain the financial condition of the corporation, and (3) to
determine whether the corporation is efficiently managed.18 The
general test, as indicated by the Court, is whether the purpose is
"germane to his status as a shareholder" of the corporation.' 0
This formulation finds support in the language of G.S. § 55-38(e)
making it a misdemeanor to use information obtained by inspection
"for any purposes other than those incident to ownership of the
shares as to which such information was obtained." Thus, the test
indicates quite properly that the shareholder is not confined to seeking information relating to a specifically corporate matter, e.g.,
suspected breach of duty, but may inquire into matters reasonably
related to his position as shareholder and the value of his stock.
Improper purposes-which the corporation must establish by
facts-are often matters of a shareholder's bad motive. Thus the
Court lists the following: (1) the requested inspection is not "in
good faith and would tend to advance a purpose inimical or hostile
to the corporation or the other stockholders," (2) the shareholder
seeks only to gratify his curiosity, or (3) primarily to harass the
corporation of its management, or (4) to "advance a speculative
purpose," or (5) (as a catchall) "some other improper purpose."2
This is consistent with established authority."1 Obviously, it is not
always easy to say when some forbidden motive dominates the
legitimate purposes for which inspection is sought, and this determination will often turn upon matters of fact and the trial court's
impression of the plaintiff and the character of his demands. Thus,
inspection would properly be denied if the shareholder's purpose is
to obtain information to advance his own business affairs, e.g.,
where he is in a competitive business; or to dig up possible grounds
" Ibid. Presumably, determination of a shareholder's possible assessment liability would also be a proper purpose in the relatively few cases
where this might arise. The shareholder had indicated this as one reason
for the inspection he sought. Cooke v. Outland, 265 N.C. at 604, 144 S.E.2d
at 837.
19 265 N.C. at 615, 144 S.E.2d at 845.
2 Ibid.
" RoBINsoN, op. cit. supra note 3, § 58, at nn.20-25, indicates decisions
in North Carolina construing "proper purpose."
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for litigation with a view to having a "strike suit" bought off at
a handsome price; or to obtain a sucker list of shareholders to be
sold to others. Certainly, inspection is properly denied if its purpose is merely to "gratify his curiosity," but a line must be drawn
between idle curiosity and a sincere desire to satisfy oneself that
the affairs of the corporation are being properly managed. Thus,
a shareholder's genuine suspicion that all is not well need not be
treated as idle "curiosity," for after all his purpose may be simply
to feel assured that all is in fact in order. Although the meaning
of "advanc[ing] a speculative purpose" is not clear, presumably it
seeks to block fishing expeditions or inspections for idle curiosity.
In short, most of the proscribed objectives could be subsumed under
the rubric that they do not relate to or advance the interest of the
2
shareholder qua shareholder but qua some other personal status. 1
Thus, in this case, the Court thought that records of the deposits
of directors, officers and employees were not germane to the status
of shareholder.23 This would probably be correct without more;
but if the shareholder should assert a sincere and not unreasonable
belief that bank personnel had misappropriated funds, the relevance
of such records is evident. 4
Elsewhere I have suggested that, while this standard is good as far as
it goes, it might prove slightly restrictive if the reason for inspection is
to determine some matter germane to the individual's interest not as a shareholder but as, say, a former officer or director of the corporation. Folk,
supra note 3, at 832 n.271. This would be true in a close corporation where
a shareholder's interest as director or officer may be more important to him
than his interest as a shareholder. For instance, if a minority shareholder
were removed from a compensated office without explanation, he would want
to obtain inspection of records; but what has been done to him does not
especially affect his position as shareholder, although it may grievously impair his interests in other ways, such as cutting off his salary or voice in
corporate affairs. Certainly inspection would be proper here. While incumbent directors (and presumably incumbent officers) have inspection
rights at common law, the posture of ousted or former directors (and, a
2

fortiori, officers) is considerably less certain.

ROBINSON,

op. cit. supra note

3, §22265
96. N.C. at
615, 144 S.E.2d at 845.
' 4The Court, unfortunately, put its seal of approval upon a familiar but
erroneous "proposition that those in charge of the banking corporation are
merely the agents of the stockholders, who are the real and beneficial owners
of the property, the legal title to which is held by the banking corporation . . ." so that inspection by a shareholder of his corporation's records
is "one merely for the inspection and examination of what is his own."
Cooke v. Outland, 265 N.C. at 610, 144 S.E.2d at 841. This is a nice fiction
but meaningless and erroneous. In no real sense are the shareholders the
real and beneficial owners of corporate property; the shareholder's right is
simply to receive dividends if as and when declared, to vote on matters as
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CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
Richard M. Smith*
PERFECTION OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN MOTOR VEHICLES

The 1961 General Assembly revised the statutes governing the
perfection of security interests in motor vehicles subject to licensing
by requiring the security interest to be noted on the certificate of
title.' An announced reason for the revision was that "a certificate
of title that can be relied upon as a ready means by which all legal
interests in motor vehicles may be determined would be in the public
interest .. *"2 Of course, the statute does not completely fulfill the
policy indicated by the preamble because express exceptions to its
coverage permit perfection of three types of "legal interests" by
methods other than notation on the certificate of title. Artisan's or
storage liens, governmental liens, and security interests created by
a manufacturer or dealer who holds the vehicle for resale will not
be indicated on the certificate of title.3
In an elusive opinion, the North Carolina Supreme Court has
engrafted an additional exception onto the statute. The Court has
held that the secured party may perfect by taking possession of the
vehicle although leaving the debtor in possession of the "clean" cerprovided by statute and charter, and to share in the proceeds of liquidation.
Moreover, directors and officers are not agents of the shareholders but of
the corporation. If they are agents of the shareholders, one would have to
answer whether they are agents of a majority, three-fourths, 99%, or 100%
of the shareholders. If there was a principal-agent relationship between
shareholders and directors, the shareholders could at any time override
directors' action despite the statutory commitment of the affairs of the
corporation to the directors. Directors and officers are agents of the corporation as a separate legal entity; they are elected and may be removed by
the shareholders, but until removed they are essentially like public officialsgenerally responsible to the electorate but not agents of the electorate.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill.
I N.C. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 835. The portions of the act relating to perfection of security interests are contained in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-58
through 20-58.10 (1965).
2 N.C. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 835, preamble. (Emphasis added.) Another
reason was stated to be: "The certificate of title, [under prior law] often
regarded as absolute, is not conclusive as to liens and may not be relied
upon to show good title for purpose of sale or encumbrance."
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-58.9 (1965).
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tificate of title. In April and May of 1963, Long, a new and used
automobile dealer, gave to the plaintiff, Wachovia Bank, chattel
mortgages on twelve used automobiles as security for a loan. Subsequently, in April, May and June of 1963, Long executed in favor
of the defendant, Wayne Finance Company, chattel mortgages
covering the same twelve automobiles. The defendant took possession of the certificates of title to the automobiles. On June 19, 1963,
the plaintiff took possession of the automobiles and recorded its
chattel mortgages in the register of deeds office. A few hours later,
on June 20, 1963, the defendant recorded its chattel mortgages.
Thus, the plaintiff had possession of the automobiles and the firstrecorded chattel mortgages. The defendant had possession of the
certificates of title and the subsequently-recorded chattel mortgages.
The court held that the plaintiff had the prior claim to the proceeds
of the agreed-upon sale of the automobiles. The reason given was
that recording acts have never been held to be applicable where the
secured party takes possession of the collateral. Furthermore, the
Court stated: "People do not normally purchase or lend money on
second hand automobiles merely upon the exhibition of the certificate of title." 5 If this statement had effect in leading to the conclusion of the Court, this writer would think it counter-balanced by
the assumption that people should not purchase or lend money on a
second hand automobile without taking possession of the certificate
of title as well as the automobile.
The Court stated that the defendant would have had the prior
lien if it had transmitted the certificates to the Department of Motor
Vehicles within ten days after the mortgages were executed, but
this statement appears to be founded upon the fact that the plaintiff
took possession nineteen days after the date of execution of the
defendant's last mortgage. It would appear that if the plaintiff had
taken possession before the execution of the defendant's mortgages,
their perfection by transmission of the certificates to the Department of Motor Vehicles thereafter would have been unavailing, for
the Court said "the Legislature did not intend to prevent a mortgagee who has actual possession of the pledged vehicle from ac"Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Wayne Fin. Co., 262 N.C. 711, 138
S.E.2d
481 (1964).
5
Id. at 715, 138 S.E.2d at 484. This fact, if it is a fact, does not appear
in the record of the case.
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quiring a lien having priority over liens not then perfected."'
Nevertheless, standing alone, this conclusion has not greatly altered
the degree of reliability of the certificate of title that is dictated by
the express terms of the statute. The prospective lender or purchaser is, in any event, bound at his peril to determine whether
the vehicle is subject to an artisan's possessory lien, which will not
appear on the certificate of title.7 However, by choosing this broad
ground as a basis for the decision, the Court has cast in doubt the
interpretation and applicability of another section of the statute
that has far more importance to commercial lenders.
The parties stipulated that at all relevant times, Long was "engaged in the business of buying and selling new and used automobiles."" G.S. § 20-58.9 (3) exempts from notation on the certificate
of title "a security interest created by a manufacturer or dealer who
holds the vehicle for resale. . .

."

Although the statute does not spe-

cifically so provide, it may reasonably be inferred that such security
interests may be perfected in the manner applicable generally to
the type of security interest, e.g., filing or recording in the county
where the dealer maintains his place of business.' In the instant
case, the prevailing party did record first, and it seems that the
Court could have disposed of the case on that relatively simple
ground without mentioning possession.
The only serious objection to such a disposition of this case
would be that the exception from notation on the certificate of title
is intended to apply only to the financing of new automobiles for
which no certificate of title has been issued. And the grouping of
manufacturers and dealers within the same exception lends some
weight to the argument. However, it is believed that other considerations override such a construction.
The annual volume of used automobile sales10 and the conse0 Ibid.

"N.C.
STAT. § 20-58.9(1) (1965).
'Record,GEN.
p. 4.
9G.S. §§ 47-20, -20.2(2) (Supp. 1965). The Uniform Commercial Code

will require that security interests not noted on the certificate of title be
filed in the office of the Secretary of State and, if the debtor (dealer) has a
place of business in only one county, the security interest must additionally
be filed in that county. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-401 (1965).
" Eleven million, three hundred thousand used automobiles were purchased in the United States in 1963. AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS Ass'N,
AUTOmOnLLE FACTS & FIGUREs 43 (1965). Totals for North Carolina are
not available, but an estimate based upon proportion of United States popula-
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quent volume of inventory that passes through the hands of dealers
makes unduly burdensome a rule that would require the transmittal
to Raleigh of the certificate of title to each inventory vehicle that
is used as collateral for credit by the dealer. And during the period
in which the certificate was in transit to Raleigh and back to the
dealer's financer, the vehicle would not be saleable.
A primary reason for requiring notation of liens on the certificate of title is the mobility of the automobile, which makes desirable,
if not necessary, some certain place where the status of title may be
determined. However, considered in conjunction with the provision
that a buyer in the ordinary course of business from the dealer
will have priority over any security interests created by the dealer,"
the mobility factor loses importance when the automobile is in the
hands of the dealer. The dealer's place of business, not necessarily
the location of any specific automobile owned by him, is the point
around which credit inquiries revolve. The dealer's place of business is presumably not so mobile. Therefore, it would seem that
the dealer's creditors or bulk purchasers could be adequately protected if there is a public record of the security interests in the
county where the dealer has a place of business. In fact, creditors
would be better served if there was a single location where the
security interests could be recorded, rather than a notation on each
certificate of title.
In the absence of express limitation on the term "dealer," it is
submitted that G.S. § 20-58.9(3) should be construed to apply to
new and used automobile dealers. And an argument for the application of G.S. § 20-58.9(3) was made as the first point in the plaintiff-appellee's brief.'" The Court did not mention that section of
the statute in its opinion. Thus, trying to project the Court's future
interpretation of G.S. § 20-58.9(3) by choosing between unexpressed alternatives in the instant case would not be profitable. But
it is believed that the application of G.S. § 20-58.9(3) to similar
tion residing in North Carolina would be in excess of 280,000. Liberal discounting for the probable fact that states with a higher per capita income
have a higher proportion of automobile sales and for the facts that not all
used automobiles are sold by dealers and not all that are are used as
collateral for loans would leave a substantial number of unnecessary forwardings of certificates of title to the Department of Motor Vehicles if
dealer1 created security interests are required to be shown on the title.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-58.9(3) (1965).
1"Brief of Appellee, p. 2-3,
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cases that might arise in the future would result in the soundest
interpretation of the statute.
In National Bank of Sanford v. Greensboro Motor Co.,13 the
Court dealt with the validity of motor vehicle chattel mortgages
that were executed prior to the time the certificates of title were
issued in the mortgagor's name. On December 4, 1961, Carolina
Concrete purchased two trucks from Fields and the certificates of
title were assigned to Carolina. On December 14, 1961, Carolina
executed a chattel mortgage in favor of plaintiff as security for a
loan of 8500 dollars. The chattel mortgages were recorded December 18, 1961.'- However, the certificates of title were not forwarded by Carolina to the Department of Motor Vehicles until
May and November of 1962. Carolina sold the trucks to the defendant in November 1962, and certificates of title were issued in the
defendant's name. The plaintiff brought an action for conversion."
The Supreme Court, in affirming the decision of the superior court,
held for the defendant. The Court reasoned that, under the Motor
Vehicle Act, title does not pass to a purchaser until application for
the new certificate is made. Therefore, at the time the mortgages
were executed, Carolina did not have title to the trucks, and the
"mortgages" were merely "contracts to mortgage" if and when
Carolina acquired title. In support of this conclusion, the Court
cited Chandler v. Cameron,' thus giving new credence to a decision
that would be best forgotten. In Chandler the Court held that a
contract to convey absolute timber rights in a tract of land that
was executed at a time when the grantor owned a one-sixth interest,
but recorded after the grantor acquired an additional one-sixth interest by conveyance from his sister, was not valid as to the second
one-sixth interest as against a subsequent grantee who recorded
after the first grantee. In such a situation, the "estoppel by deed,"
or "feeding the estoppel" doctrine as theretofore interpreted by the
Court would dictate that when the grantor acquires the second onesixth interest, legal title would vest in the first grantee, 17 subject
13264 N.C. 568, 142 S.E.2d 166 (1965).

"Recording was the proper method of perfection at that time because
the requirement of notation of liens on the certificate of title did not become
effective until Jan. 1, 1962. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-58.10 (1965).
"3 The defendant had sold the trucks to a third party before this action
was commenced.
1229 N.C. 62, 47 S.E.2d 528 (1948).
17 See Hallyburton v. Slagle, 132 N.C. 947, 952-53, 44 S.E. 655, 658
(1903); Wellborn v. Finley, 52 N.C. 228, 236 (1859).
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to the restrictions of the recording acts. A recording made before
the grantor acquired title has not been recognized as valid because
it is off the "chain of title" of the grantor.1 8 But it was assumed
that a recording made after the grantor acquired title is valid as
against any subsequently recorded interest. 9 However, in Chandler
the Court held that the contract to convey, insofar as it related to
property not owned by the grantor at the time of execution, was a
"mere personal contract" that could not be recorded. Consequently,
even though the contract was in fact on record, it was not notice to
the subsequent grantee, who prevailed with respect to the second
one-sixth interest.
Heretofore, Chandler might have been dismissed as an excursion for the sake of justice or as "contract to convey" law.2 ° However, current introduction of the case into chattel mortgage law in
National Bank of Sanford appears to add an additional and unnecessary condition to the general "estoppel by deed" doctrine. In
Chandler the Court expressly stated that the "personal contract"
was valid between the parties. But this is little protection to a
grantee or mortgagee who holds the unrecordable "personal contract." The grantor or mortgagor can, after acquiring title, convey
to a third person who, by recording, will have priority. To have
an interest that could be recorded, the first grantee would be required to procure a new conveyance from a probably reluctant
grantor. This might require equitable action for specific enforcement of the "personal contract," a totally unnecessary additional
step when the first grantee already holds a warranted conveyance
from the grantor, the only defect of which is the antecedent date.
Thus, it is the opinion of the writer that the revival of Chandler
is undesirable and probably unnecessary in the instant case. Here,
"8Federal Land Bank v. Johnson, 205 N.C. 180, 170 S.E. 658 (1933);
Builders Sash & Door Co. v. Joyner, 182 N.C. 518, 109 S.E. 259 (1921).
10 Builders Sash & Door Co. v. Joyner, supra note 18 (dictum).
'oThere is another possible theory that could explain the result of Chandler on the precise facts, but it requires disregarding much of the opinion and
doing some violence to the general recording rules. The first contract to
convey was recorded on December 16. The second contract was executed
on December 14 and recorded on December 18. It might be theorized that
the holder of the first contract has a recordable equitable interest, not subject
to the normal race recording rules, which will be cut off by a bona fide
purchaser who acquires his interest before recording of the equitable interest. But, as indicated, although this might explain the result, it is not consistent with the court's assumption that the first contract was personal and
not, under any circumstances, subject to recording.
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there was no attempt by the plaintiff to re-record or perfect the
chattel mortgage subsequent to the time the mortgagor acquired
title. The Court could have applied the rule that the recording made
before the mortgagor acquired title is not valid and reached the
21
same result.
It should be noted that the Uniform Commercial Code will require an entirely different approach to the problem in the case of
personal property. Disregarding transitional problems, 22 the Code
offers at least two grounds for reaching a different result in similar
cases. Section 9-2042s provides that a security interest "attaches"
when there is an agreement that it attach, the secured party gives
value, and the debtor has "rights" in the collateral. The Code does
not purport to define generally the time at which the debtor acquires
rights in the collateral. 4 However, it seems that "rights" may be
something less than "title," else the latter, more restrictive term
would have been employed. 5 In National Bank of Sanford the
debtor had possession of the trucks and the certificates of title under
a completely executed contract of sale. The debtor's interest was
not defeasible by the vendor or the vendor's creditors or purchasers.
The only step required for acquisition of "title" was the purely
21

See note 18 supra.

2' If the Code were superimposed upon the exact situation in National
Bank of Sanford, questions concerning the transition from filing of security
interests in motor vehicles to them on the certificate of title under the
Motor Vehicle Act would unduly complicate this general discussion. For
example, if the security interests were deemed not to have "attached" on
December 14, 1961, there would be a question as to the validity of the filing
or recording beyond January 1, 1961. The following discussion disregards
such questions and assumes that filing or recording was at all relevant times
a proper
method of perfection of the chattel mortgages on motor vehicles.
2
4N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-204(1) (1965).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-204(2) (1965) contains some specific, limited
rules on acquisition of rights in crops, animals, fish oil, gas, timber, contract
rights and accounts. Why the drafters deemed necessary a specific rule that
a debtor has no rights in "fish until caught," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9204(2) (b) (1965), and deemed unnecessary an attempt at general definition
is not explained.
2"In Cain v. Country Club Delicatessen of Saybrook, Inc., 25 Conn. Supp.
327, 203 A.2d 441 (1964), the court assumed in dictum that a debtor acquires rights in collateral when the goods are "identified" to a contract of
sale. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-501(1) (1965). And N.C. GEN. STAT. §
25-2-501(2) (1965) clearly contemplates that goods may become identified
to the contract before "title" passes to the buyer. The court in Cain left
unanswered the question whether the debtor acquires "rights" at the time of
execution of the contract of sale and before identification of the specific
goods to the contract. But the court held that mere possession does not
give the debtor rights in the collateral.
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formal step of making application for issuance of the certificates.
Therefore, under the Code, the chattel mortgage (security interest)
probably would have "attached" on December 14, 1961, the date of
execution.
Moreover, insofar as the basic validity of the security agreement
is the issue, it makes no difference when the debtor acquired rights.
There is no specified order in which the three events necessary for
attachment must occur.2" The security agreement may be executed
at any time. The security agreement that is executed before the
debtor has rights in the collateral is not a "mere personal contract"
or "contract to mortgage"; it becomes a lien without additional
action when the secured party gives value and the debtor acquires
rights in the collateral.
Furthermore, as to personal property other than motor vehicles,"'
the notice filing concept incorporated into Article 9 contemplates
that financing statements may be filed before the security agreement
is executed or the interest attaches.' The financing statement is effective for sixty days beyond the maturity date of the obligation, if
the date is stated, or for five years.29 It will operate to perfect any
security interest in described collateral that attaches within the effective period. Thus, a chattel mortgage that is executed and filed as
a financing statement under the Code will become a perfected security interest, valid against subsequent purchasers and creditors, whenever the debtor acquires rights in the collateral and the secured party
gives value.
NOTICE OF FORECLOSURE

In Woodell v. Davis ° the plaintiff brought an action for
wrongful foreclosure that was based upon an alleged agreement by
the defendant to refrain from foreclosure as long as interest was
paid and to give plaintiff personal notice in advance of foreclosure.
The defendant foreclosed by exercise of the power of sale and did
not attempt to give plaintiff personal notice. The Court affirmed
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that no consideration for

" N.C.

GEN. STAT. § 25-9-204, comment 2 (1965).
The motor vehicle security interest, under the Code, will be perfected
;as it is today-notation on the certificate of title-and filing will not be
effective. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-302(3) (1965).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-402(1) (1965).
'"N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 25-9-403(2) (1965).
,O261 N.C. 160, 134 S.E.2d 160 (1964).
IT
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defendant's agreement was alleged. The Court noted that the statute
governing notice of exercise of the power of sale3 1 requires only
proper advertisement. Thus, in absence of agreement to the contrary, the debtor is not entitled to personal notice or service.
In Certain-Teed Prods. Corp. v. Sanders,2 the Court extended
the principle of the Woodell case to junior lien holders. The defendant sold a vacant lot to Howze. Howze executed a deed of trust
to defendant as security for 595 dollars of the 750-dollar purchase
price. Subsequently, Howze executed a deed of trust to the plaintiff's assignor to secure a 10,908.84-dollar note. The note was given
for the price of materials and labor that were used to construct a
house on the lot. After construction of the house began, the defendant procured foreclosure of his deed of trust. The foreclosure
proceeding was properly advertised and conducted. The defendant
bid 300 dollars at the sale. No upset bid was filed and a deed to
the property was in due course given to the defendant. Plaintiff
sought, by this action, to have the foreclosure declared void. Plaintiff alleged that it did not have actual notice of the foreclosure and
that the property had a market value of 5000 dollars or more at the
time of the sale.
The Court held, inter alia, that the fact that the plaintiff received no personal or actual notice of the sale did not render the
sale defective. Notice by advertisement is all that is required. The
Court expressed reluctance at ordering reversal and nonsuit. However, the statutory requirements for foreclosure were complied with
and the Court had little choice. The only alternative, under the
present state of the law, would be to embark upon a potentially
unsettling and undesirable scrutinization of the adequacy of price
obtained at foreclosure sales.
A statute that would minimize the possibility of a first mortgagee's acquiring the property at such a patently inadequate price is
clearly called for by Sanders. If the junior secured parties were
assured of receipt of actual notice of the foreclosure under the
first mortgage, it would be unlikely that cases such as Sanders
would arise. Almost certainly the plaintiff would not have stood
aside and permitted the security for the 10,000-dollar note to disappear for 300 dollars, had it received actual notice of the fore-

"N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 45-21.17 (1950).
"264 N.C. 234, 141 S.E.2d 329 (1965).
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closure. Furthermore, a statute facilitating the receipt of actual
notice by junior lien holders would offer considerable protection of
the debtor's interest.
Some jurisdictions require that the first mortgagee must give
personal notice of the foreclosure to all parties who hold recorded
interests in the property at a specified time prior to foreclosure. 3
Such a rule, of course, requires the first mortgagee to search the
title to the property subsequent to the mortgage and before commencement of foreclosure proceedings. This requirement for real
property probably imposes an unnecessary burden on the mortgagee
and imposes additional cost upon the debtor.
A far preferable solution to the problem is that adopted in California."4 Any subsequent mortgagee or lien holder may record a
request for notice of foreclosure. The recording officer is directed
to note this request on the recorded copy of the first security interest. Prior to foreclosure, the first mortgagee is required by the
statute to send, by certified or registered mail, notice of foreclosure
to all persons whose request for notice is noted on the recorded
copy of the first mortgage. Thus, the interested junior secured
parties are assured of the ability to actively participate in the foreclosure of the first mortgage.
The North Carolina General Statutes Commission presently has
under consideration for recommendation to the General Assembly
a statute similar in purpose to the California statute. This proposed
statute, as presently drafted, requires that the junior secured party
send a copy of his request for notice to the first secured party, in
addition to recording the request. Also, it provides that failure of
the first secured party to comply with requests for notice will not
invalidate the sale as to third parties, but the defaulting party shall
be liable for damages to the junior secured party. The proposed
statute achieves a very satisfactory balance of convenience for all
parties concerned, and it is hoped that it, or a statute of similar
import, will be enacted in North Carolina.
The Uniform Commercial Code provides that the secured party,
upon exercise of the power of sale, must send "reasonable notifica"E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 297.04(2) (1958) requires the mortgagee to
serve, in the manner of service of summons in a civil action, notice of foreclosure upon the mortgagor and any other mortgagee or grantee whose
interest is recorded.
"' CAL. Civ. § 2924b.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

966

[Vol. 44

tion of the time and place of any public sale.., to the debtor, and
except in the case of consumer goods to any other person who has
a security interest in the collateral and who has duly filed a financing
statement indexed in the name of the debtor in this state or who
is known to the secured party to have any interest in the collateral."8 5
Thus, when the Code becomes effective, the personal property secured party will be responsible for searching the records prior to
foreclosure to ascertain whether there may be subsequently filed
financing statements covering the collateral. However, the Code does
not invalidate the sale made to a bona fide purchaser who has no
knowledge of the defects, but provides that the selling secured party
is liable for any loss caused the subsequent parties through failure
to comply with these requirements of notice."6
OBLIGATIONS OF THE ASSUMING GRANTEE-CHATTEL

SECURITY

The traditional law of real property mortgages dictates that,
where the mortgagor transfers his equity of redemption to a grantee
who assumes payment of the mortgage obligation, the relationship
87
of surety and principal debtor results between these two parties.
The effect of this relationship is to give the grantor who is faced
with payment of the debt because of default of the assuming grantee
the benefit of suretyship rights, such as exoneration, reimbursement,
and subrogation to rights and security held by the creditor-mortgagee. In Hatley v. Johnston,8" the Court has logically extended that
doctrine to the law of chattel security. On February 7, 1962, Hatley
purchased a truck under a conditional sales contract. The purchase
price was payable in twenty-four monthly installments. Pursuant to
contractual authorization, GMAC, the seller's assignee, procured is-

"5 N.C.
"N.C.

GEN. STAT.
GEN. STAT.

§ 25-9-504(3) (1965).
§ 25-9-504(4) (1965).

"'The North Carolina Court has held that the principal-surety relationship exists only as between the two parties-the grantor and the assuming
grantee-and the relationship between the grantor-mortgagor and mortgagee is not changed by the conveyance. E.g., Brown v. Turner, 202 N.C. 227,
162 S.E. 608 (1932). The effect of this conclusion was to deny the grantormortgagor the benefit of suretyship defenses against the mortgagee. However, several of the suretyship defenses, such as extension of time, release
of collateral, and release of the principal debtor, have since been made available to the debtor by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-45.1 (Supp. 1965). Many American jurisdictions have given the grantor the benefit of some suretyship
statute. See OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 270 (1951).
defenses without express
38265 N.C. 73, 143 S.E.2d 260 (1965).
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suance of a credit life insurance policy insuring Hatley's life for the
amount unpaid in the event of Hatley's death. The contract stated
that sixteen dollars of the time-price differential was allocated for
the insurance. On February 1, 1963, Hatley sold the truck to Johnston, who assumed payment of the remainder of the installments
due. On February 18, 1963, before Johnston had made any payments on the contract, Hatley died. The insurance company paid
GMAC the amount due on the purchase price, and GMAC marked
the lien satisfied. Johnston applied for and was issued a new certificate of title to the truck. Hatley's estate brought suit against Johnston for the amount of the installments due at Hatley's death.
The Court held, in reversing a nonsuit, that the relationship of
surety and principal existed as a result of Johnston's assumption of
the obligation under the conditional sales contract. Therefore, Hatley's estate, to the extent that it paid any part of the obligation owed
by Johnston on the assumption contract, was entitled to reimbursement and subrogation to the rights of GMAC on the conditional
sales contract. The Court, in effect, held that the payment by the
insurer was a payment by Hatley's estate. Thus, the estate was
entitled to subrogation to the entire amount paid by the life insurance.
The Court can scarcely be faulted for its conclusion in this case.
The insurance company did not refuse payment and was not here
involved. Therefore, a more-or-less unexpected 1300 dollars had to
be disposed of as between the three parties. GMAC claimed no role
other than as agent of Hatley in procuring the insurance. Johnston
had no relationship to the insurance; he had made no payments on
the contract and in no sense contributed to the price of the insurance. Hatley had furnished, directly or indirectly, the funds with
which the insurance was purchased, a sufficient ground it seems to
deem him the owner of the policy and alone entitled to its benefits.
However, anticipation of this problem when buying goods in
these circumstances could probably give the benefit of the insurance policy to the assuming grantee. A primary reason for not
doing so in this case was the grantee's lack of insurable interest in
the grantor's life. If the contract of sale had contained an express
provision for the assignment of the policy as a part of the consideration for the sale, the lack-of-insurable-interest objection would
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not have been present. An assignee of a valid policy normally needs
no insurable interest as a basis for enforcement of the policy."0
This case, of course, raises many problems of insurance and
equity that are beyond the scope of this Survey.4 0 But it should be
noted that despite the extensive use of credit life insurance, many
of these conceptually difficult, if not frequent, problems are yet to
be dealt with.
CONVEYANCE OF EQUITY OF REDEMPTION TO CREDITORMERGER

In Farmers Co-op. Exch., Inc. v. Holder,4 the Court applied
another familiar real property doctrine-merger-to chattel security. The defendant had purchased from plaintiff's agents a farm
tractor. The purchase was financed under a conditional sales contract. When the first installment fell due, the defendant refused to
pay on the ground that the plaintiff was not furnishing maintenance
service as agreed. The defendant offered to return the tractor to
the plaintiff. This offer was accepted by the plaintiff in May, 1962.
In July of that year the defendant signed, at plaintiff's request, an
instrument that released to the plaintiff "all title and interest" in
the tractor and authorized the plaintiff to repossess "free from any
and all claims on the part of [defendant]. . .

."

The plaintiff re-

tained the tractor for about ten months. During the period that it
was in the possession of the plaintiff, the tractor was used by one
of the plaintiff's directors for his personal use. In March, 1963,
the plaintiff sold the tractor at an auction and sought a deficiency
judgment against defendant and the guarantors of the obligation.
The Court held that the conveyance of the equity of redemption by the "release" resulted in a merger of the legal and equitable
estates in the plaintiff conditional vendee. Therefore, no deficiency
judgment could be recovered.
The result of this case is eminently correct. But this writer has
"E.g., McNeal v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 192 N.C. 450, 135 S.E. 300
(1926).
" For example, could the insurance company in this situation refuse to
pay until the assuming grantee has defaulted on the ground that until such
time the face amount of the policy cannot be determined? To whom should
the benefit of the proceeds go if the creditor purchases the insurance without direction from the initial debtor? See generally 43 TEx. L. REV. 580
(1965).
"1263 N.C. 494, 139 S.E.2d 726 (1965).
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a largely semantic quibble with the general assumption that the
doctrine of "merger" is the key to proper disposition of this type
of case. A security interest will not exist without an obligation to
support it, but the obligation-the debt-may exist without the
benefit of security. And concluding that merger, which joins the
legal and equitable estates in the property, destroying the security
interest, ipso facto destroys the severable personal obligation does
not take proper account of that latter fact. 42 The essential, and more
realistic, question in these cases is whether the parties intended that
the conveyance of the equity of redemption should constitute payment or satisfaction of the personal obligation, not whether the
parties intended that "merger" should occur. Merger is the appropriate doctrine to justify cases where the mortgagee is competing
with intervening junior lien holders,4 3 but it has little place as the
sole basis for results in the situations here under consideration.
The emphasis in analysis should be placed upon construction of
the contract to determine the intent of the parties with respect to
payment. Assuming a specific conveyance of the equity of redemption under a conditional sales contract or other security interest
retained by a vendor,4 4 it is suggested that a rule of construction
should presume that the conveyance is accepted by the creditor in
total satisfaction of the obligation. The creditor has the ability to
accept a return of possession of the collateral for foreclosure without prejudicing his right to a deficiency judgment. When, however,
42 If the only evidence of the personal obligation was contained in the
mortgage instrument, it would be easy to see how the "merger" theory
would be appealing. But the mortgagor or conditional vendee of any substantial items who does not sign separate notes today is probably rare. Of
course, the roots of the current misapplication of the term "merger" are
far deeper. See OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 272 n.60 (1951).
" See, e.g., Washington Furniture Co. v. Potter, 188 N.C. 145, 124 S.E.
122 (1924).
"With that type of purchase-money security interest the value of the
property presumably has a direct relationship to the amount of the unsatisfied obligation. Unless otherwise agreed, the debtor should have a reasonable, justifiable expectation that the specific conveyance requested by the
creditor will have the effect of satisfying the obligation. Of course, if a
security interest retained by the vendor of real property were involved the
vendor would not be entitled to a deficiency judgment in any event. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 45-21.38 (1950).
In other types of security transactions, there perhaps should be no presumption; rather the question of intention could be resolved on the basis of
such factors as the relationship between actual value of the property and
the unpaid obligation, or whether the mortgagee had some special use for
the property.
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the creditor additionally requests a specific conveyance of the
debtor's interest in the collateral, the burden should be upon him to
specify the terms under which the conveyance is accepted, if those
terms are other than total satisfaction of the obligation. The fact
that a merger will take place by the conveyance, thus destroying
the relationship of mortgagor and mortagee with respect to the
property, aids this rule of construction.
In the instant case, the facts that the creditor was obviously
trying to discharge the contract so as to avoid possible liability for
breach of the maintenance agreement and that the creditor retained
the property and used it as its own for nearly a year only reinforce
the suggested rule and result.

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Kenneth L. Penegar*
SANCTION LAW

No decisions in the processes of the criminal law are more
directly related to the long-range purposes and objectives of the
criminal law than those involving the kind and length of restraint
which the state imposes on persons convicted of crimes. It is nevertheless open to serious question how far developed concepts of fairness and scrupulous regard for the need for individualization in
sanctioning have emerged in the practice of the courts. Several of
the cases from the North Carolina Supreme Court during the survey
period are illustrative.
The need for more precision as to how and what matter may
be considered in the sentencing hearing, for example, is suggested
by the Court's per curiam opinion in State v. Caddell.1 Appellant
had been convicted of felonious breaking and entering of a service
station, wherefrom he took a television set and some twenty-five
dollars in cash. In deciding to award an active sentence of six-toten years, the trial judge consi'dered a fingerprint record from F.B.I.
files. The record did not reveal what had resulted from the several
* Associate

Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel

Hill.1265 N.C. 563, 144 S.E.2d 621 (1965).
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arrests indicated. Nor does the trial record indicate what if any
explanations or arguments were made with respect to this "evidence." The Court is nevertheless moved to conclude there was no
error committed since: "We are sure the careful and conscientious
Judge did not give any improper consideration to the fingerprint
record." 2 This sweeping presumption of fairness, while it might be
justified in particular cases, seems peculiarly out of place generally
in a system that purports to insist upon a rational nexus between
ends and means and strives to institutionalize procedures by which
the rationality can be seen by independent observers or appellate
decision-makers. 3
Where adequate procedures are in existence by which one's liberty-even if it is of the qualified sort such as in probation-can be
modified, the Court can more easily appraise what happened to
change the status of the appellant. In State v. Seagraves,4 appellant's
conviction had resulted in a suspended sentence and conditions of
probation were enumerated in detail. Among these were the typical
ones such as that the probationer must (1) avoid persons or places
of disreputable or harmful character, (2) report to the probation
officer as directed. The probation officer tried to invoke these conditions by asserting to the court that the probationer had been seen
with a gun and that he had visited a tavern-all in violation of the
"Probation Officer's instruction and advice." No other evidence
was before the trial court except the probation officer's report. In
holding that the state had not sustained its burden of proof that
any of the conditions of probation had been violated, the Court
quite properly called attention to the fact that the judicially imposed
conditions did not include following the "probation officer's instructions and advice." Furthermore, it was pointed out that if something untoward was involved in the enumerated activities of the
2

Id. at 564, 144 S.E.2d at 622.
Compare Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), with Townsend
v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948). See generally Note, "Due Process and
Legislative Standards in Sentencing," 101 U. PA. L. REv. 257 (1952). A
few jurisdictions require that pre-sentence reports be made available to the
8

accused, e.g., ALA. CODE, tit. 42, § 23 (1940); CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203; VA.

CODE ANN. § 53-278.1 (Supp. 1957). Disclosure is not required in federal
courts, although the advisory committee proposing the Federal Rules did
so recommend. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c); REPORT OF THE ADVIsoRY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF CRIMINAL PROcEDURE, 33 (1944). And in Utah the

sentencing court is required to hear any matters touching on a proper sentence in open court. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-12, -13 (1953).

'266 N.C. 112, 145 S.E.2d 327 (1965).
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appellant, such as visiting a tavern, it remained for the state to
spell out the circumstances making it so.'
The problem of what length of active sentence is appropriate
when a retrial of the case has been ordered following appellate review was raised again during the last term of the Court.' In State
v. Slade,' the Court-not unexpectedly-reiterated its position that
it is neither an abuse of discretion nor a violation of any constitutional right for the court after the second trial to impose a more
severe sentence than the court in the first trial saw fit to do. Nor
does the Court insist on any showing of changed circumstances
that would warrant the different sentence. The only limits are those
set by the statute punishing and defining the offense. Of course
if resort is made merely to the conceptual explanation of this result,
viz., that the new trial is de novo, the slate is wiped clean, etc., then
it is sensible in terms of logic to speak not of an "increased" sentence but of the, only valid sentence in the case. This rationale,
while it has the merit of simplicity and logic, does not invite
laudable responses from observers who cannot ignore the fact that
one judge has already exercised some discretion relative to the goal
of our criminal sanctions. The feeling is inescapable that the final
sanction owes at least a part of its quantity to a sense of resentment
Having adequate procedures in being to make the decision process
faithful to the demands of rationality and fundamental fairness does not
mean, however, in the contemporary context anyway that the full "rigors"
of the due process clause-as tested in the areas of pre-trial, trial, and appeal
-are applicable to the probation revoking procedures. See note 3 supra. In
the recent case of State v. White, 264 N.C. 600, 142 S.E.2d 153 (1965), the
Court sustained an order revoking probation where officers had entered
without a warrant and found intoxicants on the appellant's premises. It
appeared that the appellant had earlier been convicted of making liquor
and had been awarded probation on condition first, that he not have on his
premises any intoxicants or materials for their manufacture, and secondly,
that he "permit any lawful officer to search ...with a search warrant."
While this is in accord with the weight of current authority, it seems at
best a questionable step toward the rehabilitation of an offender to insist
upon the waiver of primary constitutional rights. It is interesting that the
discovery here in question was apparently not that of a probation officer
making a supportive visit but rather of police officer who should normally
be proceeding under warrants anyway. Quaere is there a practice in being
whereby local officers are apprised of probationers in their bailiwicks who
become victims of routine if random investigation, depending on their
offenses?
' See State v. White, 262 N.C. 52, 136 S.E.2d 205 (1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 1005 (1965); State v. Williams, 261 N.C. 172, 134 S.E.2d 163

(1964).
'264 N.C. 70, 140 S.E.2d 723 (1965).
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that appellant had taken up the court's time with an unnecessary
second trial.8
Of related interest are the cases that raise the issue whether a
sentence within the limits allowed by statute may nevertheless be
held "cruel and unusual" within the meaning of the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution. The view of the North
Carolina Court is evidently that the answer must necessarily be no.
9 it is said: "The punishment imposed in a particIn State v. Garris,
ular case, if within statutory limits, is within the sound discretion
of the presiding judge."' 10 And in State v. Slade" even more explicitly it is said: "Judge Campbell's judgment on the first count
in the indictment was within the limits authorized by the statute,
and this being true it does not offend constitutional provisions forbidding the infliction of 'cruel or unusual' punishment."' 2 In fairness it should be said that these opinions did not fully explore the
ramifications of what was being decided in these particular cases,
that is, that arguably these cases did not present -facts of the sort
properly to invoke the eighth amendment. Yet in another case where
the argument was pressed, it would appear with more cogency, the
Court held to the same view, namely that "when punishment does
not exceed the limits fixed by statute, it cannot be considered cruel
and unusual punishment in a constitutional sense."'" This case inSee generally Van Alstyne, "In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penalties
and the Successful Criminal Appellant," 74 YALE L.J. 606 (1965). If
there are no satisfactory constitutional arguments for the delimitation of
sentences in this situation by the terms of the first judgment, still there
would appear to be sound reasons in policy for not sustaining the heavier

penalty. It would appear that such cases would be good candidates for
appellate review of sentences, a system statutorily authorized in at least two
sister jurisdictions. See generally Penegar, "Criminal Law Sanctions in
Two Civil Rights Cases," 43 N.C.L. REv. 667, 670-72 (1965). The disparity problem was raised explicitly in two cases before the North Carolina

Court last term. In State v. Gibson, 265 N.C. 487, 144 S.E.2d 402 (1965),
the appellant was comparing his two-year sentence for prison escape with
those received by prisoners similarly situated and making the argument that
such a sentence was excessive especially when considered in light of the
fact that his accumulated "good time" was forfeited by the offense and conviction. The Court disposed of these contentions in these terms: "Obviously, the simple statement of defendant's contentions discloses they are wholly
without merit. Further discussion is unnecessary." 265 N.C. at 488, 144
S.E.2d at 403. See also State v. Garris, 265 N.C. 711, 144 S.E.2d 901 (1965).
711, 144 S.E.2d 901 (1965).
:265
1Old. N.C.
at 712, 144 S.E.2d at 902.
1264 N.C. 70, 140 S.E.2d 723 (1965).
22 Id. at 72, 140 S.E.2d at 725.
"' State v. Stubbs, 266 N.C. 295, 298, 145 S.E.2d 899, 902 (1966), 44
N.C.L. REv. 1118.
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volved a charge of sodomy based on homosexual acts apparently
between consenting males. The sentence was for seven-to-ten years.
The Court was unwilling to concede that any constitutional attack
on a sentence falling within the statute could be sustained.14
Nor are all sentences to be tested by statutory guidelines. The
uncertainty that surrounds the sentencing phase of the criminal law
process is heightened by the preservation of such common-law concepts as the "infamous offense." This is illustrated in the recent
case of State v. Alston, 5 where the trial judge imposed a life sentence for the offense of conspiracy to murder. On a petition for
certiorari growing out of a post-conviction hearing the Court held
that the life sentence was "clearly unlawful and excessive." The
reason isto be found in the fact first, that conspiracy to murder has
no specific punishment assigned to it, and secondly, in the provisions
of G.S. § 14-2. This statute provides that every felony for which
no specific punishment is prescribed by statute carries a maximum
two-year sentence but "if the offense be infamous," then imprisonment may be for four months up to ten years.'8
That consolidation of offenses for the rendering of one judg7
ment has its pitfalls, too, has been illustrated by State v. Seymour.1
Appellant was charged with eight separate incidents of house breaking and larceny, each of which constitutes a felony punishable by
up to ten years in prison.' Apparently for administrative convenience the trial judge awarded one sentence of twenty years, which
would not have been longer than the aggregate of the possible sen"'
We

postpone for further consideration the matter of the social desir-

ability of criminally punishing this kind of conduct. See section on "Substantive Matters," text accompanying notes 38 to 54 infra. The emphasis
here is on the theoretical question, its importance is not diminished thereby,
whether the Court accurately perceives the constitutional argument addressed
to it in these cases. The United States Supreme Court has recently said that
while a punishment may be called for by statute, still punishment so authorized may not be considered in the abstract. The punishment must be considered in light of the crime condemned as well as other factors, such
as severity. In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the Court
held it was cruel and unusual punishment for a state to punish a person
for being a narcotic addict. See also Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th
Cir. 1966) (holding it cruel and unusual to punish one for being a chronic
alcoholic). And see generally Packer, "Making the Punishment Fit the
Crime," 77 HARv. L. Rlv. 1071 (1964); 16 STAN. L. REv. 996 (1964).
15264 N.C. 398, 141 S.E.2d 793 (1965).
15 See generally Penegar, supra note 8, particularly at notes 13 and 14; 28
N.C.L. REv. 103 (1949).
1265 N.C. 216, 143 S.E.2d 69 (1965).
8
N .C. GEN. STAT. § 14-54 (1953).
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tences on the eight offenses. The Court on review of the case on a
writ of certiorari held that for crimes of this kind the maximum
sentence is ten years since only one judgment was entered. It is
not apparent that the trial judge had he known of this requirement
would not have gone to the extra trouble of entering a series of
separate judgments on which he could have imposed the length of
sentence he thought the appellant needed.
One of the most recurring issues in the law of sanctioning has
to do with a little known rule sometimes referred to as the Hirabayashi rule." Surely no term of our Supreme Court passes but
that at least one case raises, among other issues of irregularity below, whether if two sentences are imposed for different offenses
but to run concurrently, error as to one has any effect on the judgment entered. The last term was no exception in this regard, for
in State v. Wilson,20 the Court took occasion to reiterate that where
two sentences run concurrently, error with reference to one count
is not prejudicial. If regard is had only for the actual difference a
reversal would make in the active sentence imposed, then the rule
certainly makes practical sense. If, however, it is also remembered
that the additional conviction stands on the record and poses potential hazards to the individual's future, then the rule loses some
of its cogency and fairness.
Three additional cases from the last term deserve special mention because of the peculiarly difficult policy considerations they
pose for the rational application of sanctions to certain kinds of
socially harmful behavior. The first is State v. Massey,2 1 where
appellant received two consecutive six-month sentences for escape.
The last one of these escapes occurred at a time when he was in
unlawful detention, an erroneous sentence having been imposed for
car theft. The Court in dictum said: "Nevertheless, his remedy
was a petition for habeas corpus, not escape." 2 The Court cited
the recent case of State v. Goff.13 Quaere if that long a sentence is
indicated when the escape was from a period of unlawful detention.
"oHirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), to the effect that
where sentences on each count of the indictment run concurrently, it is
unnecessary to consider questions raised with respect to other counts if one
count must be sustained.
20 264 N.C. 595, 142 S.E.2d 180 (1965).
21265 N.C. 579, 144 S.E.2d 649 (1965).
22
Id.at 581, 144 S.E.2d at 650.
2-264 N.C. 563, 142 S.E.2d 142 (1965).
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Two other cases may be considered in tandem. They both pose
the same kind of problem for the policy-oriented decision-maker,
namely, what sort of restraints are indicated for certain kinds of
offenses, disregarding the individualization that otherwise would be
called for in the particular case.24 Much of the routine thinking in
this regard is done for us by the use of the convenient historical
differences between felony and misdemeanor. That is, traditionally
the one kind of crime regularly carries with it more severe sanctions than the other. But which label to give the particular category
of proscribed conduct, that is the harder question and one that in
modern times has been assumed by the legislative branch even in
the common-law world. One notable distinction has long been made
between threats to the sanctity of life and the person on the one
hand and threats to property on the other. Accordingly it may cause
some surprise to learn that in North Carolina larceny if by breaking and entering carries the felony label2" while an aggravated assault with a deadly weapon inflicting bodily harm is denominated
a misdemeanor. 20
SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS

Crimes
Conspiracy is a common-law crime which has for good reason
variously been called "that elastic, sprawling and pervasive offense, ' 2 7 a chameleon,2m and the "darling" of the prosecutor.20 One
reason this is so is that many persons may be tried at once, but
sometimes the efficiency gets in the way of individual rights. When
that happens, the state (and the defendants for that matter) may
be put through the trial ringer all over again. Such a case is State
v. Littlejohn,"° where the familiar rule was applied that statements
"'One has in mind the serving of one or more of the preferred sanctioning goals-rehabilitation, deterrence, prevention.
" State v. McKoy, 265 N.C. 380, 144 S.E.2d 46 (1965). And it does
not matter what the value of the thing stolen is. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §
14-72 (Supp. 1965), and cases annotated thereunder.
" State v. Braxton, 265 N.C. 342, 144 S.E.2d 5 (1965). See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-33 (1953), and annotated cases thereunder.
" Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445 (1949) (concurring
of Justice Jackson).
opinion
28 Ibid.
" Klein, "Conspiracy-The Prosecutor's Darling," 24 BROOxLYN L.
Rav. 1 (1957).
8°264 N.C. 571, 142 S.E.2d 132 (1965).

1966]

SURVEY OF NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW

977

of one alleged conspirator are incompetent and prejudicial as to the
others when made in their absence. Clearly the statements would
be admissible against the maker as indicating his involvement with
somebody for a nefarious purpose, but because there was no evidence against the other alleged conspirators in the same trial except
these statements, all are entitled to new trials. The opinion does not
indicate whether there was a motion for severance, but this kind of
case indicates how-sometimes at least-the "slop-over" effect may
work to the defendant's advantage. It would seem preferable for
courts-on their own motion if need be-to avoid the many potential pitfalls of the group trial and grant separate trials for each.
In the long run it might be more economical.
Robbery and attempt to rob: both crimes require a specific intent
to steal, but the words "to rob" or "robbery" in an instruction on
either crime connotes the necessary intent. This is the holding of
State v. Spratt.31 The opinion in this case properly emphasizes that
the essence of robbery as a crime is the use of force for the taking
of property not under a claim of right. The common understanding is that the thing taken will not belong to the defendant.
Furthermore in robbery the value of the thing taken or attempted to be taken is of no consequence.32 But there must be some
proof that whatever is taken is tangible property. This is the thrust
of the Court's holding in State v. Guffey. 3 It is accordingly not
sufficient to allege that "value," merely, was taken from the victim.
The common-law explanation for this of course is that to be the
subject of robbery, the property had to be subject to larceny. Common-law larceny protected only chattels. In other words the common law left to one side trespass to realty as by severing a tree;
and it also left to one side the securing of choses in action or other
nontangible property by force or fraud as punishable in other ways,
if at all. 3 4 In the instant case it would have appeared sufficient to
allege the taking of so many bills totalling in value 1000 dollars,
instead of merely the taking of 1000 dollars "in value." A fine
point, to be sure, but one which illustrates the internal sense of the
81265 N.C. 524, 144 S.E.2d 569 (1965).
8' State

v. Guffey, 265 N.C. 331, 144 S.E.2d 14 (1965).

:3 Ibid.
' Larceny by trick, taking by fraud, forgery, and extortion-all developed in response to the maturing complexity of society's commercial life.
But the development left gaps and doubts.
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common law. In other words the whole structure of the common
law of crimes has a certain logical symmetry, cohesion, and rationality; and part of its ability to respond to felt needs of a society
across time, the assumption has been, relates to this logical symmetry. 5 "[B]ut there is a danger of becoming fascinated by the
beauty of a machine which one makes constantly more perfect for
a specialized purpose. The machine tends to exist in and for itself
and to acquire a greater importance than the purpose it was meant
to fufill; and the purpose itself often disappears." 86 How much
more sensible-with all homage to the fundamental tradition in our
legal heritage, rationality-it would be today to charge persons in
our courts for what we really deplore in their acts. In the context
of robbery this would mean the coercive act directed at another
37
person motivated by monetary gain.

Sex, the Law, and Judicial Theology
Two cases from the Court during the period here surveyed relate to the common-law crimes of rape and sodomy. Both of these
crimes are heavily proscribed by statutes in North Carolina. 8 Both
are considered particularly reprehensible as forcible aggressions of
body and personality against another human being. But of course
not every act in these two categories is always accompanied by true
force. Indeed it is not uncommon that persons arrested and convicted for sodomy are consenting adults. It has not been made
clear in modem times why society should (sufficient to warrant its
representatives to establish ten-year prison terms-and longer-for
it) continue to punish what the common law in this jurisdiction
traditionally refers to as "the abominable crime against nature"
5
See, e.g., LAwsoN, THE
(1951).
'old. at 13.

RATIONAL

STRENGTH

OF ENGLISH

LAW

"Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.3 (Tent. Draft No. 2 1954), which
defines with particularity "Theft by Intimidation." Coupled with another
section making the commission of theft accompanied by reckless or intentional injury to the victim a more serious felony, this provision of the
Model Penal Code covers existing common-law robbery and the fuzzy extortion areas fairly completely. See Note, "A Rationale of the Law of
Aggravated Theft," 54 CoLmU. L. REv. 84 (1954).
88 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-21 provides the death penalty for forcible rape
or having carnal knowledge of a girl under twelve. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14177 (1953) prior to 1965 provided a minimum of five years, maximum of
sixty years imprisonment for crimes against nature.
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(with man or beast)." Of course it rather depends upon one's
conception of nature to say that certain sexual acts are natural,
others are not. Even if one assumes that what is customary is also
natural, the ground is no surer. Kinsey should have disabused this
generation of any smugness about conventions among sex-partners
-be they spouses, or otherwise.4" And of course more recent studies

illustrate that homosexual relationships are not uncommon in our
contemporary society. Still numbers do not mean "rightness," but
what does in this area? Most of our crimes are directed at conduct
which threatens to or actually does invade some clearly discernable
interest of a person or persons, directly or indirectly (as by evasion
of taxes). Such crimes as murder, assault and battery, kidnapping,
robbery, larceny-all dearly protect the individual's values of life,
bodily security, and wealth. Likewise the crime of forcible rape
protects against unconsented violations of body and personality, supports the values of respect and affection (of others with whom the
victim chooses to share attributes of these values such as intimacy).
"' Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE art. 207, comment (Tent. Draft No. 4 1955):
Sexual Offenses: The Code does not attempt to use the power of
the state to enforce purely moral or religious standards. We deem
it inappropriate for government to attempt to control behavior that
has no substantial significance except as to the morality of the actor.
... Our proposal to exclude from the criminal law all sexual practices
not involving force, adult corruption of minors, or public offense
is based on the following grounds. No harm to the secular interests
of the community is involved in a typical practice in private between
consenting adult partners. This area of private morals is the distinctive concern of spiritual authorities.

See also NEw YORK STATE COMM'N ON REVISION, PROPOSED NEW YORK
PENAL LAW 343-44 (1964): "A majority of the Commission is of the

opinion that, in light of modern sociological and psychiatric principles,
criminal prosecution of homosexual acts privately and discreetly engaged
in between competent consenting adults, serves no salutary purpose. This
follows the approach adopted by both the Model Penal Code and by the
1961 revision of the Illinois Criminal Code."
"0"The inherent physiological capacity of an animal to respond to any
sufficient stimulus seems the basic explanation of the fact that some individuals respond to stimuli originating in other individuals of their own
sex-and it appears to indicate that every individual could so respond if
the opportunity offered and one were not conditioned against making such
responses. . .

."

KINSEY,

SEXUAL

BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN

FEMALE

447 (1953).
One estimate has it that there are twenty convictions for homosexual
behavior for every 60,000,000 such acts performed. New Jersey Commission on Habitual Sex Offenders, quoted in BLOCH & GEIs, MAN, CRIME
AND SOCIETY 306 (1962).
And Kinsey estimates that between 30% and 45% of American males
have engaged in some homosexual activity. KINSEY, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN
THE HUMAN MALE 651 (1952). The incidence among women is much lower.
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What values of society, however, are protected by the crime of
sodomy-as it concerns consenting adults?
In the recent case of State v. Stubbs,4 the appellant argued that
one who commits acts of "perversion" may be diseased and hence
not subject to rigors of the criminal sanction in the statute. This
was consistent with a theory that there is some utility in the sanction, in the definition, itself. It is not likely that a constitutional
argument, based on a means-ends test, would have faired any better,
although it comes straighter to the real point of contention now
besetting our society. The Court was here content to rest its decision in upholding the conviction (for homosexual acts between
males of greater than sixteen years of age) and sentence (of from
seven-to-ten years in prison) upon the familiar but unruly and imprecise notion of "public decency and morality." The source, according to our Court, of this felt morality which is supported by the
crime of sodomy is the Christian religion, for the Court takes pains
to quote from an earlier North Carolina opinion to this effect:
"According to Blackstone, the English law treated the offense in
its indictments as unfit 'to be named among Christians.' IV Blackstone's Commentaries, p. 215. Our courts are no less sensitive than
their English predecessors." 4 Is the law of criminal sanctions,
which deprives a man of years of his liberty and exposes him to
the new restraints, torments, and temptations of prison,4 3 then to
be justified at bottom on the sensitivities of judges? If judges in
Blackstone's day and before were shocked by homosexual acts,
maybe also were the people who lived under the law. In fairness,
of course, it must be added that these judges did not initiate the
concept of sodomy;44 but their performance here in this caseN.C. 295, 145 S.E.2d 899 (1966), 44 N.C.L. REv. 1118 (1966).
"1266
42
Id.at 298, 145 S.E.2d at 902.
"' Homosexual activity, many times of the forced variety, is not uncommon in the prisons of America. See CLEMMER, THE PRISON COMMUNITY
(1958).
""The North Carolina legislation is directly traceable to that which was
probably the first English statute on the subject, a law passed in the year
1533 during the reign of King Henry VIII." Spence, The Law of Cripes
Against Nature, 32 N.C.L. R1v. 312 (1954). But by English interpretations
this statute referred only to intercourse between man and beast, bestiality,
between man and man per bestiality, between man and man per annum,
buggery. "Sexual copulation per os [i.e., by the mouth] was not sodomy at
the common law." Id. at 314.
See also District Judge Craven's thoughtful opinion in Perkins v. North
Carolina, 234 F. Supp. 333 (W.D.N.C. 1964), where it is said: "Imprison-

1966]

SURVEY OF NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW

981

reaching back into a time when church and state were at least jointly responsible for the total salvation of the person, reaching for
justification on natural law principles-indicates the need for a new
look by society and its representatives at just what it intends by
the laws punishing such conduct.4 5
40
The other notable case in this category is State v. Carter,
where the indictment charged forcible rape in violation of G.S. §
14-21. The victim was a nine-year-old, the defendant the girl's
stepfather living in the same house. The principal issue on appeal
was whether the state had proved the element of force, there being
nothing in the record to indicate that the girl had made any resistance-although the state's case may be characterized as showing
that the defendant used considerable force in the act itself. The
victim's own testimony included this statement: "No, I did not
resist Poochy [defendant] in any way."'
The Court, reviewing
several cases from other jurisdictions where the prosecutrixes were
over twelve years of age, concluded that fear might reasonably take
the place of force in one so young against one so strong, i.e., no
actual show of resistance is required in these circumstances. This
may be valid in the abstract, but there is no evidence of fear on
the girl's part (indeed she may not have had time to display it
under the facts here) in this case as there was in State v. Thompson, 48 one of the cases relied upon by the Court. Some doubt in
this regard is probably responsible then for the Court's cautious
conclusion "that the mere failure of this nine-year-old child in the
ing Perkins for his homosexual conduct is not unlike putting a person in
jail for being addicted to the use of narcotics, as was done in Robinson v.
California. . .

."

Yet, the judge found that the sentence was well within

the statutory limits and that the North Carolina Court had long interpreted
its statute to cover this kind of conduct; so, the constitutional difficulty was
avoided. But "if the statute were a new one, it would be obviously unconstitutional for vagueness." Id. at 336.
" See also the case of State v. Harward, 264 N.C. 746, 142 S.E.2d 691
(1965), where the indictment was also for homosexual conduct between
males of over the age of sixteen and where the conviction was for the
attempt. Sentence was for four-to-eight years in prison. The argument
was made and rejected here that the statute creating the crime of taking
indecent liberties with children had impliedly repealed or modified the statute
dealing with sodomy in its common-law fullness. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.1
(Supp. 1965) is the new statute. The Court relied on an earlier case rejecting the same contention, State v. Lance, 244 N.C. 455, 94 S.E.2d 335
(1956).
"8265 N.C. 626, 144 S.E.2d 826 (1965).
"' Id. at 630, 144 S.E.2d at 828.
48

227 N.C. 19, 40 S.E.2d 620 (1946).
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power of defendant, a grown man, to resist, and most probably
induced by fear and violence not to resist, was no consent. . .. "40
The most curious thing about this decision is that the Court was
obviously straining to fit this case into the forcible rape category
when for reasons of the aims of the criminal law it seems to have
been quite unnecessary. The State could have prosecuted this defendant under the second clause of G.S. § 14-21, namely that part which
makes it a capital offense of "carnally knowing and abusing any
female child under the age of twelve years." In other words the
same sanction is provided in either event, so strongly does society
feel about the need to protect the innocence of youth. Part of the
utility of this clause in the statute surely has been to obviate any
need in particular cases to go into the troublesome question of the
girl's state of mind." One result, therefore, of this decision is to
becloud further the concept of consent in rape cases where that
consent is or should be a genuine issue: for example, in the cases
of what would otherwise merely be fornication or adultery but for
the statutes making it legally impossible for a fifteen-year-old girl
to give her consent, though her paramour may have in good faith
taken her for sixteen or older. 1
Some explanation for this bit of judicial elephant-swallowing
may be seen in the otherwise inexplicable and gratuitous recitation
of a piece of scripture: "Over nineteen centuries ago, Jesus was
with his disciples in Galilee, and he called a little child unto him and
set him in the midst of them and said: 'But whoso shall offend one
of these little ones which believe in me, it were better for him that
a millstone were hanged about his neck, and that he were drowned
in the depth of the sea.' The Gospel according to St. Matthew
(King James' version), chapter 18, verse 6."' ' 2 Just prior to this
passage the Court recited that the girl had testified that she was
nine years old and that she "put (her) trust in God."5' 3 Even as"265 N.C. at 633, 144 S.E.2d at 830. (Emphasis added.)
In this regard the other two cases upon which our Court principally
relied seem inopposite, since they both involved girls above the age of
twelve. State v. Cross, 12 Iowa 66, 79 Am. Rep. 519 (1861) (fifteen-yearold); Bailey v. Commonwealth, 82 Va. 107 (1886) (fourteen-year-old).
"Reasonable mistake in age was held to be a valid defense to a charge
of statutory rape in People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 393 P.2d 673
(1964).
"265 N.C. at 633-34, 144 S.E.2d at 831.
"'Id.at 633, 144 S.E.2d 831 (1965).
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4

suming the reference is made in proper context, the impression
is left that the Court is crusading against devils and that nothing
must be left to chance lest this particular manifestation of evil may
somehow evade the further processes of our secular system of law.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

The Confession Thicket
Certainly the most troublesome set of problems facing not only
our Court but most other state courts as well nowadays is that
associated with the admissibility of confessions. What makes this
area particularly thorny now is the sixth amendment's right to counsel applied to pre-trial stages. In surveying the ten or so cases in
which our Court was faced with one or more aspects of this problem area, the impression is gained that the Court has been the match
of any other in its inability to come to grips with the fundamental
issues as they are currently being hammered out in the Supreme
Court of the United States.
An extra-judicial confession may be legally or constitutionally
inadmissible for any one of several different if related reasons. It
will prove useful in appraising our Court's trend of decision in
this area if a summary sketch of the general authorities is given
first. In the current state of the law it seems fair to divide the categories of cases into three broad areas-namely (I) confessions
rendered inadmissible because they were involuntarily made in contravention of the due process clause (of either the fifth or fourteenth amendments) ; (II) confessions rendered inadmissible because they were made in the absence of counsel in contravention
of the sixth amendment, carried over to the states through the
"' And it seems questionable that the context is taken into account. According to one scholar what Jesus was doing in the events as chronicled by
Matthew was delivering a lecture to the members of his group, telling them

to have no pride of place, to be as children in this regard. Specifically
therefore it is possible to read the word "children" in verse 6 as meaning

disciples, i.e., those who were His followers. These persons should not be
"given a hard time" because of their belief in Him. See Gerhardt Barth,

Matthew's Understanding of the Law, in TRADITION AND INTERPRETATION

(1963).
" E.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944);
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
The common-law rules as to confessions related primarily to probative
value and reliability. See generally Developments in the Law--Confessions,
IN MATTHEW

79 HAgv. L. REv. 935, 954-66 (1966).
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fourteenth amendment's due process clause;" and (III) confessions
rendered inadmissible because they were products of illegal detention. This third category admits of a two-part subdivision. In
subdivision (a) are included those cases wherein there has been a
violation of the accused's fourth amendment rights, in other words
the detention is improper because of the way in which it was brought
about.57 Or, the detention may be improper because of what happens after an otherwise proper custody has begun. In this subcategory, (b), are the cases resting (1) in the federal courts on
the statutory authority of Federal Rule 5(a), calling for prompt
production of the accused before a magistrate; (2) in some states
on similar statutory authority;5 and (3) in either system sometimes on extended constitutional concepts crystallized from categories I and IL.59 It has sometimes been argued that a third
sub-category ought to be created under heading III, namely for
those cases in which the arrest simpliciter was invalid, but no other
fourth amendment violation appears; in other words, to void the
proceedings after an unlawful arrest-whether or not a confession
is made. Thus far this argument, the rationale of which is beyond
the scope of this Survey, has failed to persuade any court to rule
that the Constitution requires such an extension of the exclusionary
rule. 60
" Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), 43 N.C.L. REv. 187 (1964).
See 44 N.C.L. REv. 161 (1965).
"Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); Upshaw v. United
States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332
(1943).
"' Several states have prompt arraignment statutes similar to Federal
Rule 5 (a). See the collection of such statutes in McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332, 342-43 n.7 (1943). Only a few of these, however, have an
exclusionary rule like McNabb-Mallory. Vorhauer v. Delaware, 212 A.2d
886 (Del. 1965); People v. Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410, 102 N.W.2d 738
(1960); CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 54-1c (Supp. 1963). North Carolina
has neither the rule of prompt arraignment nor any effective way to insure
an early, impartial warning of the accused's rights. Cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. §
15-47 (1965).
SI.e., combining elements of denial of access to relatives or a la-wyer
with length or quality of detention and factors of susceptibility (e.g., state
of health, social sophistication) to reach a result that requires exclusion of
the confession. E.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (decided
prior to Escobedo); United States v. Drummond, 354 F.2d 132 (2d Cir.
1965); Thompson v. Cox, 352 F.2d 488 (10th Cir. 1965); Montgomery v.
State, 176 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1965).
" See, e.g., Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois,
119 U.S. 436 (1886). This is the rule today even though an illegal "seizure"
of the person clearly violates the fourth amendment. Henry v. United States,
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In contrast to this somewhat complicated structure the North
Carolina Court has for all practical purposes one test for inadmissibility of extra-judicial confessions or admissions. And that is, was
it voluntary? Several instances of this test, simple in name but
broad in factors to be considered, appeared in the opinions of our
Court in the period surveyed. In State v. Pearce,6 for example,
there was an arrest in late February for the crime of rape, then
an appointment of counsel in early May. Relying on G.S. § 15-4.1,
calling for appointment of counsel in cases of indigent persons accused of capital felonies and within five days of being bound over,
and relying on the 1932 case of Powell v. Alabama, 2 (to which
our statute seems the equivalent response), the Court said, "[S] uch
long delay ... constituted a denial of the prisoner's statutory and
The Court
constitutional right to the benefit of counsel. . . ."
held, however, that what this amounted to when considered in light
of the fact that the admissions were given in the detective bureau
interrogation room was an involuntary confession. Hence on that
basis it was excludable.
In five other cases during the time being surveyed here the Court
decided cases involving periods of unlawful detention but in which
the Court found that the confessions or admissions were voluntary.
Furthermore in none of these cases was a lawyer present, although
in two of these the Court found that the police had warned the
accused that he could remain silent, and could call anyone he wished.
In other words, none of the cases presented the precise factual situation of Escobedo v. Illinois,6" but they did present issues of the sort
other jurisdictions have dealt with in terms of category III above.
And at least two of this group of cases also presented other fundamental constitutional issues, although it is not clear that the points
were argued strongly, under the same category III.
State v. Hines6 5 provides a convenient introduction to this group
of cases. Four persons, all of whom were indicted, tried, and convicted of armed robbery, are involved in this appeal. One of them
361 U.S. 98 (1959). But see the suggestion of at least one commentator
that no court should have jurisdiction of any accused person brought before
arrest in 100 U. PA. L. R.v. 1182 (1952).
of an
illegal
it by61266
virtueN.C.
234,
145 S.E.2d 918 (1966).
02287 U.S. 45 (1932).
-266 N.C. 234, 236, 145 S.E.2d 918, 920 (1966).
6,378 U.S. 478 (1964).
266 N.C. 1, 145 S.E.2d 363 (1965).
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was George McNeill, who was "picked up for questioning" and
handcuffed and taken to police headquarters. There was conflicting
evidence as to what was told him, but the trial court could find, as it
did, that he was given a warning that he did not have to say anything, that if he did it could be used against him, and that he could
call a lawyer. He called no one. Finally he was told, in the words
of the Court, that "he could be arrested for armed robbery" of a
named store. Thereafter McNeill confessed to participation in the
robbery. Then a warrant was procured for his arrest, this after he
had already been taken into custody. Much the same procedure was
used with respect to one of the other appellants, Leak, except that
on appeal different counsel argued different theories of exclusion.
This point will be treated subsequently.
In State v. Keith66 appellant and another were tried and convicted for "safecracking," under these circumstances: the accused
were asleep at the home of one of them when the police came inwithout warrants, having just left the scene of the break-in-and
"asked [them] to go to the Police Department to answer some
questions; they consented." A search of the car of one of the
accused revealed a sledge hammer, crowbar, and screwdriver. During the ensuing hours at police headquarters when no warrant had
issued both appellants confessed to the crime, although at different
times, but after having had some warning.
In every one of the appeals just described the Court held that
the confessions were "voluntary." In other words, in the view of
our Court as long as no promises or threats were made or other
clearly coercive tactics were employed, no taint attached to the inculpating statements even though there may be other irregularities
in police practice. Beyond this, however, it is not completely clear
what factors the Court considers critical on the voluntariness issue,
for in both Keith and Hines the fact that warnings had been given
was stressed in the Court's opinion. Yet in State v. UpchurchT no
warnings were given; an inculpating statement was made; and it
was ruled to have been voluntarily made. In this latter case a warrant was used in making the arrest.
It would appear that the Court is confused as to the role the
Escobedo rule should play, in that it evidently feels the access to
counsel is important on the one hand for it is discussed in a signifi06266 N.C. 263, 145 S.E.2d 841 (1966).
67264 N.C. 343, 141 S.E.2d 528 (1965).
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cant way in the Keith and Hines cases. Yet, when the Escobedo
rule is specifically argued, as it was in one of the appeals in the
Hines case (as to Leak, mentioned above) and as it was in the
Upchurch case, the Court takes an exceedingly narrow view of its
scope and application. Thus, in Upchurch the Court summarily
dispenses with the Escobedo argument in these terms: it "was decided by a five to four court on entirely different facts, and . . . [is
not] applicable here to the free and voluntary conversation (an
officer) and defendant had.""' Voluntariness of course was not an
issue which the Court ruled on in Escobedo, and the right to access
to counsel in pre-trial accusatory interrogation which that decision
guarantees is an entirely separate concept. It may be involved in
a case where voluntariness is also an issue, but it is not the same
issue.
A more thoughtful response to the argument that a confession
should be excluded on the basis of the rule in Escobedo can be seen
in Leak's appeal in the Hines case. There the Court held: "We do
not interpret Escobedo to mean that counsel must immediately be
afforded one taken into custody before he is interrogated by officers,
under all circumstances, particularly where no counsel is requested,
as in the instant case." 69 But here again one is left to speculate in
8 1d.

at 347, 141 S.E.2d at 531.
266 N.C. 1, 16, 145 S.E.2d 363, 373 (1965). "In support of our
opinion as to the Escobedo case, see People v. Hartgraves, 31 Ill. 2d 375,
202 N.E.2d 33 (1964)," and six other cases from five more jurisdictions.
Ibid. Contra, e.g., United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429
(3d Cir. 1965); People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 937 (1965). See 44 N.C.L. REv. 161 (1965). [Since this
writing, the United States Supreme Court decided Miranda v. Arizona, 34
U.S.L. Week 4521 (U.S. June 14, 1966), in which the following rules were
laid down:
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used
as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of
an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive
effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner
and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an
attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if
the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not
wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere
fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some
statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain
from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an
attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.
Id. at 4523. In Johnson v. New Jersey, 34 U.S.L. Week 4592 (U.S. June
21, 1966), both Escobedo and Miranda were declared not to have retroactive effect. Ed.]
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light of the Court's evident narrow view of Escobedo what significance attaches to the discussion in these cases of the warning given
to the accused of his right to call a lawyer, etc.7 °
Finally, since it is clear that the Court has made a kind of fetish
out of the voluntariness rule, which as pointed out above is only
one of several tests now applicable to confession situations generally
throughout the nation, it is perhaps a little surprising to find that
the Court does not take a rigorously conservative view as to the
judicial procedures by which the rule they do have is made operative. In State v. Painter7 the Court held that no separate hearing
is required on the objection to the introduction of the confession in
all cases. Where the defendant offers no evidence and "there is
plenary evidence" of the confession's voluntary quality, the court's
admitting the confession amounts to a finding that the confession
was voluntary.72
Confessions and Fourth Amendment Violations
The two cases of the five above referred to which raise the most
serious questions about the enlightened administration of criminal
" Voluntariness of course may be affected by the absence of such a warning, but likewise the way in which the warning is given may be equally im-

portant. One attorney active in the practice of criminal law of North Carolina has told the writer of the practice in one city whereby police manage
to interject a number of ingratiating remarks-such as talk of baseball
scores-throughout the beginning of the interrogation when the warning
is being given. This practice suggests that the impact of the admonition
about silence and access to counsel (assuming the accused knew of one or
felt bold enough to call a lawyer if he did know one), conceding that in
the way it was given the impact may have initially been quite limited, would
likely be considerably dissipated by the time critical questions are actually
posed. In other words the failure to ask for a lawyer may be due to
"ignorance, confusion, or intimidation." 79 HARV. L. REV. 935, 1003 (1966).
"Besides, to interpret the significance of a request and its denial in terms
of intimidation appears to be a reworking of the voluntariness test ... , an
approach the [Supreme] Court conspicuously avoided in Escobedo. Thus
there seems to be no rational justification for a different result in cases in
which the accused requests a lawyer and those in which he does not." Ibid.

265 N.C. 277, 144 S.E.2d 6 (1965).

" It would appear that most jurisdictions, whether they use the "orthodox," the New York, or the Massachusetts rule, assume that the trial judge
will make specific findings after hearing both sides-even if the defense only
cross-examines. See generally Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility Between Judge and Jury, 21 U. CHi. L. REv. 317
(1954). Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), in which the Court held
the New York procedure violative of due process (in that in close cases
the judge could pass the buck to the trial jury along with the issues on the
merits of the charge), seems to require a hearing sufficient enough to
render it clear upon what facts and premises the judge makes his determination of voluntariness.
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procedure are ones where, in addition to some period of illegal
detention, there is also an invasion of the accused's residential privacy followed by incriminating statements and the production of
other damaging evidence. In State v. Mitchell 3 defendants were
convicted of breaking and entering and larceny of articles of clothing, money, and other personalty. Police attention was drawn to
the two appellants, Mitchell and Hinton. Hinton was questioned
about the large number of coins he had been seen with; in this
interview, which took place in a police car in front of Hinton's
home, Hinton explained by saying he had won the money in gambling. The officer, named Blackley, then went on to Mitchell (we
are not told what transpired on this first encounter) and "took him
to Police Headquarters" where Mitchell subsequently admitted his
part in the break-in. What followed, concerning the co-defendant
Hinton, is a classic example of the worse tradition in American law
enforcement, the "smash and grab" techniques so fully documented
a generation ago in the Wickersham Committee report. In the
words of summary of the Court:
About 11:00 P.M. the same night Blackley, officer Perry and
defendant Mitchell went to Hinton's home. Hinton's aunt admitted Blackley. Hinton was asleep. Blackley awakened him and
told him to get the items of clothing which had been taken from
Antone's Department Store. Hinton got them from a closet on
the back porch; they consisted of pants, a coat and a sweater.
his part in two of the 'break-ins.' He was
Hinton then admitted
74
then arrested.
With this wholesale affront to the fourth amendment before it, the
Court waltzed directly into its discussion of the voluntariness test
and concluded that the court below had made a determination on
that issue and it was not lightly to be disturbed. The only nodding
recognition given to the possible presence of any other substantial
issue is in this remark: "In the instant case the incriminating statements were made in the ordinary course of investigation. Defendants were found with stolen goods in their possession. They were
not held incommunicado. They were not questioned over long periods of time ....
"265 N.C. 584, 144 S.E.2d 646 (1965).
"Id. at 586, 144 S.E.2d at 648.
7"Ibid.
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The conceptual companion piece to the Mitchell case, and on its
facts ranks with that case in terms of the degree of police departure
0
from lawful processes, is State v. Egerton."
Egerton and two
others were tried and convicted of armed robbery. The circumstances leading to this result which are of interest here are as follows: as a result of something told them by a "reliable informer"
police went to a certain rooming house, got some sort of "permission" from one Barnes "who was in charge of the building" and
went to a room where they found one of the two other defendants
in bed "with the covers tucked under his chin." The officers removed the bed covers and found Egerton in the same bed. In an
adjoining room they found the third defendant. Subsequently, it
does not appear whether there at the rooming house or at police
headquarters, but presumably within the same period of custody
which began at the rooming house, each defendant made admissions
of guilt. The Court concluded: "Competent evidence supports the
court's finding and conclusion that the admissions were free and
voluntary. These admissions were received at the time the officers
77
were making their investigation.
In neither of these opinions was there a single indication that
the Court was aware of the possible violations of the accuseds'
rights "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures." In the Egerton opinion
the Court does, however, at least address itself to the arrest aspect
of the case: "We think the information in possession of the officers
was sufficient to authorize the arrest without a warrant. '7' What
information, gained as of what time, gained how? These questions
remained unanswered. The Court goes on to recite the early morning visit to the rooming house bedroom. Then the Court concludes,
presumably in support of the last quoted sentence above: "The
officers were in possession of such facts as to justify taking the
three into custody until they could be identified by (the victims of
the robbery) .79 In support of this conclusion the Court cites the
statute authorizing arrest of felons who are likely to evade arrest
if not immediately apprehended and a recent decision of the Court
"8264 N.C. 328, 141 S.E.2d 515 (1965).
17
Id. at 331, 141 S.E.2d at 517.
8
Id. at 330, 141 S.E.2d at 517.
"°Id. at 331, 141 S.E.2d at 517.
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8s
addressed to the problem of citizens aiding in the arrest of felons.
If there was probable cause for an arrest prior to going into the
rooming house, there was no excuse on the showing made here for
not first obtaining a warrant."' If probable cause existed only
after the discovery of Egerton and his cohorts, then the arrest that
followed-if that is when the Court thinks it was made-was justified in the final analysis by what was turned up by the search of
the living quarters of the appellants.8 2
In any event these last two cases-Mitchell and Egerton-and
one of the cases discussed above in another connection, Keith, seem
to present situations calling for the application of the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine as extended by the case of Wong Sun v.
United States." In that case federal agents entered Toy's house without probable cause, and during an exchange with these officers Toy
made incriminating statements. Toy was arrested in his bedroom.
The Supreme Court, stressing the fact that Toy's fourth amendment rights had been violated, held that his admissions could not
be used against him in the subsequent trial for violation of federal
narcotics laws. And since the fourth amendment was held to apply
in all respects to the states in Ker v. California, 4 Wong Sun would
80
.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-41 (1965) is the statute. State v. Brown, 264
N .C.81 191, 141 S.E.2d 311 (1965), is the case.
In this connection it must be added that neither the aunt in Mitchell
nor the manager of the rooming house in Egerton had any authority from
the appellants to consent to a search touching their rights. See Stoner v.
California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (a hotel guest); McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948) (a boarding house occupant). And see State
v. Hall, 264 N.C. 559, 142 S.E.2d 177 (1965), where our Court recently
clearly enunciated a husband's rights vis-i-vis those of his wife in a search
of their home.
82 It has been established in the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court that arrests cannot be justified by what is produced by an unreasonable search. See Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); People
v. Brown, 45 Cal. 2d 640, 290 P.2d 528 (1955). If, however, the state
takes the view that an entry of a dwelling by its officers was not for the
purpose of a search for things but for the arrest of a person or persons,
still there are constitutional doubts. The precise question does not appear
to have yet been authoritatively decided, but see Jones v. United States,
357 U.S. 493 (1958), where it is said that such an argument presents "a
grave constitutional question, namely, whether the forceful nighttime entry
into a dwelling to arrest a person reasonably believed within, upon probable
cause that he had committed a felony, under circumstances where no reason
appears why an arrest warrant could not have been sought, is consistent
with the Fourth Amendment."
8:3 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
8'374

U.S. 23 (1963).
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appear to apply to state as well as federal prosecutions. And it
should be noted here that the method and nature of the entry into
the defendants' apartment in the Ker case valid under California
law-an emergency situation demanded the entry by stealth in view
of the ease with which marijuana could be disposed of-was held
not to violate the fourth amendment but only after a considered
discussion of the inherent reasonableness of the procedure. None
of the entries in the cases being discussed here-Mitchell, Egerton,
and Keith-seem to fit into this category. Indeed there is really no
discussion of this facet of the case in the Court's opinions. 85
" In one case during the Court's last term the Court did seem called
upon to apply the "poisonous tree doctrine." State v. Hall, 264 N.C. 559,
142 S.E.2d 177 (1965), where it was held that a wife may not consent to
a search which incriminates her husband, involved the seizure of stolen
goods, a clock and a radio, which were shown to defendant in jail, whereupon he confessed to the crime. In this confession defendant also told of
the whereabouts of a truck which had also been stolen. Alluding to the
problem of the admissibility of evidence about the truck, a problem surely
to be faced on re-trial, the Court said: "At the next trial the court may
determine whether the confession was actually free and voluntary or whether
it was triggered by the use the officers made of the fruits of their illegal
search to such an extent as to render it inadmissible in evidence." Id. at
563, 142 S.E.2d at 180. Again the fetish of voluntariness, but this time the
Court is on surer ground. Prior to the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963), it would have been
more accurate to characterize the problem in terms of one of the clear
exceptions to the "poisonous tree doctrine," namely whether an independent source would have produced the evidence anyway. Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (dictum). See Coplon v. United
States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952).
For an application of the rule and its exception in circumstances analogous
to the instant case see Somer v. United States, 138 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1943),
where the court said as to evidence later obtained from the defendant himself (analogous to the discovery of the whereabouts of the truck in Hall):
"As the record stands, it was the information unlawfully obtained which
determined their (the officers') course."
In the Fahy case the police obtained evidence which tended to incriminate defendant during an unconstitutional search of defendant's premises,
then he was arrested and made incriminating statements. The Supreme
Court reversed on several grounds, but declared that defendant "should
have had a chance to show that his admissions were induced by being confronted with" the illegally seized evidence. In other words it is implied
that such speculative criteria as the accused's susceptibility, the length of
time between being confronted with the other evidence and his later confession, etc., are to be employed. This is likely to prove to be a complex
test to apply; perhaps it would be better to go back to the rigorous dictum
of Silverthorne, namely, that evidence illegally seized should not be used at
all-judicially or nonjudicially. And the sanction for using it would be the
exclusion of any evidence that cannot be shown to have had, potentially at
least, an independent source.
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DAMAGES
Walter D. Navin, Jr.*
WRONGFUL DEATH

Under the North Carolina wrongful death statute damages for
such a loss are limited to those that are "a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury resulting from such death." 1 Wrongful death statutes--described by Sir William Holdsworth as "a
conservative reform ... conservatively construed""--created a cause
of action where none existed at common law. A carefully guarded
exception to the rule expressed in that fine old Latin maxim, Actio
PersonalisMoritur cum Persona,3 it is one cause of action that does
not exist in the absence of damages, at least in North Carolina.
As the Court has phrased it "negligence alone, without 'pecuniary
injury. . .' does not create a cause of action."'
The measurement of damages in an "ordinary" wrongful death
action gives rise to some perplexing legal questions as the excellent
student comment at an earlier page in this volume of the Review
illustrates. ' But whether the amount of damages is measured by the
loss-to-the-estate-of-deceased or the loss-to-the-beneficiaries rule,
that there is damage when the income-producing head of a family
unit is wrongfully killed is conceded. Doubts may exist when the
decedent happens to be a wife and mother;' and substantial concern
about damages has been voiced when the decedent is a child, although here, too, recovery seems clear, "notwithstanding greatly
increased difficulty in application [of the pecuniary injury damage
rule]." 7
Suppose, however, that the child is mentally retarded, or sup*Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill.
IN.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-174 (1949).
'15 HOLDSWoRTH, A HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAW 220 (1965).
SIbid.
'Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 398, 146 S.E.2d 425, 428 (1965);
Armentrout v. Hughes, 247 N.C. 631, 101 S.E.2d 793 (1958); Annot., 69
A.L.R.2d 628 (1960).
Comment, 44 N.C.L. REv. 402 (1966).
'Lamm v. Lorbacher, 235 N.C. 728, 71 S.E.2d 49 (1952), Comment,
44 N.C.L. REv. 402, at 444 (1966).
'Russell v. Windsor Steamboat Co., 126 N.C. 961, 36 S.E. 191 (1900).
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pose it is, in the delicate language of the law, en ventre sa nere,
having existed only eight months of the mother's term of pregnancy
when it expires as a result of defendant's wrongful negligence. Has
the death of such a child resulted in a pecuniary injury?
In 1965 three cases placed this question before the North Carolina Supreme Court for resolution. They were Gay v. Thompson,8
Godfrey v. Smith,' and Scriven v. McDonald.'
At the age of eleven Anthony Scriven "could do about the same
things as the five-year-old child could."" His I.Q. score was about
30, putting him in "aseverely retarded range."' 2 He had been to no
public school but had spent nearly a year at a school for the mentally
retarded. At the time of his death as a result of allegedly negligent
conduct on the part of defendants, Anthony was living at home,
and "the mental picture gained from a reading of the record is
one of tenderness and consideration for a beloved but seriously
retarded and handicapped boy.' 1 3 But the statute leaves no room
for sentiment; it confers a right only for pecuniary loss. The
burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to show pecuniary loss and,
in the Court's view, the evidence negates rather than shows such
loss since the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn is that Anthony would have continued to be a dependent person rather than
a person capable of earning a livelihood.' 4 A trial court decision
awarding plaintiff (Anthony's administrator) 5,750 dollars was
accordingly reversed. 5
In Gay v. Thompson" alleged malpractice on the part of the
pregnant mother's attending physician resulted in the wrongful
death of Baby Gay, stillborn during the eighth month of pregnancy.
In this action the defendant had demurred to pleadings seeking a
50,000-dollar recovery, and the trial court overruled the demurrer.
Wrongful death damages are at best speculative, said the Court,
but where there are sufficient facts and it is necessary, a jury may
indulge in such speculation. Damages may not be assessed on the
basis of pure speculation with no factual substantiation whatever.
N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966).
266 N.C. 402, 146 S.E.2d 431 (1966).
"264 N.C. 727, 142 S.E.2d 585 (1965).
1 Id. at 729, 142 S.E.2d at 586.
2- Id.at 730, 142 S.E.2d at 587.
13264 N.C. at 732, 142 S.E.2d at 588.
8266

1,Ibid.
15 Scriven v. McDonald, 264 N.C. 727,
18266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E,2d 425 (1966).

142 S.E.2d 585 (1965).
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In the case of a prenatal death it is impossible to predict whether the
unborn child would have given anyone pecuniary benefit or not.
The death of a foetus represents no pecuniary loss. The prenatal
child born alive but disabled as a result of prior negligence may
recover but this is in reality a type of common-law action and not
a wrongful death statutory proceeding. Since the damages are too
speculative, the demurrer should have been sustained.' The same
logic and result was applied in Godfrey v. Smith,"8 an opinion filed
contemporaneously with Gay v. Thompson. In Godfrey the foetus
had been destroyed as a result of an automobile accident. The decision in Godfrey was controlled by the Thompson case.
Other jurisdictions have allowed wrongful death recovery on
facts analogous to those in the Gay and Godfrey cases. The Gay
opinion is a compendium of cases and other authority on the issue.
But after examining the decisions carefully Justice Parker followed
a New Jersey case, Graf v. Taggart,"9 which denied recovery, and
set to one side the precedent allowing recovery apparently on the
ground that the lead case, Verkennes v. Corniea,2 9 did not distinguish between prenatal death and prenatal injury.
On the other hand, Justice Bobbitt, authoring the Scriven decision, found no direct authority and little analogous material. It is
apparently a case of first impression." The problems these cases
raise are quite difficult to resolve and perhaps are of such a fundamental concern as to be a matter for legislative action. It seems
difficult to rebut the argument that even a mentally retarded child
contributes something of value to a family relationship, a value
that within the limits of judge-control of the process can be measured in dollars by a jury. Funeral expenses, if they represented a
direct out-of-pocket expenditure by the principal beneficiaries under
the statute, ought at least to be recovered since the amount is readily
ascertainable and is a present expense, a direct consequence of the
negligent act.22
Ibid.
N.C. 402, 146 S.E.2d 431 (1966).
1043 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964).
20229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
"Cf. Schreck v. State, 25 Misc. 2d 929, 231 N.Y.S.2d 563 (Ct. Cl.
1962), where recovery of funeral expenses was allowed when epileptic children in a state institution were negligently slain.
If
2' Cf. Davenport v. Patrick, 227 N.C. 686, 44 S.E.2d 203 (1947).
nominal damages are recoverable, then costs may be assessed against the
defendant, otherwise not. See Justice Parker's dissent in Armentrout v.
'

18266
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As for the unborn child, the fact of birth is so fundamental an
occurrence that it may well serve also to measure the beginning of
the wrongful death cause of action.
EMINENT DOMAIN

Another cause of action requiring the presence of substantial
damage before it can be maintained is that involving the taking of
real property by the creation of a continuing nuisance by the state.
One way of answering the question, has the state appropriated
plaintiffs' property for a public purpose by creating a continuing
nuisance, is to ask whether the damage has been substantial. One
would think three feet of ocean water standing in and on your
business property would cause such damage, but a claimant has to
prove it, and in Midgett. v. Highway Comm'n2 3 the plaintiffs' evidence fell short.
The State Highway Commission, in building new highway 158
along the inland side of the Outer Banks near Nags Head, intersected an old east-west road running from the ocean to the sound.
In the course of construction it was found necessary to raise the
roadbed about five feet above the natural grade and this in turn
dammed a natural water runoff that carried ocean water into the
sound when storms occasionally drove the ocean "over the dune
line." 24 Drains were placed beneath the roadway but debris and
sand apparently clogged them. The Midgetts owned buildings and
land nearby, toward the ocean side of the banks, and had since
first realization of the project protested the construction of the
roadway. During the early morning hours of March 7, 1962, an
ocean storm of moderate intensity drove the waves over the dune
line flooding the natural runoff and, allegedly because of the roadway's acting as a dam, flooding plaintiffs' property.
An uncompensated taking? No. Plaintiffs introduced evidence
showing the difference in value of their property before and after
construction of the new highway, that his business premises were
flooded to a depth of three feet, and that a garden was destroyed.
But if there were damages, said the Court, they did not occur until
Hughes, 247 N.C. 631, 634, 101 S.E.2d 793, 796 (1958). North Carolina
does not allow nominal damages in a wrongful death action. Armentrout
v. Hughes, 247 N.C. 631, 101 S.E.2d 793 (1958).
265 N.C. 373, 144 S.E.2d 121 (1965).
24 The facts are taken from the opinion, 265 N.C. at 374-76, 144 S.E.2d
at 122.
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the storm of March 7, 1962. The cause of action occurred only
when damage had been inflicted. Thus the evidence as to value
before and after construction offered by plaintiffs is "wholly irrelevant, entirely prospective and speculative, and of no probative
value."2 Furthermore, plaintiffs' argument that he can avoid a
nonsuit since there is evidence of at least nominal damages is incorrect. The only way plaintiffs can recover is on a theory of continuing nuisance, an actual, permanent invasion of their land
amounting to an appropriation of, and not merely damage to, the
property. To do this, substantial damages must be shown. Recovery
cannot be based on guesswork. Each individual in the community,
said the Court in quoting an earlier North Carolina private nuisance
case, 6 must put up with a certain amount of annoyance, inconvenience or interference, and all must take a certain amount of
2
risk in order that all may get on togetherY.
Three feet of water
in your place of business is certainly an inconvenience; it probably
also would have been a taking28 but for the fact that culverts had
been provided for the runoff and they may have been clogged with
sand and debris. The question becomes whether the construction of
the bypass itself caused the damage or whether state employees were
negligent in failing to clean out the debris. If the damage caused
flows from a circumstance temporary in nature, there is a mere
injury, not a taking; a negligence, not a nuisance, cause of action.
The State Highway Commission is not liable in tort for the negligent omissions of its employees even under the provisions of G.S.
§ 143-291, the state tort claims act. Since plaintiff's evidence left
to the realm of speculation the cause of his damages, the trial
court's nonsuit was affirmed. 29
CONTRACTS
Ray Charles, leader of an aggregation entitled "The Sixteen
plus the Raelets, Musicians," failed to make a scheduled appearance
in Roanoke, Virginia. Oliver W. Arnold, who promoted the event,
thereupon brought suit against Mr. Charles for breach of contract.
Just why the suit was maintained in North Carolina on a contract
:'265 N.C. at 377; 144 S.E.2d at 124.
2' Watts v. Pama Mfg. Co., 256 N.C. 611, 124 S.E.2d 809 (1962).
27 265 N.C. at 377; 144 S.E.2d at 125.
2S See Milhous v. Highway Dep't, 194 S.C. 33, 8 S.E.2d 852 (1940).
'Midgett v. Highway Comm'n, 265 N.C. 373, 144 S.E.2d 121 (1965).
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signed in New York and to be performed in Virginia does not
appear. The terms of the contract, so far as they can be inferred
from the opinion, guaranteed the performers 3500 dollars plus fifty
per cent of the gross in excess of 7000 dollars less admission taxes.
The entrepreneur was to keep what remained. As the trial court
determined, gross receipts (less taxes) amounted to 12,900.90 dollars. The trial judge awarded Arnold fifty per cent of that figure,
6,300.45 dollars. On appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court,
the judgment was affirmed, 0 although Charles argued the amount
should be reduced by the amount Arnold saved as a result of the
breach. In particular Mr. Arnold did not pay 1000 dollars to a
local Y.M.C.A., apparently for promotional activities, that he had
agreed to pay. (With whom he had agreed does not appear.)
In giving Arnold the full amount the Court stated that the terms
of the contract called for this sum, there was nothing speculative
about it, and had the contract been fully performed, this is exactly
what Arnold would have received; his expenditures were of no concern to the defendant."'
That the injured party is entitled to be placed in the same position in which he would have been had the contract been carried out
is often said to be the appropriate rule. 2 But phrased in this manner and this broadly the statement is deceptive since it tends to
accentuate measurement of damages solely in terms of plaintiff's
gross dollar disappointment. A fairer statement of the appropriate
rule would add to the language above the words, "at the least cost
to the defendant.' '3 3 In the instant case, plaintiff would have been
1000 dollars poorer had the contract been carried out, as a result of
his payment to the Y.M.C.A. But this does not end the inquiry.
The nature of the savings to plaintiff must be examined.3 4 The
line to be drawn is between a performance by the plaintiff that is
part of his cost in acquiring the defendant's promise and that which

" Arnold v. Ray Charles Enterprises, 264 N.C. 92, 141 S.E.2d 14 (1965).
See Wurfel, Conflict of Laws, North Carolina Case Law, 44 N.C.L. REV.
923 (1966).
1
1d. at 100, 141 S.E.2d at 20.
'

cCORmICK, DAMAGES, § 137 (1935).

"RESTATEMENT, CONTRACrS, § 329, comment a (1932).
",As an initial step it is helpful to consider the differences in legal

theory between a suit for a money debt as for the purchase price of property
when title has passed and an action for damages when something plaintiff
promised remains to be done. See 5 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 995, 1036, 1038
(1964 ed.).
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is not.3 5 Thus, if Arnold owed a duty to Charles to utilize the
Y.M.C.A. as a promotional device, or if payment of the 1000 dollars to the Y.M.C.A. was a condition precedent to the appearance
of the musicians, Arnold has saved a part of his cost of acquiring
defendant's promise and his recovery should be reduced by that
amount. On the other hand, if the payment were unrelated to the
Charles promise, no deduction need be made. Considering the nature of the enterprise it seems likely that Charles probably sought
satisfactory local promotion and that Arnold probably was under a
duty to Charles to provide it. It is the net amount of losses caused
and gains prevented in excess of savings made possible by the
defendant's breach that measures plaintiff's recovery.3"
MISCELLANEOUS

Several other decisions involving the law of damages in one
way or another were handed down during the past year. In Jenkins
v. Harvey C. Hines Co.,sT plaintiff's attorney over objections
of defendant's attorney, who "anticipat[ed] that he was going to evaluate," translated his client's pain and suffering the
result of a cut hand and finger when a soft drink bottle exploded
into 86,100 dollars by multiplying the minutes in the waking hours
of his client times her life expectancy and charging defendant a
cent per minute. The Supreme Court found it did not have to rule
directly on the question whether such argument is proper because
the injured party while testifying remarked that although her finger
felt drawn up and tight, "it doesn't give me any pain .... -38 A
trial court verdict for 15,000 dollars was reversed for a new trial on
all issues.
The fact that an injured party has recovered workmen's compensation for his disability is irrelevant and incompetent in that
party's suit against the third-party tort-feasor. Thus where defendant's attorney elicited such information from plaintiff on crossexamination, the resulting judgment for defendant was reversed
" Southern Materials Co. v. Bryan Rock & Sand Co., 308 F.2d 414 (4th
Cir. 1962) (dictum); Kahn v. Antevil, 290 N.Y.S. 367 (App. Div. 1936);
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, § 335, comment b (1932); McCoPRuxIcK,
DAMAGES, § 143 (1935).
"' RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 329 (1932).
.T 264 N.C. 83, 141 S.E.2d 1 (1965).
88Id. at 91, 141 S.E.2d at 7.
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in Spivey v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. 9 The Court pointed out that
plaintiff does not necessarily get a double recovery, since under an
appropriate statute 0 the State Industrial Commission may have an
interest in the money received.
In Slaughter v. Slaughter4 a father set off firecrackers outside
the window of a room in which his sons were watching television.
His mother was also in the room and became so frightened that
she rushed from the room, tripped, fell and injured herself. In
awarding the mother recovery the Court remarked that as a general
rule damages for mere fright are not recoverable, but where there
is a contemporary physical injury, there may be recovery.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Michael P. Katz*
CUSTODY
Where both parties to a custody dispute are "persons of good
character and fit and suitable persons to have the care and custody
of the child," any decision as to what the "best interests of the
child" require of the court becomes, ultimately, an effort to predict
the unpredictable. In Jolly v. Queen' the trial judge had awarded
custody to the father of an illegitimate child. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that "when there is a specific finding that the
mother 'is now of good character and reputation and is a fit and
suitable person to have the custody of minor children,' "2 she ought
to have custody of the child.
The mother's subsequent marriage and the existence of a child
of the marriage appear to have been influential factors-the Court
may well have taken the view that this was a more "natural" family
situation for a ten-year-old boy than being the only child of a
middle-aged couple. Yet there is always the possibility that the
29264 N.C. 387, 141 S.E.2d 808 (1965).

"0N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 97-10.2 (1965).

"1264 N.C. 732, 142 S.E.2d 683 (1965).
*

Hill.

Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel

'264 N.C. 711, 142 S.E.2d 592 (1965).
2Id. at 715, 142 S.E.2d at 596.
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removal to another environment could prove upsetting to the child.
It is regrettable that the Court dealt with the issue at such an abstract level, instead of articulating the factors it regarded as relevant
in making its prediction. In cases such as Jolly v. Queen, the Court
is in an impossible situation-someone will have to be hurt and
there is always the risk that the prediction will turn out to be inaccurate. The Court might have taken this opportunity to recommend the use of child psychologists or welfare workers, to allow a
clearer picture of the issues to be developed.
In Hinkle v. Hinkle,3 the lower court had found on the facts
that both parents were "fit and suitable" to have the custody of
the children. As in Jolly v. Queen, there was no impartial evidence
from social caseworkers or other skilled persons as to the needs of
the children. The Court decided that the "best interests" of the
children would be served by placing them with the father. The
position of the Court, with nothing on record to permit a prediction, is an unenviable one. The best it can do is guess. In this
case defendant might have utilized expert testimony to reinforce
the testimony of the children as to their preferences.
In re Craigo4 presented a pathetic situation: Neither parent
being fit to have custody, the Court granted it to the grandparents
of the children. In Stanback v. Stanback,5 the children had become
embroiled in a bitter custody dispute. After a custody hearing on
the merits, the lower court granted custody of the two children to
the husband. The court found as a fact that "the defendant ... has
over a long period of time . . . consumed excessive amounts of
alcohol and by her action and conduct has not been and is not now
a proper or fit person to have the custody of her two minor children." 6
Subsequently, the wife sought to reopen the matter in order to
gain custody. A further hearing was held before a second judge,
who set aside the first order and gave the wife custody, since "the
defendant is now sober and is practicing sobriety and has regained
her normal emotional equilibrium."' The Supreme Court set the
'266 N.C.
'266 N.C.
266 N.C.
Old. at 73,
7Id.
at 74,

189, 146 S.E.2d 73 (1966).
92, 145 S.E.2d 376 (1965).
72, 145 S.E.2d 332 (1965).
145 S.E.2d at 333.
145 S.E.2d at 333.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

1002

[Vol. 44

"finding of changed
second order aside since the Court felt that the
8
evidence."
the
by
supported
not
is
conditions
Broader considerations are involved in the court's determination.
As the Court observed:
The pleadings and the affidavits show the intense bitterness
existing between the parents of the two boys.... Whether the
one or the other should be awarded exclusive custody, or whether
in the light of the background the boys should be required to
switch from one to the other each week, are matters of grave
concern that the courts, both trial and appelate, may not view
lightly.9
In sum, the custody order should be respected unless good reasons present themselves for a new decree. The primary interest of
the children includes the psychological need for stability in a situation conducive to emotional distress. The trial courts, the Court
suggests, should be wary of feelings of sympathy. Unless the children are distressed at being placed where they are, it is best to
allow a minimum time period to close before reopening such matters.
DIVORCE

The traditional philosophy of divorce, requiring moral blameworthiness on the part of the defendant, has to a great extent been
bypassed by legislation taking note of the realities of life: It is
frequently unrealistic and usually quite gratuitous to require proof
of moral turpitude where the problem is the common and yet complex one of incompatibility. Most jurisdictions now allow divorce
after a period of separation. G.S. § 50-6 was passed to effectuate
this policy. The 1965 General Assembly has liberalized the law by
reducing the separation period from two years to one year.
The Court has responded to the problem of the incompatible
spouses in an ambivalent fashion. It has at times taken a somewhat
narrow and unsympathetic approach. In Brown v. Brown'0 it held
that a party guilty of wilful abandonment is barred from obtaining
a divorce. Again, in Moody v. Moody' the Court concluded that
since G.S. § 50-6 requires mutual consent, a defendant who had
Id.at 77, 145 S.E.2d at 335.
9 Ibid.
See Annot., 166 A.L.R. 498
0 213 N.C. 347, 196 S.E. 333 (1938).
(1947).
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N.C. 752, 117 S.E.2d 724 (1961).
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suffered a head injury such as rendered him incompetent to give
his consent, a divorce decree could not be granted. These decisions,
while undoubtedly motivated by admirable sentiments, ignore the
hardship imposed by forcing people having no will to do so to continue as man and wife."2
In Edmisten v. Edmisten'3 an action for divorce was instituted
under G.S. § 50-6. Defendant pleaded misconduct on plaintiff's part
prior to the date of deed of separation. Plaintiff demurred successfully, and the decree was ordered as prayed. On appeal, the lower
court was affirmed. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court
held that "prior misconduct of one will not defeat his action for
divorce under G.S. § 50-6."' 4 This would appear to mark a change
in the Court's approach to the problem from that in Moody v.
Moody' 5 and may lead to a reappraisal of the rationale underlying
G.S. § 50-6. To allow evidence showing the failure of the marriage
to prevent the Court from reaching a pragmatic result would be
an exercise in frustration. Edmisten v. Edmisten indicates the
Court's willingness to confront marital difficulties in a realistic fashion, to reach the result both fair to the parties and responsive to
the needs of society.

EMINENT DOMAIN
Charles E. Dameron*
State Highway Cornm'n v. Batts' raised the question whether
or not the proposed taking and condemnation of property of the
defendants was for a public purpose. The Commission instituted
proceedings to condemn property encompassing an old farm road
3,316 feet in length running from an existing secondary road and
ending in a cul de sac on property immediately to the rear of defendants' property. Defendants contended the proposed road was sole"2See 40 N.C.L. REv. 808 (1962).
N.C. 488, 144 S.E.2d 404 (1965).
"Id. at 489, 144 S.E.2d at 405.
15253 N.C. 752, 117 S.E.2d 724 (1961).
18265

* Assistant Dean and Assistant Professor of Law, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill.
1265 N.C. 346, 144 S.E.2d 126 (1965), 55 N.C.L. REV. 1142 (1966).
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ly for the private use of the adjoining property owners, pointing out
that the proposed road would lead to no other road nor would it
have any scenic value. In a four-to-three decision the Court reversed the trial court and upheld the defendants' position, holding
that such a proposed use would not be a public use and any use by
the public would be merely incidental to the private use of the
adjoining property owners, whose interests would be primarily
served.2
In State Highway Comm'n v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ.3
the defendant contested the Commission's right to condemn property owned by it and presently in use for a public purpose. The trial
court enjoined the Commission from proceeding with the condemnation, finding that the proposed taking was unreasonable and without justification. The Court reversed, pointing out that the defendant's answer did not raise the question of arbitrary or capricious
action on the part of the Commission in locating the proposed highway; therefore the question of unreasonableness was not to be considered, but only the question whether or not the Commission had
the authority to condemn the property of the defendant. The Court
pointed out that this case involved the taking of property for a
"controlled-access facility" by an agency of the state when such
property was put to a present public use by a subordinate division
of the state and did not involve a taking by the state of property
owned by the state, and that the statute authorizing a taking for
controlled access facilities referred to a taking of private "or public
property and property rights." 4 The Court concluded that the legislature had thus expressly given authority to the Commission to
condemn property of a subordinate state agency although such property was being put to a public use at the time of the taking.
The dissenters would have affirmed the trial court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law to the effect that the proposed appropriation was for the
purpose of constructing a public road and that it was for a public use. 265
N.C. at 362, 144 S.E.2d at 138.
265 N.C. 35, 143 S.E.2d 87 (1965).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-89.52 (1964).
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EVIDENCE'
Henry Brandis, Jr.*
ORDER OF PRESENTING EVIDENCE
In State v. Jackson2 it was held that it was within the discretion
of the trial judge (a) to allow further evidence after both sides

had rested and arguments had been made to the jury, and (b) to
limit the scope of subsequent arguments.
EFFECT OF STRIKING TESTIMONY

Ordinarily when a witness gives an unresponsive answer that
is stricken on motion, the judge should immediately instruct the
jury not to consider it. However, the Court held that, when the
record indicated the jury could only have interpreted the granting

of the motion as meaning that the evidence was not to be considered,
3
failure to give the instruction was not reversible error.
COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES

The Court reiterated the rule that, while a wife may testify as
to illicit relations tending to prove that her husband is not the
father of her child, she is not competent to testify to the husband's
nonaccess.' In another case5 defendant was being prosecuted for
assault by tying the victim's hands and feet and then setting her
afire. After this tender courtship and before trial, he married her.

Explaining that the solicitor told her that she had to testify, she
gave evidence as to the assault. The Court held that she was a
competent witness under G.S. § 8-57. 6
'See also in this Survey, under Civil Procedure (Pleading and Parties),
"Necessity of Introducing Pleadings as Evidence."
* Graham Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at

Chapel Hill.
'265 N.C. 558, 144 S.E.2d 584 (1965).

'Moore v. New York Life Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 440, 146 S.E.2d 492 (1966).
'State v. Wade, 264 N.C. 144, 141 S.E.2d 34 (1965). The husband
also is incompetent to testify to nonaccess. The justification for receiving
the illicit relations testimony is that frequently this would otherwise be impossible to prove. And may not the same plausibly be said of nonaccess?
Bluntly stated the rule seems to be that the wife may not testify that the
child is, in any event, bound to be a bastard, but she may testify that the
child is, in fact, a bastard by the cooperation of X.
State v. Price, 265 N.C. 703, 144 S.E.2d 865 (1965).
'Under this statute, in general, a spouse is not compellable to testify
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When the competency of a nine-year-old child was challenged
because of age, the Court held that this was for determination by
the trial judge in his discretion; and the record, reflecting his consideration of the matter in the absence of the jury, demonstrated
that he did not abuse his discretion in declaring her to be com7
petent.
IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES
In Junior Hall, Inc. v. Charm Fashion Center, Inc.,8 an action
to recover the price of merchandise that defendant, a retailer, contended was defective and not marketable, a defense witness testified
that she saw the goods and in her opinion they were not marketable. On cross-examination, over objection, it was brought out that
she had also testified for the same defendant in another action
brought by a vendor. The judge instructed the jury that this was
only to show bias, if in fact it did so. The Court held that this
was not error.
In another case9 defendant, on the issue of contributory negligence, contended that plaintiff was driving under the influence.
Defendant's witness, a patrolman who arrived at the scene thirty
minutes after the crash, testified that he detected the odor of whiskey in plaintiff's car. On cross-examination plaintiff's attorney
wished to introduce in evidence a written statement, acknowledged
by the witness to be his own, made (by the dates given) twenty-nine
days or (by the Court's computation) twenty-eight days after the
collision. It was to the effect that he could not say whether any of
the parties had been drinking. The judge excluded the statement.
The Couri reversed, holding that the exclusion deprived plaintiff of
his right to full and fair cross-examination.
CORROBORATION

Our Court's rather consistent practice of allowing much evidence, otherwise inadmissible, to enter the case as "corroboration"
is, in the view of this-writer, often eminently sensible. Recent examples of its invocation are (a) to admit prior consistent statements
against the other spouse, but one of the stated exceptions is in case of
assault by husband against wife. In the principal case, she was not a wife
at the time of the assault, but the Court clearly interpreted the statute
sensibly.
"State v. Carter, 265 N.C. 626, 144 S.E.2d 826 (1965).
8264 N.C. 81, 140 S.E.2d 772 (1965).
9
Brewer v. Garner, 264 N.C. 384, 141 S.E.2d 796 (1965).
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of the prosecuting witness in a criminal case;1" and (b) in an action
for diminution in value of plaintiff's homeplace, caused by defendant's sewer system, to allow plaintiff, as a witness, to read the
telegram he sent defendant saying the "sewage stench forces me to
abandon my home" (even though the actual emigration was deferred for some time thereafter)."
OPINION EVIDENCE:

What. Is Opinion?
Witnesses make statements which, dependent upon the circumstances, might be interpreted as a mere opinion or conclusion not
based upon minimally adequate observation, or as only indicating
something less than absolute certainty as to what was in fact observed. In State v. Bridgesa 2 testimony of a prosecution witness,
that "I think" defendant was the man witness observed committing
a hold-up, was properly classified as the latter, the lack of certainty
going to weight and not to admissibility.
Witnesses also make statements which, dependent upon the circumstances, might be interpreted as mere opinion or as a "shorthand
statement of fact." It is a far from easy line to draw. In Gooding
v. Tucker 3 a witness's statement that plaintiff "couldn't close" his
car door was classified as the latter. Other testimony in the case,
throwing much light on what was meant by this, adequately justifies the decision.
Inferences for Jury
In a wrongful death case' 4 defendant's contention was that
intestate's car jerked to the left as defendant, traveling in the same
direction, was attempting to pass. The trial judge, though finding
a plaintiff's witness to be an expert traffic engineer, refused to allow
him to be questioned regarding whether or not the 1959 Ford
intestate was driving could "fishtail." The Court affirmed, holding
that an opinion of even an expert is not admissible as to matters
within the ordinary experience of men; that the jury is deemed
"0State v. Norris, 264 N.C. 470, 141 S.E.2d 869 (1965). The fact that
there were slight variations in the prior statements did not destroy their
corroborative effect or make them inadmissible.
" Glace v. Town of Pilot Mountain, 265 N.C. 181, 143 S.E.2d 78 (1965).
12266 N.C. 354, 146 S.E.2d 107 (1966).
8264 N.C. 142, 140 S.E. 2d 719 (1965).
' Glenn v. Smith, 264 N.C. 706, 142 S.E.2d 596 (1965).
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capable of deciding such questions without the aid of opinion evidence; and that most jurors are thoroughly familiar with the operation of automobiles and are thus capable of determining what
inferences the facts will permit or require.
This does not literally invoke the "jury province" rule in the
sense that it bars opinion evidence because it is on the very question
the jury must decide,15 though in this case the place of impact, in
reference to the center line of the highway, was the most critical
fact in controversy. Exclusion here, as indicated, is based upon the
notion that the jury can draw inferences as well as the expert,
whether or not the issue is the critical one to be decided by the
jury.' Presumably the witness would have testified that the car
could not have fishtailed, or at least that such was highly improbable.17 And can it be seriously contended that the average juror,
sitting on a case in the fall of 1964, would be familiar with the
fishtailing propensities of a 1959 Ford?
Surely the evidence was relevant. Defendant's own testimony
claimed jerking or fishtailing. While plaintiff had some evidence
that intestate's car never left its side of the road, both intestate
and his passenger were killed in the wreck. The credibility of defendant's testimony was critical, and exclusion of the proffered evidence deprived the jury of an aid in appraising such credibility.
(The jury found that both defendant and intestate were negligent.)
It is possible that the Court believed that any expert opinion as to
fishtailing-at least of a nature helpful to plaintiff-would be in8
herently incredible, but the decision is not rested on that ground.1
" For a gingerly exploration of that great judicial morass, see STANSNORTH CAROLINA EvIDENxcE, § 126 (2d ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited
as STANSBURY].
BURY,
10

See STANSBURY

§

124.

"'The exact nature of the testimony sought from the witness is left
somewhat speculative, as the trial judge refused to allow counsel to get
into the record the questions to be asked and the answers to be given.
Since the rule is that the offeror must get at least the substance of the
testimony into the record in order to predicate error upon its exclusion,

this seems to have been unreasonably arbitrary conduct on the part of the
judge, though the Court did not condemn it.
8The opinion states that what a car would do in rounding a left curve
involved many imponderables-speed, inflation of tires, power used in ac-

celeration, mechanical condition of car, road conditions (particularly whether
there was loose sand or gravel), whether the cars were in their proper lanes,

etc. All this may well be true (though, by defendant's own testimony,

whether intestate's car was in the wrong lane would depend upon fishtailing,
and not vice versa). The more true it is, the more doubt it casts upon the
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In another and much less questionable case' 9 it was held that
the opinion of a nonexpert witness on the issue of negligence is
not admissible when the material facts can be placed before the
jury.
In Dixon v. Edwards" plaintiff's attorney, in presenting his
wrongful death case, used an expert mechanical engineer specializing in traffic accident reconstruction who had examined the cars
and the scene sixteen days after the accident to describe what he
found and testify, in answer to hypothetical questions proper in
form, as to his opinions regarding the relative positions of the
vehicles, the angle of impact, the parts first colliding, and the amount
of overlap. After defendant's evidence, the witness was recalled
and, again in answer to hypothetical questions proper in form,
opined, in effect, that the collision could not have occurred in the
manner described by defendant's witnesses. On neither occasion did
he express an opinion as to the location of the vehicles, at the time
of the impact, in relation to the center line. The Court expressed
no opinion whether he could properly have done so, though it recognized that there is a split of authority on the matter in other jurisdictions and said that the matter has not been decided in North
Carolina.2 ' The Court also expressed no opinion as to the propriety
of the evidence actually given by the witness as, even considering
this testimony, it found that plaintiff should have been nonsuited.
It is apparent, however, that the purpose of the expert's rebuttal
assertion that jurors are themselves so expert in such matters that they
need no help from an expert witness.
"' Beanblossom v. Thomas, 266 N.C. 181, 146 S.E.2d 36 (1966). See
also McDaris v. Breit Bar "T" Corp., 265 N.C. 298, 144 S.E.2d 59 (1965),
holding that the statement of a witness that he was familiar with boundaries
"as contained in the deed" is a conclusion which the jury might draw from
competent evidence, but which may not be drawn by the witness.
265 N.C. 470, 144 S.E.2d 408 (1965).
21 In Cheek v. Barnwell Warehouse & Brokerage Co., 209 N.C. 569, 183
S.E. 729 (1936), a nonexpert witness, who described what he found at
the scene after the crash but did not observe the crash, was not allowed to
give an opinion as to where on the highway the crash took place, since
that was "the very question the jury was called upon to answer." Whether
the Court will distinguish between expert and nonexpert testimony remains
to be seen. Such a distinction has been recognized in some situations. See
STANSBURY § 126. In both civil and criminal cases the Court has ruled out
testimony of a highway patrolman as to speed, based upon his examination
of the scene, when he did not see the crash. Tyndall v. Harvey C. Hines
Co., 226 N.C. 620, 39 S.E.2d 828 (1946); State v. Roberson, 240 N.C. 745,
83 S.E.2d 798 (1954) (and, even when admitted, it is without probative
value).
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evidence was akin to the purpose for which the expert's opinion was
offered in the fishtailing case.
Speed from Lights
Where plaintiff testified that he observed defendant's car lights
while the car traveled some 130 yards and that the car was swaying
back and forth from speed, it was permissible for him to testify
that defendant was traveling from seventy-five to eighty miles per
hour.2 2
Mental Competence
In full harmony with prior authority involving various documents, it was held that lay witnesses, whose testimony demonstrated
an adequate opportunity to observe decedent, could testify that in
their opinion decedent did not have sufficient mental capacity to
know and understand the nature and effect of signing a paper cancelling his life insurance policy and requesting its cash value.2 In
the same case a medical expert who examined decedent for the first
time three days after the paper was signed testified that decedent
had cirrhosis of the liver, with jaundice, was acutely ill, nervous
and drowsy, and was moderately disoriented; that these conditions
could have existed prior to the date of the examination and possibly
did; and that in the opinion of the witness it was unlikely that
decedent "could understand legal matters for a few days prior"
thereto. The Court held that all of this was clearly admissible, except that it thought the reference to "legal matters" was not to be
commended, though under the circumstances this was not thought
to be prejudicial to defendant or confusing to the jury. Such a
view of the matter is certainly sensible. It is fortunate that the
Court did not equate this to testimony, condemned by prior cases,
that in the opinion of the witness a person did not have sufficient
mental capacity to make a deed or will.2 4
Party As Own Expert Witness
In Galloway v. Lawrence,25 a malpractice case, defendant (who
had other experts, also) offered himself as an expert witness. Plain22 Jones v. Horton, 264 N.C. 549, 142 S.E.2d 351 (1965).
" Moore v. New York Life Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 440, 146 S.E.2d 492
(1966).
2" See STANSBURY §
127.
2 266 N.C. 245, 145 S.E.2d 861 (1966).

1966]

SURVEY OF NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW

1011

tiff's attorney did not desire to question him regarding his qualifications. The Court held that defendant could qualify and testify
as an expert, but that it was error for the trial judge to say, in the
hearing of the jury: "Let the record show that the Court finds as
a fact that Dr. Lawrence is a medical expert, to wit: an expert
physician in surgery." This should have been said out of the hearing of the jury since, as an expression of opinion by the judge it
was in violation of G.S. § 1-180. In some settings this might well
seem strained and overly technical. However, in this case, a critical
question was whether defendant had visited plaintiff. He alone
testified that he did. While this was a matter of veracity rather than
of expertise, the judge's statement might conceivably have influenced the jury in appraising his credibility. The wisdom of the
statute is open to serious debate, but it is still on the books.2
Other Matters Involving Experts
In the absence of case authority one might suppose that a properly qualified expert should be allowed to testify either that fact A
caused fact B, or that fact A could or might have caused fact B,
dependent upon the degree of certainty existing in his mind. However, our Court has shown a decided preference for the latter type
answer, even when the witness feels no such uncertainty, and the
questions must be phrased accordingly.17 This preference was manifested in two cases-one involving the cause of a fire2 ' and the
other the cause of the cracking and bulging of building walls.29
The first also held that hypothetical questions are improper when
they assume facts not in evidence;3 and the second held (a) that
" A question might be raised whether the same result would follow had
plaintiff's counsel, in the presence of the jury, objected to his acceptance
as an expert or, short of that, had conducted a cross-examination as to his
qualifications designed to insinuate that they were none too good. A question might also be raised whether, when a witness is challenged for age or
lack of mental capacity, the judge may, in the presence of the jury, pronounce him qualified.
See STANSBU3RY § 137; 43 N.C.L. Rnv. 979 (1965).
Keith v. United Cities Gas Co., 266 N.C. 119, 146 S.E.2d 7 (1966).
"Schafer v. Southern Ry., 266 N.C. 285, 145 S.E.2d 887 (1966).
Cf. Bryant v. Russell, 266 N.C. 629, 146 S.E.2d 813 (1966), decided
after the period covered by this Survey. There a hypothetical question was
excluded because the evidence then did not support an assumption stated
in it. The evidence was later supplied, but by then the expert had been excused and was not recalled. The Court held that it was not error to exclude
the answer of the witness, offered at the close of plaintiff's evidence, since
the witness was not then available for cross-examination.
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a hypothetical question is improper when it calls for an answer on
the basis of premises not clearly stated in the question, and (b)
that a witness, whatever his qualifications, may not be permitted to
express an opinion based upon his observations when it appears that
the observations were, in the eyes of the Court, inadequate for the
purpose."
Under the rule that whether a witness is a qualified expert is
a preliminary question for the trial judge, where there was competent evidence to support his findings, the Court refused to review
findings that, while the chief of a municipal fire department was
an expert fireman, he was not an expert in the detection of the
32
causes of fires and explosions.

The Court approved the reception of expert testimony (a) that a
still the witness examined was capable of making whiskey and that
mash he observed was fermented and ready to run and be manufactured into whiskey,3 3 and (b) that everyone who has an alcohol
content of 0.15 per cent in his blood is under the influence of
alcohol. 4
RELEVANCE

Prior Offenses
In a prosecution for forgery it was held that evidence of prior
forgeries by defendant is generally admissible as bearing on defendant's intent in the forgery charged. 5
In a murder case, in which defendant was not a witness, it was
held to be reversible error for the state to attempt to prove, without
" See also Branch v. Dempsey, 265 N.C. 733, 145 S.E.2d 395 (1965),

44 N.C.L. Rav. 1146 (1966), where the testimony of a physician as to cause
of death was excluded because his own observation was an inadequate basis
for an answer and he was not asked proper hypothetical questions.
"Edwards v. Hamill, 266 N.C. 304, 145 S.E.2d 884 (1966).
" State v. Little, 265 N.C. 440, 144 S.E.2d 282 (1965). Why not limit
him to saying that it could or might have been ready to run?
" State v. Webb, 265 N.C. 546, 144 S.E.2d 619 (1965). As the opinion
indicates, similar testimony, including testimony by the same witness, had
been approved in prior cases.
" State v. Painter, 265 N.C. 277, 144 S.E.2d 6 (1965). The evidence
of the prior forgeries was part of a confession admitted in evidence, but
the Court's statement regarding admissibility is a general one. Cf. State v.
Welch, 266 N.C. 291, 145 S.E.2d 902 (1966), another forgery case, where
there was some testimony with regard to checks other than those covered
by the indictment, but the jury was instructed to disregard it, and the
Court found no reversible error.
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directly connecting it with the homicide in any way, that defendant
was a sexual pervert.36
When defendant in a criminal case takes the witness stand, he
may be cross-examined about prior offenses for impeachment purposes, though the state is bound by his answers; and the Court
followed its prior decisions allowing not only questions regarding
prior convictions, but also (and much more questionably) questions
regarding prior indictment.3 7
Character of Premises
Where defendant was charged with possession of nontaxpaid
whiskey for the purpose of sale and defendant neither took the stand
nor offered character evidence, since evidence of his own reputation would have been inadmissible, it was error to admit evidence
that his house had a bad reputation for having whiskey for sale.38
Evidence of Occurrence or Condition at One Time as Proof of
Same at Another Time
The Court approved (a) evidence that on prior occasions plaintiff had been seen driving with his car door open, as evidence that
it was open at the time of the collision in litigation ;39 (b) evidence
that X was seen driving a car on various occasions ranging from
some five hours to a few minutes before the wreck, as evidence
that he was driving at the time of the wreck;4 (c) evidence of the
"6State v. Rinaldi, 264 N.C. 701, 142 S.E.2d 604 (1965). The solicitor
argued to the jury that this showed a character that would not hesitate to
murder. Justice (now Chief Justice) Parker and Justice Sharp dissented.
" State v. Brown, 266 N.C. 55, 145 S.E.2d 297 (1965). Actually, one
of the questions was whether defendant had been "charged . . . or indicted."
" State v. Tessnear, 265 N.C. 319, 144 S.E.2d 43 (1965). The Court
points out that since defendant was not charged with maintaining a nuisance,
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 19-1, -3 (1953), authorizing such evidence, were not
applicable.
" Gooding v. Tucker, 264 N.C. 142, 140 S.E.2d 719 (1965). The opinion
does not indicate the time lapse between the prior occasions and the collision.
Possibly the opinion could be interpreted as approving such evidence as
corroborative only, but it states that the evidence was competent as bearing
upon the condition of the car and as tending to corroborate the other
testimony.
' Rector v. Roberts, 264 N.C. 324, 141 S.E.2d 482 (1965). Here no question of corroboration was involved. This evidence was held sufficient to
carry to the jury the issue of the driver's identity. There is no discussion
of whether evidence of the earlier occasions would have been admitted in the
absence of the evidence as to the occasions very close to the wreck in point
of time.

1014

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

speed of a vehicle some two-tenths of a mile from the wreck, as
evidence of speed at the time of the wreck (but, in another case,
under the circumstances presented, the Court rejected evidence of
speed two or three miles away);42 and (d) evidence of lack of
mental capacity within a reasonable time before and3 after the criti4
cal date, as evidence of such capacity on that date.
When the issue involved a safety device on an amusement ride,
as well as the conduct of the attendant with respect thereto, it was
permissible to allow others who patronized the ride, before and after
plaintiff's injury, to testify to the condition of the device and the
attendant's conduct when they rode.44
Price as Evidence of Value
Reviewing the rules regarding admissibility, in condemnation
cases, of evidence of price paid by the condemnee, the Court allowed
use of evidence of price paid nineteen months before the condemnation.4
Offer in Compromise or to Pay Medical Expense
Where the testimony was that defendant offered to give notes
for the entire amount in controversy, this was evidence of an admission, not of an offer in compromise, and hence was admissible. 40
The Court also held that, under the circumstances, defendant's
offer to borrow money and pay plaintiff's hospital bills was not an
admission of liability and was incompetent.41
'"Wilkerson v. Clark, 264 N.C. 439, 141 S.E.2d 884 (1965). Cf. Rector
200 yards away.
v. Roberts, supra note 40, involving testimony as to speed
42 Greene v. Meredith, 264 N.C. 178, 141 S.E.2d 482 (1965).
'2 Moore v. New York Life Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 440, 146 S.E.2d 492

(1966).

"Dockery v. World of Mirth Shows, Inc., 264 N.C. 406, 142 S.E.2d 29
(1965). The exact time lapse was not mentioned, but, since it appears that
a fair was in progress, it may reasonably be assumed that the time lapse
was relatively short.
' Northgate Shopping Center, Inc. v. State Highway Comm'n, 265 N.C.
209, 143 S.E.2d 144 (1965). A complicating factor, which did not prevent
admission, was that the tract purchased and the land condemned were not
identical.
"Tindal v. Mills, 265 N.C. 716, 144 S.E.2d 902 (1965).
"Gosnell v. Ramsey, 266 N.C. 537, 146 S.E.2d 476 (1966). For discussion of N.C. GEr. STAT. § 20-166(d) (Supp. 1965), the Good Samaritan
statute enacted by the 1965 General Assembly, see Note, 44 N.C.L. REv. 508
(1966).
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SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
Two cases involved the "breathalizer." In the first48 it was held
that the qualifications of the person making the test were amply
demonstrated and that his testimony was competent under G.S. §
20-139.1. The opinion rather clearly demonstrates the Court's own
approval of the validity of such evidence.
The second case49 involved the statutory prohibition against the
giving of the test by an arresting officer. The Court classified as
such an officer one who was present at the scene and was prepared to
assist, if necessary, even though the actual arrest was made by
another officer. Of course, once the statute is construed to go beyond the technical making of the arrest, other problems of construction are bound to arise; but any other decision would have
flagrantly disregarded the spirit of the statute, particularly where,
as in the principal case, the testing officer had directly observed
defendant, had called for help, and was approaching defendant when
his fellow officer arrived.
In another case," the trial judge admitted a "stopping chart"
prepared by the State Department of Motor Vehicles showing, for
various speeds, distance traveled during reaction time before braking, and distance traveled from first braking to full stop. Noting
that the great majority of jurisdictions passing on the question
have excluded such charts, the Court reversed, saying that, if it be
assumed that the chart is keyed to average drivers, cars and road
conditions, nothing indicated what those averages were or how they
compared to the situation in litigation; that it was not the equivalent
of expert opinion as to stopping time under stated circumstances;
that the compilers were not present and subject to cross-examination; and that it was inadmissible hearsay. It was also true that
the chart was not properly authenticated, but the Court deliberately
rested its decision upon the broader ground.
THE HEARSAY

RULE AND EXCEPTIONS THERETO5

Declarationsof an Agent
One case52 in this area has been made the subject of a note
"State v. Powell, 264 N.C. 73, 140 S.E.2d 705 (1965).
145 S.E.2d 917 (1966).
Stauffer, 266 N.C. 358,
,State v. v.
Vestal, 264 N.C. 500, 142 S.E.2d 361 (1965).
Hughes
51 See also the discussion of Hughes v. Vestal, supra note 50.
"Branch v. Dempsey, 265 N.C. 733, 145 S.E.2d 395 .(1965).
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elsewhere in the Review.5" It held inadmissible, as against the principal, evidence of a post-occurrence extrajudicial declaration of an
agent tending to show liability where principal and agent were being
sued together and there was prima facie proof of agency at the time
54
of the occurrence.
In another case it was held that, while extrajudicial declarations
of an agent are not admissible against the principal to show the
agent's authority, where there was sufficient evidence to justify a
finding that the principal ratified a new contract made by the agent,
purportedly on behalf of the principal but without authority, the
extrajudicial declarations became admissible as evidence of the
terms of the new contract.55 The declarations in question were
apparently made at the time the new contract was negotiated, and
the case would not necessarily be authority for admitting declarations made after the making of the contract but stating its terms.
Deceased Declarant
The Court held that, in an action against the principal and the
administratrix of the deceased agent, the trial court properly excluded evidence of the declarations of the agent not contended to
be part of the res gestae.5" Since defendant's attorney was the proponent of the evidence (through cross-examination of a plaintiff's
witness and direct examination of his own witness), it may safely
be assumed that no question of a declaration against interest was
involved and that the declaration was not only hearsay, but was
also self-serving.
Testimony at a Former Trial
In Norburn v. MackieT plaintiff subpoenaed a witness who did
not appear. He had testified at a former trial in the same case.
Upon a showing that he resided more than one hundred miles away,
that he was at least sixty-five years of age, and that (as shown by
an affidavit from.his physician)- a trip to court would be detrimental
to his health, the trial judge admitted the prior testimony. The
"Note, 44 N.C.L. Rav. 1146 (1966)." See also Edwards v. Hamill, 266 N.C. 304, 145 S.E.2d 884 (1966),
where the same rule was applied.
" Carolina Equip. & Parts Co. v. Anders, 265 N.C. 393, 144 S.E.2d
252 (1965).
" Faison v. T & S Trucking Co., 266 N.C. 383, 146 S.E.2d 450 (1966).
1264 N.C. 479, 141 S.E.2d 877 (1965).
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Court approved, and this is certainly well within the requirements
for reception of such evidence.5"
Deposition Taken in Another Action
Defendant offered in evidence a deposition taken on adverse
examination in another action, growing out of the same occurrence,
to which plaintiff in this action was not a party. Plaintiff had no
opportunity to cross-examine the deponent. The Court held that
the deposition should have been excluded under G.S. § 1-568.24
and that, since it was excluded by statute, the fact that a different
ground of objection was advanced in the court below did not make
its admission proper.59 The validity and extent of this latter rule
are open to serious question.6" Should a different rule apply to
hearsay barred by statute than to hearsay barred by judicial decision? Indeed, in this case, the judicially developed hearsay rule
would, upon proper objection, exclude the evidence, even in the
absence of the statute. Further, the statute upon which the Court
relied was probably not intended to apply to the situation before the
Court. 1
Death Certificates and Coroner's Reports
It is provided in G.S. § 130-73 that any copy of the record of a
birth or death properly certified by the State Registrar shall be
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. In Branch v. Dempsey62 the trial judge nevertheless excluded a duly certified copy of
a death certificate, as well as a certified copy of the report of the
coroner (who had also signed the death certificate). The Court

" See

STANSBURY §

145.

"' Glenn v. Smith, 264 N.C. 706, 142 S.E.2d 596 (1965). The statute
cited bars use of the deposition against any party not notified of its taking,
and, since the present plaintiff was not a party, he received no such notice.
(The Court calls attention to the fact that it was not pointed out to the
trial judge that the deposition was taken in another action.) The actual
objection made in the court below was, under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-83(9)
(1953), that the witness resided within forty miles of the place of trial.
o See the discussion of the rule in STANSBURY § 27 n.92. The Court's
opinion in the principal case cited as authority 2 McINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1532 (2d ed. 1956). The rule is there
stated, but the one case cited does not really support the proposition, as is
explained by Stansbury. On the other hand, Stansbury cites other North
Carolina cases that do support it.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-568.24 (1953) seems pretty clearly designed only
to govern admissibility of a deposition against parties to the same action
in which it is taken.
265 N.C. 733, 145 S.E.2d 395 (1966).
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held that this was not error, since the documents contained statements from unidentified sources to which the coroner could not have
testified, over objection, had he been on the witness stand. The
Court said:
The purpose of the statute appears to be to permit the death
certificate to be introduced as evidence of the fact of death, the
time and place where it occurred, the identity of the deceased,
the bodily injury or disease which was the cause of death, the
disposition of the body and possibly other matters relating to the
death. We think it was not the purpose of the Legislature to
make the certificate
competent evidence of whatever might be
63
stated therein.

Despite the fact that this leaves some considerable uncertainty,
the decision in the case, under the circumstances presented, seems
reasonable. A literal acceptance of the broadest possible statutory
meaning clearly would open the way for much double (or more
multiple) hearsay, speculation, and groundless conclusions regarding
the manner in which the fatal injury was caused. It does seem
most unlikely that the legislature intended such a result.
In another case64 the Court held that it was error to exclude the
death certificate, but the error was harmless, as the signer of the
certificate was a witness and testified to all the matters reflected in
the certificate.
Business Entries
In a prosecution for wilfully disposing of mortgaged property,

a ledger account sheet was sufficiently identified and was admissible
when the owner of the business testified that it contained entries
made in the regular course of business by his secretary."5 This
seems well within the rules prescribed by the more recent North
Carolina cases.6 8
"265 N.C. 733, 748, 145 S.E.2d 395, 406 (1965). Presumably the certifi-

cate would still be admissible in part, with the usual rules, as to documents
only partly admissible, applying.
",Weeks v. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 264 N.C. 140, 141 S.E.2d
7 (1965).
" State v. Dunn, 264 N.C. 391, 141 S.E.2d 630 (1965). The case also
held that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-18 (1953) is not applicable where an original
instrument is offered in evidence with the certificate of the Register of
Deeds as to the time and place of recording; and that, further, the original
instrument is admissible, whether recorded or not.
"8See STANSBURY § 155.
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Hearsay Opinion
In a condemnation proceeding exception was taken to the award
of the commissioners and there was trial de novo in the superior
court. The commissioners, as witnesses, testified to their estimate
of damage caused by the taking. Upon objection, they were not
permitted to testify that they had been appointed by the clerk of
the superior court to ascertain the damages. The Court held that
exclusion was proper, since the good reputation of the witnesses
could be established only by evidence of such reputation-not by
evidence of the esteem in which they were held by some particular
person.67
Analytically, when offered to prove character, evidence of reputation is just as much hearsay opinion as the evidence proffered in
this case, though it involves collective opinion and is admissible
under an exception to the hearsay rule.
The decision in the principal case is undoubtedly correct and is
consistent with prior authority excluding evidence, offered on the
issue of mental competence, that the person whose competence was
in issue had held public office or was allowed to serve on a jury.,,
Where the issue is mental competence, conversely to the situation
when the issue is character, opinion evidence is admissible and
reputation evidence is not;69 but in both situations, when extrajudicial conduct or statements are relevant only on the theory that
they imply an opinion held by the actor or declarant, they are hear70
say.
STATEMENTS TAKEN FOR A REPORT TO THE

ICC

71

the Court held that,
In Craddock v. Queen City Coach Co.
since under 49 U.S.C. § 320(f) an accident report to the Interstate
"' Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Smith, 264 N.C. 581, 142 S.E.2d 140
(1965).
"In re Will of Crabtree, 200 N.C. 4, 156 S.E. 98 (1930) ; Ray v. Ray,
98 N.C. 566, 4 S.E. 526 (1887). The opinions in these cases do not contain
an analysis of the essential nature of the evidence and thus perhaps leave
the reason for exclusion open to some doubt. For the classic-and correctanalysis see Wright v. Tatham, 5 Cl. & Fin. 670 (H.L. 1838). See also
STANSBURY § 143. Cf. Jackson v. Parks, 220 N.C. 680, 18 S.E.2d 138 (1942)
(letter written to plaintiff, more directly indicating belief in plaintiff's sanity,
excluded).
"In re Nelson's Will, 210 N.C. 398, 186 S.E. 480 (1936). Annot., 105
A.L.R. 1443 (1936).
10 See Wright v. Tatham, 5 Cl. & Fin. 670 (H.L. 1838).
11264 N.C. 380, 141 S.E.2d 798 (1965).
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Commerce Commission is barred from use in evidence or for any
other purpose in a suit arising out of the accident, a statement taken
from defendant's employee by defendant's counsel for use in preparing such a report would not be made available to plaintiff's
counsel; that to require its production would make the statute worthless.
JUDICIAL NOTICE

The Court took judicial notice that "nowadays both covenants
not to sue and releases are ordinarily prepared by attorneys representing the insurance company of the covenantee or releasee, and
that they are intended for use in the several states. ...
The case
was on demurrer, and it is not to be inferred that the Court would,
by taking judicial notice, dispense with proof if there was an issue
as to the identity of the draftsman.
In another case, on appeal by plaintiff from an involuntary
nonsuit, the Court said:
Any person who operates an automobile which is equipped
with an automatic transmission knows that when it is left in
"drive" with the motor running, a jolt may cause it to move
forward under its own power; that sometimes vibrations from
within the motor itself will feed gas to the carburetor and set the
vehicle in motion; and that slight pressure on the accelerator
will start the car forward. . . . Furthermore, it is a matter of
common knowledge that, absent warning devices installed for
that purpose, any automobile can be driven for an appreciable
distance with the parking brake set before the driver notices
that he has not released it.73
Though it seems clear that these observations affected the decision in the case, whether they rise to the level of judicial noticeor whether they ought to do so-is, at least as to the first sentence,
somewhat problematical. If they do so rise, then the body of common
knowledge is somewhat broader than the knowledge of this common observer.
In Hughes v. Vestal 4 the Court held that the trial judge, in
effect, had taken judicial notice of the information in a "stopping
chart" published by the North Carolina Department of Motor VeSell v. Hotchkiss, 264 N.C. 185, 188, 141 S.E.2d 259, 262 (1965).
Nance v. Parks, 266 N.C. 206, 208, 146 S.E.2d 24, 26 (1966).
'264 N.C. 500, 142 S.E.2d 361 (1965).
'
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hides, and that this was error, at least for the purpose for which
the information was used. :References to such charts in earlier
cases 75 were distinguished, as were earlier cases in which judicial
notice was taken of-for example-the fact that a car traveling at
thirty-three miles per hour could be stopped within 480 feet. Disapproval in the instant case is phrased in terms of the impropriety
of noticing something outside judicially recognized limits, it being
outside such limits to notice the information as, in effect, providing
a standard by which to measure the conduct of a driver in a particular case. Essentially the error seems to lie in using the chart to
show that plaintiff was traveling faster than he asserted in his testimony, in effect assuming that the chart was prepared on the basis
of average drivers, cars and road conditions, when there was nothing to show what the averages signified or how they compared with
the situation involved in the litigation. Having held that the chart
was not admissible in evidence,76 it would hardly have been realistic
to hold that it was nevertheless a proper subject for judicial notice.
The Court closes with the sweeping statement: "But we now
make it clear that such tables are not admissible as evidence in the
trial of cases and are not proper subjects of judicial notice for the
purposes of trials of cases in Superior Court. '77 Is this intended to
prohibit any possible use, or only such use as was attempted in the
instant case?
In two of these cases-Brown v. Hale, 263 N.C. 176, 139 S.E.2d 210
(1964), and Ennis v. Dupree, 262 N.C. 224, 136 S.E.2d 702 (1964)-the
issue in respect to which the Court mentioned the chart was whether,
taking the driver's own testimony as to speed and distance, he could have
stopped in time. In the third-Clayton v. Rimmer, 262 N.C. 302, 136
S.E.2d 562 (1964)-plaintiff proved the length of the skid marks made by
defendant's car, and the Court said that this was not sufficient evidence of
excessive speed, citing a chart which showed that the skid was much shorter
than the stopping distance required by a car traveling at a speed lawful for
the place involved. In all three cases, therefore, the information was brought
to bear on some aspect of a negligence issue.
" 264 N.C. 500, 142 S.E.2d 361 (1965). See text accompanying note 50,
supra.
" 264 N.C. 500, 507, 142 S.E.2d 361, 366 (1965).
"As to the cases cited in note 75 supra, the opinion states that the
references to charts were "rhetorical and illustrative" and did not amount
to "judicial notice to support decision." It also states that "perhaps" they
could be construed to take judicial notice within judicially recognized limits.
Also, before the quotation in the text, it states that the references to charts
in these cases may be misleading. It is thus fair to ask whether the Court
is really disapproving the use made of the information in the prior cases.
One possible interpretation of the quotation is that the Supreme Court,
in appraising the result of a trial, may use information which the superior
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INSURANCE
Charles E. Damero*
ACCIDENT AND HEALTH INSURANCE

In Walsh v. United States Ins. Co. of America the Court had
occasion to construe again the "confinement clause" of a policy of
insurance, 2 which policy defined "confinement" as "confinement of
the Insured continuously inside the house because of such sickness,
except that the right of the Insured to recover under the policy
shall not be defeated because he visits his physician for treatment
or goes to the hospital for treatment when such treatment cannot
be administered in the house of the Insured." The Court pointed
out that this was the only case found in which the policy had defined confinement, that such definition bound the parties, and that
a more liberal interpretation of the clause was thus precluded.'
Thus the Court held evidence of the plaintiff that he went for short
walks on his farm, occasionally drove his car, and made trips to
the beach entitled the defendant insurer to nonsuit.
court is prohibited from using in arriving at that result. However, it seems
rather difficult to believe that such a meaning is intended.
The opinion cites one other case which is probably not affected. In
Burgess v. Mattox, 260 N.C. 305, 132 S.E.2d 577 (1963), the Court took
judicial notice of the fact that is, as plaintiff's evidence showed, defendant's
truck was stopped within thirty-three feet, it could not, as plaintiff contended, have been going forty-five miles per hour. This depended upon no
chart, and the statement is certainly sound. However, the case, in the light
of the instant opinion, serves to raise these intriguing questions: If charts
are verboten, where does the Court find its common knowledge? What is
the relation of the driving experience of the justices to the body of common
knowledge?
* Assistant Dean and Assistant Professor of Law, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill.
1265 N.C. 634, 144 S.E.2d 817 (1965).
The "confinement clause" of such a policy entitles the insured to additional benefits if he, in addition to being totally disabled, is confined continuously within doors. The most recent North Carolina case prior to
Walsh was Suits v. Old Equity Life Ins. Co., 249 N.C. 383, 106 S.E.2d 579
(1959).
' The Court has previously construed such a clause to be descriptive of
the character and extent of the illness rather than to place a limitation on
the conduct of the insured. Duke v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp.,
212 N.C. 682, 194 S.E. 91 (1937); Thompson v. Mutual Benefit Health
& Acc. Ass'n, 209 N.C. 678, 184 S.E. 695 (1936).
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AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE

In a case of first impression in North Carolina, the Court in
Buck v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.' held that an uninsured
vehicle within the protection of an uninsured motorist endorsement
of a policy of insurance included a vehicle being operated by one
who was not the agent of the owner of the vehicle. Plaintiff, injured in an automobile accident, had brought suit against the driver
and the owner of the other vehicle involved in the accident which
resulted in a judgment against the driver but not against the owner
because of a determination by the jury that the driver was not
operating the vehicle as the agent of the owner at the time of the
accident. Execution against the driver was returned unsatisfied. In
the principal case, the plaintiff brought suit against her own liability
insurer seeking to recover under the uninsured motorist endorsement, which defined "uninsured automobile" as being one where
there was no insurance policy "applicable to the accident with respect to any person or organization legally responsible for the use
of such automobile," The trial court found as a fact that at the
time of the accident the other vehicle was being operated without
the permission, knowledge, or consent of the owner but denied recovery on the ground that such vehicle was not an "uninsured
vehicle." The Court reversed, pointing out that the applicable section of the Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Act
of 1953' did not define the term "uninsured motor vehicles" but
that the policy did and that there was no insurance policy of the
owner applicable to the accident. The Court acknowledged that
literally there was insurance on the owner's vehicle but that the
endorsement must be construed to protect the insured and to carry
out the intention of the legislature in regard to financial responsibility of motorists.
Griffin v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.6 involved the cancellation of a policy of insurance by the loan company financing the
cost of the premiums on an assigned risk policy pursuant to a power
of attorney given the loan company by the insured. The cancellation was requested after the insured failed to make the installment
payment that was due. The policy was cancelled, and the unearned

'265 N.C. 285, 144 S.E.2d 34 (1965).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b) (3) (Supp. 1965).
81264 N.C. 212, 141 S.E.2d 300 (1965).
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premium returned to the loan company. Shortly thereafter the insured was involved in an accident that resulted in a judgment
against her in favor of the plaintiff who then sought recovery
against the cancelling insurance company. The plaintiff, in the trial
court, was allowed to introduce evidence to the effect that the loan
company had not notified the insured of her nonpayment, and had
not notified her of its intention to request cancellation, and that the
unearned premium refund resulted in a balance due the insured that
would have been sufficient to keep the policy in force through the
date of the accident if so applied. The Court held that the introduction of such evidence was prejudicial error, pointing out that the
policy authorized cancellation by the insured and specifically provided that payment or tender of any unearned premium was not a
condition of cancellation. Further, the Court pointed out, relying
on Daniels v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,7 that an insured has the
right to cancel either in person or by an authorized agent and that
no notice of such effected cancellation need be given by the insurer
to the insured."
In Jamestown Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.' a
prospective purchaser of an automobile was involved in an accident
while test-driving the automobile. Plaintiff insurance company, the
insurer of the automobile sales company under a garage policy,
brought an action against defendant insurance company, insurer of
the prospective purchaser's father, seeking a declaratory judgment
as to the liability of each for damages resulting from injuries
sustained in the accident by other parties. The garage policy provided coverage only if no other liability insurance was available.
The father's policy excluded from coverage a nonowned automobile
used in the automobile business by the insured and also limited
coverage to a "relative" of the insured (the father) and defined
"relative" as one who was a resident of the same household as the
insured. The evidence revealed that the son was twenty-nine years
old, had previously left home to work, had been married but was
presently separated, had been away during service in the Army,
'258 N.C. 660, 129 S.E.2d 314 (1963).
'The Griffin case again came to the Court on appeal by the plaintiff after
a new trial and a judgment of nonsuit. The Court reversed stating that
cancellation of the policy was a matter of defense and the defendant's evidence in that regard should not be considered on motion of nonsuit. Griffin
v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 265 N.C. 443, 144 S.E.2d 201 (1965).
p266 N.C. 430, 146 S.E.2d 410 (1966).
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and was living at his father's home only until he could make other,
more suitable, arrangements. The Court affirmed the trial court's
judgment in favor of the plaintiff insurance company and held that
the son was a resident of the same household. The Court discussed
the various definitions of "residence" as applied to different legal
situations and argued that in the context of an insurance contract
it should be given a meaning consistent with a layman's understanding of the term. In the principal case the Court decided that the
son was a resident of his father's house because he had no other
home. 10 The Court also held that the exclusion of the defendant
insurance company's policy did not apply reasoning that use in the
automobile business by the insured meant that the insured must be
engaged in the automobile business for the exclusion to have any
application.
In Mayberry v. Home Ins. Co.," also a case of first impression
in North Carolina, the Court held that a liability insurer was obligated to pay interest on the entire amount of the judgment rendered
from the date of judgment until the date of payment of the amount
due under its policy into court rather than just to pay interest on
the amount of its obligation under the policy. In the instant case
there was judgment for 79,500 dollars and the insurer's liability
was 5,000 dollars. The Court, reversing the trial court, allowed the
plaintiff to recover interest on the full amount of the judgment
from December 12, 1962 (date of judgment), to April 5, 1963
(date of payment into court). The reasoning of the court was
based on the policy language to the effect that the company would
pay "all interest accruing after entry of judgment."' 2
LIFE INSURANCE

Horn v. Protective Life Ins. Co.' 3 was an action based on the
death-by-accidental-means clause of a policy. The plaintiff's evidence was to the effect that the insured, a seventy-two-year-old man
with a history of heart disease, accidentally drove his car off a road
This interpretation is generally consistent with prior North Carolina
cases involving the same language. E.g., Newcomb v. Great Am. Ins. Co.,
260 N.C. 402, 133 S.E.2d 3 (1963).
11264 N.C. 658, 142 S.E.2d 626 (1965).
'= It should be noted that the policy in suit was an assigned risk policy
and that ordinary family policies specifically provide for payment of interest
entire amount of the judgment.
on the
18265 N.C. 157, 143 S.E.2d 70 (1965).
1"
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one snowy night, across two ditches, down a ninety-foot embankment, and into a large tree. There was expert medical testimony
that there were no major injuries resulting from the wreck sufficient
to cause death and that death was due to a heart attack. The Court
reversed the trial court and held that a nonsuit should have been
granted because the plaintiff's evidence did not show that the death
resulted "directly and independently of all other causes" from injuries caused by accidental means as was required by the policy
language. This decision is in line with prior North Carolina cases
dealing with death by accidental means holding that where preexisting disease and accidental injuries combine to cause death the
latter cannot be the cause independent of all other causes. 4
Moore v. New York Life Ins. Co.'5 involved the question
whether or not the surrender of a policy for its cash surrender value
could be set aside after the death of the insured upon a showing of
mental incapacity at the time of the surrender. The Court held that
it could be set aside reasoning that the surrender of a policy was
akin to other agreements entered into by one who was mentally
incompetent in that such are voidable and can be disaffirmed after
death by either the heirs or the personal representative of the deceased. In this case the insured had signed both a request for cash
surrender value and a request for change of beneficiary on April
24, 1963 (although the latter was dated April 23, 1963). The insured died May "17, 1963, never having cashed the cash surrender
value check. The widow, who was the original beneficiary, sued as
executrix of the estate, not contesting the change of beneficiary to
the estate of the insured. The Court affirmed an award for the
plaintiff. The Court also stated that the widow had, by her actions
"'Penn. v. Standard Life Ins. Co., 160 N.C. 399, 76 S.E. 262 (1912),

as quoted by the Court in the principal case, set out these guidelines:
"1. When an accident caused a diseased condition, which together
with the accident resulted in the injury or death complained of,
the accident alone is to be considered the cause of the injury or
death.
"2.When at the time of the accident the insured was suffering from
some disease, but the disease had no causal connection with the
injury or death resulting from the accident, the accident is to be
considered as the sole cause.
"3. When at the time of the accident there was an existing disease,
which, cooperating with the accident, resulted in the injury or
death, the accident cannot be considered as the sole cause or as
the cause independent of all other causes."
265 N.C. at 163, 143 S.E.2d at 75.
15266 N.C. 440, 146 S.E.2d 492 (1966).
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subsequent to death of the insured, acquiesced in the change of
beneficiary so that a judgment in the present action would preclude
her from recovering in her individual capacity in a later action. 6
In Clinard v. Security Life & Trust Co." the insured died November 5, 1961, and notice and proof of death was not filed with
the insurance company until October 1, 1963. The certificate of
group life insurance in suit contained a provision requiring that
notice and proof of death be submitted to the company within ninety
days after the date of death. The Court held that a judgment of
nonsuit entered by the trial court should be reversed. The plaintiff
beneficiary's evidence to the effect that she had heard the insured
speak of a policy and that she had searched for it but had failed to
find it until she happened upon it in an old dresser in the basement
of her home only twenty-four hours prior to filing with the company was sufficient to excuse the beneficiary's delay and avoid a
forfeiture of the policy. The Court, citing cases from many other
jurisdictions, states the rule to be that such a forfeiture provision
as contained in the policy in suit can be avoided by evidence showing
that the beneficiary is ignorant of the existence of the policy and is
not negligent in failing to discover the existence of the policy.

REAL PROPERTY
William B. Aycock*
Several cases involving real property were decided by the Court.
For the most part they were cases concerning Landlord and Tenant,
Recordation, Lis Pendens and the Rule in Shelley's Case.
LANDLORD AND TENANT

Apportionment of Rent. as to Time
At common law, rent does not accrue from day to day, like
interest, but becomes due only upon-the day named for payment.
"An interesting question, which the Court specifically does not answer,
is whether or not a beneficiary of a policy that contains a right to change
the beneficiary has any right to contest such a change on the basis of mental
incapacity of the insured either before or after death.
'17264 N.C. 247, 141 S.E.2d 271 (1965).
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
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Hence rent which is due at the time of the death of the lessor passes
to his personal representative for administration as an asset of the
decedent's estate, while rent which becomes due after that time
becomes the property of the heirs or devisees who are entitled to
the reversion, as an incident thereof.' Further, if an owner, after
making a lease for years, dies between two rent days, there is no
apportionment of the rent between the personal representative and
the heir, devisee or trust beneficiary. The rent follows the reversion
and all the rent for this period will go to the heir, devisee or trust
beneficiary.
The common-law rule of no apportionment of rent has been
altered in North Carolina by three statutes which require an apportionment in certain situations. The Court in Wells v. PlantersNat'l
Bank & Trust Co.2 clarified some of the misunderstanding concerning the extent to which the common-law rule of no apportionment
has been changed by statute. In that case farmland held in an inter
vivos trust to A for life, with corpus distributable free of the trust
to specified remaindermen in fee at A's death, was leased by the
trustee for the calendar year 1962. Rents reserved were one third
of the tobacco sales, payable as the tobacco was sold. On June 28,
1962 (178th day of the one-year lease period), before any tobacco
had been sold, A died. The remaindermen, relying on the commonlaw rule of no apportionment, claimed all the rent from the tobacco
sales. On the other hand, the administrator of A's estate contended
that the rent should be apportioned equally between A's estate and
the remaindermen. In a declaratory judgment proceeding the Court
disagreed with both parties and held that the estate of A was entitled to rent for the 178 days of the lease period which elapsed
before A's death. The remaindermen were entitled to the balance.
Apportioned on this basis 48.77 per cent of the rent went to the
estate of A and the other 51.23 per cent to the remaindermen.
The Court relied on G.S. § 42-6 and G.S. § 37-4 in making its
decision,

G.S. § 42-6 provides that in all cases where rents, or any other
payments of any description, are made payable at fixed periods
to successive owners under any instrument, and where the right
of any owner to receive payment is terminated by a death or
'First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Frazelle, 226 N.C. 724, 728, 40
S.E.2d 367, 371 (1946).
265 N.C.98, 143 S.E.2d 217 (1965).
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other uncertain event during a period in which a payment is
growing due, "the payment becoming due, next after such terminating event shall be apportioned among the successive owners
according to the parts of such periods elapsing before and after
the terminating event."8
G.S. § 37-4 makes G.S. § 42-6 applicable to trusts. In Wells, A and
the remaindermen took under the same trust instrument; therefore
G.S. § 42-6 and G.S. § 37-4 were applicable.
G.S. § 42-7 provides for apportionment of rents on farm leases
in lieu of emblements when the life tenant dies during the lease
year. This statute, however, is limited to farm leases that are determined, inter alia, by the -death of the life tenant. In Wells the
farm leases made by the trustee extended beyond the duration of
the trust; hence they did not terminate at A's death. For this reason
G.S. § 42-7 was deemed inapplicable.
G.S. § 42-6, G.S. § 42-7 and G.S. § 37-4 do not entirely abrogate the common-law rule of no apportionment. 4 For example,
where X, owner of land in fee simple, leases it and dies during the
lease period, there would not be an apportionment of rent not due
at X's death. The rent would follow the reversion. X's successor
would be entitled to all the rent payable after his death. G.S. § 42-6
and G.S. § 37-4 would not apply because X and his successor (heir,
devisee, or trust beneficiary) do not take under the same instrument.
G.S. § 42-7 also would not apply in this situation because the lease
did not terminate at X's death.
Liability of Lessee for Negligent Acts of Sublessee in the Use of
the Premises
Dixie Fire & Cas. Co. v. Esso Standard Oil Co.5 is an important
case in the law of landlord and tenant. A filling station building
was leased to Esso Standard Oil Company which subleased the
premises. The building was damaged by fire in excess of 8,000
dollars as a result of the alleged negligence of the sublessee while
8

Id. at 105, 143 S.E.2d at 222.
'I re Estate of Galloway, 229 N.C. 547, 50 S.E;2d 563 (1948) ; FirstCitizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Frazelle, 226 N.C. 724, 40 S.E.2d 367 (1946).
In Wells v. Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 265 N.C. 98, 143 S.E.2d 217
(1965) the Court eliminated Phillips v. Gilbert, 248 N.C. 183, 102 S.E.2d
771 (1958), as having any bearing on the question of apportionment of
rent inasmuch as this aspect of the case was not presented to the Court by
counsel.
265 N.C. 121, 143 S.E.2d 279 (1965).
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he was servicing an automobile. In accordance with a provision
in the lease respecting repairs, the owner of the premises had the
building repaired. The owner was insured by the plaintiff insurance company. After reimbursing the owner and, being subrogated
to the rights of the insured, the plaintiff insurance company instituted suit to recover from the lessee, Esso Standard Oil Company,
the amount it paid to the owner.
Plaintiff upon being required to make an election of remedies
elected to proceed in negligence. Defendant, Esso, then demurred
ore tenus on the ground that "the complaint fails to allege a cause
of action in negligence." The trial judge sustained the demurrer.
On appeal the judgment sustaining the demurrer was reversed. The
Court decided that the plaintiff was entitled to proceed on the theory
of negligence. The following appears to be the basis upon which
the Court arrived at this conclusion:
It is true that the sublessee was not the agent of Esso in the
ordinary sense, and Esso's liability to lessor is not based on the
principle of respondeat superior. But it is also true that Esso put
sublessee in possession and control of the property and assumed
the risk that sublessee might breach the covenants, express and
implied by which Esso had bound itself in its solemn contract
with lessor. Liability of Esso to lessor was imposed by breach
of the implied covenant that waste would not be committed by
negligence in the use of the property-the observance of the
covenant being a duty which, by terms of the lease, Esso could
not delegate to a sublessee so as to relieve it of responsibility.0
The creation by the Court of an implied covenant on the part of the
lessee that waste will not be committed by a sublessee is obviously
a development of considerable significance in the law of landlord
and tenant. Consideration of the full implication of this decision is
beyond the scope of this Survey.
Extension of Term
Two cases dealt with the question of extension of the original
term in leases. In each case the lease provided an option for exten6 Id.

at 128, 143 S.E.2d at 284. (Emphasis added.) There was a provision in the lease sufficient to hold Esso liable for negligence of a sublessee,
but consideration of this covenant by the Court apparently was foreclosed
by the election of the plaintiff to proceed in tort. The extent to which the
indemnity provision in the lease influenced the Court's decision in this case
remains to be seen.
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sion by the lessee upon condition precedent that written notice be
given the lessor within a specified time. Such notice was not given
in either case. Nevertheless, the decision in both cases was to extend the original term of the lease on the ground that there was a
waiver of the notice requirements in the leases. In one case the
lessee's conduct was responsible for the waiver whereas in the other
case the acts of the lessor were responsible.
In Coulter v. Capitol Fin. Co.' the lease provided that the lessee
had the option to extend the term for two additional years at an
increased rental of fifty dollars per month by giving written notice
thirty days before the termination of the original term. When the
original term ended, the lessee continued in possession without
having given the lessor notice of its intention to exercise the option
to extend the term. Instead, the lessee paid rent at the increased
rate of fifty dollars per month. Six monthly payments were made
(two by original lessee, two by the assignee, and two by the
reassignee) before the reassignee gave written notice to the lessor
that in thirty days the lease would be terminated. The lessee, assignee and reassignee in turn were under the impression that after
the termination of the original lease they were tenants from month
to month. They relied on the following provision in the lease:
"Should the lessee remain in possession of the leased premises
beyond the expiration of the original term or any renewal or
extension of this lease, which shall result in a tenancy from
month to month, this lease may be terminated by either party
upon the giving of thirty (30) days' written notice to the other
party."8
The Supreme Court considered this provision "ambiguous." Since
the lease was prepared by the lessees, it was construed in favor of
the lessor. Thus the provision for a month-to-month tenancy would
not apply if the option to renew were exercised. The Court concluded that when the original lessee held over and then paid rent at
the rate which was to be paid only if it exercised the option to extend for two additional years, and the lessor accepted this increased
rental, the extension of the lease was effected. Both parties were
bound for two years beyond the original term.
In Kearney v. Hare9 the lease for one year provided for an opN.C. 214, 146 S.E.2d 97
8266
Id.at 215, 146 S.E.2d 98-99.

(1966).

8265 N.C. 570, 144 S.E.2d 636 (1965).
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tion to extend for a year at the time for not more than four times
by the lessee's giving the lessor written notice within a specified
time. During the one-year term, the lessor requested the lessee to
pay the rent for the following year before the lessor was entitled
thereto. The lessee paid two thirds of the requested advance payment before the first year of extension began and the remainder of
the full year's rent shortly after the beginning of the first year of
extension. The lessor, who wanted to terminate the lease at the
earliest possible date, contended that the lessee was only a tenant
from year to year without right to exercise the option to extend
for each of the following three years inasmuch as the lessee did not
give the lessor the written notice specified in the lease. The Supreme
Court held that the lessor waived "further" notice by requesting
and accepting payment of rent for the first year of extension. The
Court also indicated that the rental check under the circumstances
might be deemed sufficient to provide the notice of extension required in the lease.
RECORDATION

North Carolina's recordation statute (G.S. § 47-18, The Connor
Act) is the "pure race" type. Stress is placed on the time of filing
for registration (recordation), and the fact that a purchaser who
filed for registration first had actual notice of a prior purchase of
some or all the interest in the same property is immaterial. North
Carolina stands alone in adhering to the view that no notice, however full or formal,' 0 to a subsequent purchaser will supply the want
of registration of a deed. All other states by either statute or judicial decision have incorporated the "notice" feature into their recordation laws on deeds and, with few exceptions, in respect to all
types of instruments transferring an interest in real property."
G.S. § 47-18 (The Connor Act) provides in part:
(a) No conveyance of land, or contract to convey, or lease of
land for more than three years shall be valid to pass any
property as against lien creditors or purchasers for a valu"The race-type of statute
106 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 913 (1958).
field
and embodies a literal
in
this
by
enactments
was the earliest form taken
application of the wording of the English Statute of Enrollments, [1536]
and the Massachusetts statute of 1640." Id. at 274.
"Id. § 913. The race type still prevails as to mortgages in Arkansas,
as to mortgages and oil and gas leases in Ohio, and as to mortgages, other
than purchase money mortgages in Pennsylvania.

19661

SURVEY OF NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
1033
able consideration from the donor, bargainor or lessor but
from the time of registration thereof in the county where
any portion of the land lies, . .. to be effective as to the

land in that county.
In Bourne v. Lay & Co." the defendant, a Tennessee corporation, leased certain property from the owner for five years effective
July 1, 1961, at a rental of seventy-five dollars per month with an
option to renew for five years. This lease was not filed for registration until September 10, 1962, approximately fifteen months after
its execution. On December 2, 1961, the lessors conveyed the leased
premises to the plaintiff. The deed was filed for registration on
December 6, 1961, which was several months before the defendant
filed its prior lease for registration. Two other facts, however, were
involved. First, the deed of the lessor to the plaintiffs contained the
following provision: "There is a lease on the above described property in favor of Lay & Company which lease is for a period of 10
years and the grantors do not warrant this property as to the provision of said lease agreement."'" Secondly, plaintiffs accepted rent
from the defendant for two years and one month. Then they notified the defendant that the rent was to be increased in a substantial
amount. Defendants refused to pay the increase but tendered the
monthly rent specified in the lease.
In a declaratory judgment proceeding the Court held that the
plaintiffs were not bound by the lease since they had filed their deed
for registration before the defendant filed its lease for registration.
Notice in the deed was wholly immaterial. Further, the acceptance
of rent by the plaintiff was not an estoppel since the receipt of the
money for the use of the premises did not mislead the defendant
nor put him to any disadvantage and it was not inconsistent with
a demand for possession. The Court concluded that the defendant
was "wholly responsible for its present situation" by lack of diligence in filing its lease for registration.
The Court intimated that this unregistered lease might have prevailed had the references in the deed met the requirements previously laid down by the Court. The Court repeated these requirements
by quoting from Hardy v. Fryer:14
12 264 N.C. 33, 140 S.E.2d 769 (1965).
81d.
I at 34, 140 S.E.2d at 770.
14 194 N.C. 420, 139 S.E. 833 (1927).
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The principles deducible from our decisions upon the subject of
the sufficiency of the references necessary to impart vitality to a
prior unregistered encumbrance, may be stated as follows:
1. The creditor holding the prior unregistered encumbrance must
be named and identified with certainty.
2. The property must be conveyed 'subject to' or in subordination to such prior encumbrance.
3. The amount of such prior encumbrance must be definitely
stated.
4. The reference to the prior unregistered encumbrance must
amount to a ratification and adoption thereof.";
The plaintiffs had ample notice of the lease, but this notice was
not equivalent to a ratification of it.
The primary function of the recordation statute is to protect
purchasers for value and lien creditors. In Bowden v. Bowden"
the dispute was between an heir of Henry Bowden and the devisees
of his wife, Daisy, who survived him. A deed to Henry Bowden
and wife was sufficient to convey a tenancy by the entireties. An
error in recording omitted "and wife" in the granting clause and
added these words in the recital of consideration. If the recorded
version of the deed prevailed over the deed, the heirs of Henry
Bowden would succeed to his property but if the deed prevailed over
the recorded version, the devisees of Henry's wife, Daisy, would
be entitled to the property.
Plaintiff, an heir of Henry Bowden, contended that the content
of the recorded version of the deed put him in a favored position
by reason of certain presumptions and evidentiary values which
flow therefrom, to wit: (1) it is presumed that a public official
(Register of Deeds) in the performance of official duty has acted
correctly, in good faith and in accordance with law (Huntley v.
Potter, 255 N.C. 619, 122 S.E.2d 681), and (2) the record of
a deed, in the public registry, is prima facie evidence of the
correctness of its terms (Sellers v. Sellers, 98 N.C. 13).17
The Court rejected this contention of the plaintiff. This case did
not involve purchasers for value or lien creditors. Thus the ultimate inquiry was not what the record showed but what were the
terms of the original deed. The original deed conveyed a tenancy
"'Bourne v. Lay & Co., 264 N.C. 33, 36, 140 S.E.2d 769, 771 (1965).
'a264 N.C. 296, 141 S.E.2d 621 (1965).
'7Id. at 302, 141 S.E.2d at 626.

1966]

SURVEY OF NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW

1035

by the entireties, and this deed was admissible to correct mistakes
in the record and the register of deeds had a duty to correct error.
The Court concluded that once an error in registration is corrected,
the presumption arises on and the evidentiary advantages of the
first record are at least neutralized by the corrected record as between the parties to the deed and as to those claiming under the
parties to the deed by gift, inheritance or devise.
Lis PENDENS

The effect of lis pendens and the effect of registration (recordation) are in their nature the same thing. They constitute different
examples of the operation of constructive notice.18 In respect to
constructive notice the common-law rule of lis pendens has been
replaced in North Carolina by statute. 9 The lis pendens statute
has been strictly construed. Two cases provide examples.
In Cutter v. Cutter Realty Co.20 Cutter and Company approved
a contract for sale of a building by its wholly owned subsidiary,
Cutter Realty Company. The plaintiffs, certain shareholders of the
parent company, opposed the sale and instituted suit to restrain it.
Notice of lis pendens was filed. The Court approved the order of
the trial judge cancelling notice of lis pendens. Plaintiff's suit, according to the Court, was "not for the purpose of bringing about
any change in the record title, but is brought for the purpose of
preventing a change therein.""'
In McLeod v. McLeod 22 the Court held that an action to set
aside for fraud a consent judgment embodying the provisions of a
separation agreement is not an action "affecting title to real property" within the meaning of the lis pendens statute even though the
18
In North Carolina actual notice of lis pendens, unlike the registration
statutes, constitutes notice. Whitehurst v. Abbott, 225 N.C. 1, 33 S.E.2d
129 (1945).
1

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-116(a) (Supp. 1965):

Any person desiring the benefit of constructive notice of pending
litigation must file a separate, independent notice thereof, which
notice shall be cross-indexed in accordance with G.S. 1-117, in the
following cases:
(1) Actions affecting title to real property;
(2) Actions to foreclose any mortgage or deed of trust or to enforce
any lien on real property; and
(3) Actions in which any order of attachment is issued and real
property is attached.
265 N.C. 664, 144 S.E.2d 882 (1965).
21 Id. at 669, 144 S.E.2d at 885.
2 266 N.C. 144, 146 S.E.2d 65 (1966).
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wife might have certain rights pursuant to G.S. § 29-30 in her husband's estate should he die intestate.
THE RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE

The Rule in Shelley's Case has been characterized as "a relic,
not of the horse and buggy days, but of the preceding stone cart and
oxen days." 2 The exact reasons for the Rule, which was developed
in the feudalistic society of England, are not known.2 4 Its origins
have been traced back to 1324,25 approximately two and one half
centuries before the case whose name it bears was decided. England
abolished the Rule in 1925, and most of the states have discarded
it either by legislation or by judicial decision.26
In 1897 the Court referred to the Rule in Shelley's Case as the
"Don Quixote of the law, which, like the last knight-errant of
chivalry, has long survived every cause that gave it birth and now
wanders aimlessly through the reports, still vigorous, but equally
useless and dangerous. 2

7

The Rule has continued to flourish in the

law of real property. Three cases involving it were decided by the
Court during the few months period covered by this Survey. However, one of these cases did provide a surprise. In Riegel v. Lyerly8
the Court announced that the Rule applies to personal property as
well as to real property. This is not a new application of the Rule
in North Carolina, but apparently the most recent prior decision
applying it to personal property was in a pre-Civil War case involving slaves. 9 Since this was the law and since it has not been rejected, it is, according to the Court, still the law. Frequently, the
Court has asserted that it was unwilling to change the Rule in
Shelley's Case by "judicial fiat" and that if public policy requires a
change, it should be made by the legislature.8 0
"Sybert v. Sybert, 125 Tex. 106, 110-11, 254 S.W.2d 299, 1001-02
(1955).
2" Block, The Rule in Shelley's Case in North Carolina, 20 N.C.L. REv.
48 (1941). One explanation isthat the Rule prevented landowners from
avoiding their feudal obligations. The heirs would take by inheritance rather
than as purchasers.
"Abel's Case, Y.B. 18 Edw. 11, 577 (1324).
" The Rule has been abrogated wholly or largely in thirty-seven states.
3 POWELL,
27

239

(1952) and (Supp. 1965).
Stamper v. Stamper, 121 N.C.
251, 254, 28 S.E. 20, 22 (1897).
REAL PROPERTY,

N.C. 204, 143 S.E.2d 65 (1965).
Block, supra note 24.

28265
29

"0Riegel v. Lyerly, 265 N.C. 204, 209, 143 S.E.2d 65, 68 (1965), and
cases cited therein.
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The main justification for the Rule in modern law is that it
serves to make property alienable at an earlier date. On this basis
there is as much, perhaps more, reason to apply the Rule to personal
property as to real property. This point will be discussed in the
context of another case decided since Riegel v. Lyerly.
In Wright v. Vaden3 ' the testator bequeathed and devised all his
property (real, personal, and mixed) to his wife for her lifetime
and then to Elsie May Johnson for her lifetime and then "to the
children or other lineal descendents of said Elsie May Johnson, to
have and to hold the same to them and their heirs, executors and
administrators absolutely." The testator's wife was deceased and
the only issue before the Court was whether the Rule in Shelley's Case applied to give Elsie May Johnson a fee tail (converted
by G.S. § 41-1 into a fee simple) or only a life estate with the
remainder to her children and other legal descendents. Ordinarily,
when the remainder is given to the "children" or "issue" of the
person designated to take a life estate, the Rule does not apply. The
words "children" or "issue," standing alone, are usually construed
not to refer to an indefinite line of succession from generation to
generation essential to invoke the Rule. But in Wright v. Vaden
the use of the additional words "other lineal descendants" might
make a difference. Obviously a close question was involved, and
it could have been decided either way. The Court decided that the
words "children or other lineal descendants" are words of purchase
and that the Rule in Shelley's Case did not apply. Elsie May Johnson took only a life estate and at her death her children then surviving, together with the issue of any predeceased child, will take the
fee simple in all the property.
In order to focus again on the application of the Rule to personal property, let us suppose that the Court had decided that "children or other lineal descendants" were words of limitation and the
Rule applied to give Elsie May Johnson a fee simple. If the Rule
were limited to real property, she would have taken a fee simple in
the real property, but her interest in the personal property would
have been only for life. Riegel v. Lyerly makes it clear that whether
the duration of her interest be for life or an outright ownership, it
applies to real and personal property alike. This result is in keeping
81266 N.C. 299, 146 S.E.2d 31 (1966).
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with the modern trend of discarding distinctions between real and
personal property developed in the feudal society of England.
In Wright v. Vaden the Court quoted the Rule as stated in
Shelley's Case in 1581:
"'When an ancestor, by any gift or conveyance, taketh an estate
of freehold, and in the same gift or conveyance an estate is
limited, either mediately or immediately, to his heirs in fee or
in tail, the word heirs is a word of limitation of the estate, and
not a word of purchase.' "32

This is an inadequate statement of the North Carolina version
of the Rule in Shelley's Case. For example, "estate of freehold"
does not suggest that the Rule would apply to personal property.
Also this definition fails to reflect other distinctions which have
been made by judicial decision. Wells v. Planters Natl Bank &
Trust Co. 33 illustrates another distinction long recognized by the
Court. A trust provided that at the death of the life beneficiary the
corpus of the trust would go to his heirs generally. Did the Rule
in Shelley's Case apply to give the life beneficiary outright ownership of the property? The answer was clearly no. Why? Because,
for the Rule to apply, the interest of the life beneficiary and the
interest of their heirs must be either both legal or both equitable. In
this case the interest of the life beneficiary was equitable and the
interest of his heirs was legal.
The Rule in Shelley's Case needs to be redefined to reflect more
accurately the law applied in North Carolina today.
The Court is cognizant of the basic criticism of the Rule in
Shelley's Case and had this to say in Wright v. Vaden:
Without doubt, testator intended that Elsie May Johnson
(Wright) should take only a life estate in his property. If, however, the rule in Shelley's Case is applicable, she is entitled to
the entire corpus of testator's estate, for it operates 'as a rule of
property without regard to the intent of the grantor or devisor 3 4
The Rule is a trap for the "unwary" and sometimes for those who
have considerable knowledge of the Rule itself. Whether the utility
of the Rule in North Carolina today outweighs its disadvantages
cannot be determined without considerable study not only of the
*2Id. at 301, 146 S.E.2d at 34.
8'265 N.C. 98, 143 S.E.2d 217 (1965).
31 266 N.C. at 301-02, 146 S.E.2d at 34 (1966).
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Rule but also of the alternatives. The usual alternative is to create
a contingent remainder in the heirs of the life taker. Contingent remainders, like the Rule in Shelley's Case, cannot claim to have
33
enjoyed a long history free of difficulty.

TORTS: PART I
Robert G. Byrd*
PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE

Unexplained Automobile Accidents
The Court's decisions continue to be troublesome in cases in
which a guest automobile passenger seeks to recover for injuries
sustained when the defendant's automobile in which the passenger
is riding leaves the road for unknown reasons. In many jurisdictions res ipsa loquitur is applied in this fact situation when it is
shown that weather, traffic and highway conditions were such that
little likelihood exists that they contributed in causing the accident.'
The North Carolina Court, however, has flatly stated on numerous
occasions' that res ipsa does not apply to permit an inference of
negligence when the car defendant is driving unaccountably leaves
the road and injures a guest passenger.
When the physical facts at the scene of an accident or other
circumstantial evidence indicate specific acts of negligence by the
defendant, the North Carolina Court is more likely to find that a
case for the jury has been made.3 For example, in Drumwright v.
Wood,4 defendant's car left the road on a curve and the circumstances indicated that he had been traveling at a high rate of speed.
The Court held that the defendant's motion for nonsuit had been
" For instance, are contingent remainders in North
the common-law rules of destructibility? See McCall,
of Contingent Remainders in North Carolina,16 N.C.L.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North
Hill.

Carolina subject to
The Destructibility
Ray. 87 (1938).
Carolina at Chapel

'PROssER, ToRTs 219 (3d ed. 1964).

:E.g., Privette v. Clemmons, 265 N.C. 727, 145 S.E.2d 13 (1965).
'Southern Nat'l Bank v. Lindsey, 264 N.C. 585, 142 S.E.2d 357 (1965)
(intoxication); Wilkerson v. Clark, 264 N.C. 439, 141 S.E.2d 884 (1965)
(speed); Rector v. Roberts, 264 N.C. 324, 141 S.E.2d 482 (1965) (speed).
'266 N.C. 198, 146 S.E.2d 1 (1966).
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properly overruled. This result seems correct even in light of the
Court's unwillingness to apply res ipsa to unexplained single car
accidents generally. The evidence would support a finding that defendant negligently drove too fast and the accident was of a type
likely to be caused by excessive speed. Under these circumstances
the more probable inference is that defendant's negligence caused the
accident.
The Court still thought it necessary to negate other factors as
possible causes of the accident: "[T]here is no evidence that he
[defendant] was not well and in the full possession of his mental
and physical faculties .... There is no evidence of any other traffic
on the road at the time. There is no evidence of any mechanical
failure of the station wagon."5 Why the Court attempted in this
negative way to discount all possible causes of the accident other
than the defendant's negligence is difficult to see. Yet, this may be
significant since the Court's refusal to apply res ipsa in unexplained
single car accidents generally appears to be founded in part on this
same insistence that all factors which could have caused the accident be eliminated before an inference that defendant's negligence
was its cause can be indulged. Evidence which indicates causes of
the accident other than defendant's negligence or which tends to
eliminate such other causes must be considered in determining if
the case should be submitted to the jury, but as long as the plaintiff has the burden of proof, the mere absence of evidence should
not be a basis for discarding possible causes about which evidence
is lacking. However, even when some possible causes remain unaccounted for, the plaintiff's evidence may still permit a reasonable
inference that defendant's negligence caused the accident. Before
circumstantial evidence can be relied on for the proof of negligence
every inference other than that of defendant's negligence need not
be precluded. 6 If the inference that the defendant's negligence
caused the happening is more likely than other permissible inferences as to its cause, the case should go to the jury.
The Court's readiness in Drumwright to discount some possible
causes of the accident on the grounds that there was no evidence
relating to them should be compared with its approach to the same
problem in Crisp v.Medlin,' a case in which a nonsuit granted in
5

Id. at 204, 146 S.E.2d at 5-6. (Emphasis added.)
'PRossma, ToRTs 222 (3d ed. 1964).
"264 N.C. 314, 141 S.E.2d 609 (1965).
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the trial court was affirmed. In Medlin the physical facts at the
scene of the accident also indicated that defendant's car was traveling at a high rate of speed at the time the accident occurred. The
following excerpt from the Medlin opinion will provide a basis for
such a comparison:
There is no evidence in the record as to whether the highway
was slick, wet, or dry at the time of the wreck, or the condition
of the highway. Was the Chevrolet automobile forced off the
highway to avoid a collision with an approaching automobile
suddenly pulling into its lane of traffic, or was it caused to leave
the highway by reason of being sideswiped by a passing automobile, or was its wreck due to a tire blowout? The record contains
no evidence answering these questions ....
There is no evidence
in the record that the automobile was traveling at the time of the
wreck in a restricted speed zone ....
In our opinion, and we
so hold, the mere fact that it can be reasonably inferred from
the evidence that the Chevrolet automobile was traveling at a
very rapid speed when it wrecked is not sufficient to permit a
jury to find that such speed caused the wreck, and that its driver
was guilty of actionable negligence.8
In Drumwright, the Court dismissed some factors as possible
causes of the accident because of the absence of any evidence relating to them; in Medlin from the absence of evidence the Court concocted visions of the defendant's car being sideswiped or forced
off the road by an unidentified vehicle to support its conclusion that
the cause of the accident was left in the realm of conjecture. On
the facts present in the two cases both decisions may be right.
Nevertheless, these cases, as prior cases have, (1) suggest that the
Court's analysis of the facts in a particular case may be designed
more to justify a result than to aid in determining what the result
should be in the first instance, and (2) raise a question of how
realistically the Court evaluates various factors which might possibly have caused an accident to determine if a reasonable inference
of the probable cause of the accident can be made.
"Id. at 318-19, 141 S.E.2d at 612. In Drurnwright the Court indicated
the following inferences were permissible from circumstances which indicated speed: (1) failing to decrease speed in a curve in violation of N.C.
GENx. STAT. § 20-141(c) (1965); (2) exceeding fifty-five miles per hour
in violation of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-141(b)(4) (1965); (3) operating
in a reckless manner in violation of N.C. GFN. STAT. § 20-140(b) (1965);
and (4) failing to keep a proper lookout. 266 N.C. at 205, 146 S.E.2d at
6 (1966).
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Similar Instances Rule
The North Carolina Court has also rejected the application of
res ipsa to "exploding bottle" cases,9 but the Court's rejection here
has been softened by the "similar instances rule" which is somewhat unique to North Carolina.
[W]hen the plaintiff has offered evidence tending to show that
like products filled by the same bottle under substantially similar
conditions, and sold by the bottler at about the same time have
exploded, there is sufficient evidence to carry the case to the jury,
as such facts and circumstances permit the inference that the
bottler had not exercised that degree of care required of him
under the circumstances. Such similar instances are allowed to
be shown as evidence of a probable like occurrence at the time
of plaintiff's injury when, and only when, accompanied by proof
of substantially similar circumstances and reasonable proximity
in time.' 0
Jenkins v. Harvey C. Hines Co." presented the question of
whether one similar instance in close proximity in time was sufficient to carry plaintiff's case to the jury. The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether a single similar instance, standing alone,
would be sufficient to permit the jury to find that the explosion of
the bottle was caused by defendant's negligence. The Court held
that one similar instance is of evidentiary value if other evidence
of negligence is present and may be considered with the other evidence in determining whether the case should go to the jury. Although the Court did not decide whether proof of nothing more
than a single similar instance is enough to submit the case to the
jury, the decision leaves the clear impression that no generally applicable rule as to the sufficiency of such proof to withstand nonsuit
will be adopted by the Court. The following statement indicates
the approach of the Court: "In our opinion, whether a case should
be submitted to the jury should not depend solely upon whether
there is evidence of only one or of more than one 'similar instance.'
Depending upon the circumstances, one such instance may well be
of greater significance than two or more others."' 2
In the Jenkins case the plaintiff's proof other than the one simi'Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 228 N.C. 32, 44 S.E.2d 337 (1947).
" Styers v. Winston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 239 N.C. 504, 508, 80
S.E.2d 253, 256 (1954).
11264 N.C. 83, 141 S.E.2d 1 (1965).
12Id.
at 88, 141 S.E.2d at 4.
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lar instance was (1) a good percentage of bottles returned to defendant's plant were broken, chipped, scuffed, cracked, or defaced;
(2) inspection to detect defective bottles was made by two girls
who observed the bottles as they passed by them on a conveyor belt
at the rate of 240 to 250 bottles per minute; (3) bottles had burst
in the washers and the fillers in defendant's plant; and (4) expert
testimony that sound bottles have five times the strength necessary
to withstand the pressure normally present and that the bottle cap
is designed to permit the escape of internal pressure when it becomes abnormally high. Although the Court did not consider the
sufficiency of any of this evidence to show defendant's negligence
either in the use of defective bottles or in failing to reasonably
inspect to discover defective bottles, one apparent importance attached to it was that it tended to isolate the cause to a defective
bottle. Thus, the Court concluded that, as the bottle cap had not
been forced off, the internal pressure in the bottle apparently was
not abnormally high and thus that "it would seem reasonable to
infer that the explosion occurred on account of a defect in the
bottle."' 3
Proof of specific negligence in the Jenkins case certainly increases the probability that the explosion was caused by such negligence, and evidence tending to eliminate other possible causes makes
this probability stronger. Again it might be asked, however,
whether, once careful handling of the bottle from the time it left
defendant's hands until the time of the accident was shown, a reasonable inference might not be drawn that either of the two causes
considered by the court-defective bottle and excessive pressureexisted as a result of defendant's negligence so that even without
evidence of specific negligence the case would be one for the jury.
IMMUNITY

In First Union Nat'l Bank v. Hackney,'4 the mother and father
of four children died from injuries received in a car accident caused
by the father's negligence. The mother predeceased the father and
her administrator sued the father's estate for her wrongful death.
Three defenses to his action were asserted: (1) Any recovery in
the action should be reduced to the extent that the father would
8Id.at 89, 141 S.E.2d at 5.
1266 N.C. 17, 145 S.E.2d 352 (1965), 44 N.C.L. Rxv. 1169 (1966).
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benefit from it. (2) No true adversary proceeding existed as the
children, as sole survivors of their mother and father, were the
beneficiaries of both estates and of any wrongful death recovery
and thus were the real parties plaintiffs and defendants. (3)
Parent-child immunity would bar the action.
Under our wrongful death statute a husband, who survives his
wife, normally shares any recovery for her wrongful death along
with surviving children. 5 Equally well established rules, however,
(1) prohibit a beneficiary whose wrongdoing has contributed in
causing the death for which damages are recovered from participating in that recovery so as to deny him benefit from his own
wrongdoing 6 and (2) provide that any recovery is to be reduced
by the share that would have gone to the wrongdoer.'1 Thus the
Court sustained the first of defendant's so-called defenses.
The real-party-in-interest problem raised by the second of defendant's defenses is discussed in another part of this Survey. 18
However, the decision on this point may have significance outside
the procedural area since the real problem presented, whether raised
as a real-party-in-interest question or in some other context, is
whether the presence of liability insurance should affect the outcome
of the case. The Court properly refused to permit defendant's insurance company to use the real-party-in-interest statute as a shield
to avoid its liability under the policy. The full significance of the
case will depend upon the Court's willingness to extend this practical view to other areas in which the basis of a legal rule disappears
when defendant carries liability insurance.
One such area is that of parent-child immunity. Under North
Carolina law an unemancipated child cannot recover damages for
personal injuries caused by his parent's negligence. 19 Recognition
of the parent's immunity from suit has been based primarily on the
prevention of disruption of family harmony and the undermining
of parental discipline. In holding that the children were not the
real parties defendant in the action, the Court said: "During his
[father's] lifetime, it [liability insurance] would protect him in
10

Id.
at 20, 145 S.E.2d at 355.
Davenport v. Patrick, 227 N.C. 686, 44 S.E.2d 203 (1947).

Cox v. Shaw, 263 N.C. 361, 139 S.E.2d 676 (1965).
See Brandis, Civil Procedure (Pleadings and Parties), North Carolina Case Law, 44 N.C.L. REv. 897, 901 (1966).
19 Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C. 317, 139 S.E.2d 753 (1965).
2 "Ibid.
17

ZR
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respect of his personal liability and preserve his general estate from
depletion; and, upon his death, such policy would constitute a valuable asset of his estate and safeguard the general assets of his estate
for distribution to the beneficiaries."'" This reasoning would seem
applicable to any suit by a child against his parent or the parent's
estate and a failure to recognize this may result in loss to the
injured child, who receives no compensation for his injury, and the
parent whose assets must be used to pay medical and other expenses
of the child. Under such circumstances it cannot be seriously suggested that a child's suit against his parent threatens either to disrupt family harmony or to destroy parental discipline when the
parent is protected by liability insurance.
In earlier decisions,22 the presence of liability insurance has not
affected the immunity rule and the Court has denied a child recovery from his parent even though the parent was insured. To
say that Hackney overrules these earlier cases may go too far; however, it does seem appropriate to suggest a reconsideration of the
question is now in order. Only a few courts23 have found liability
insurance a sufficient reason to override family immunity but many
of the courts that hold differently do so on the rather technical
ground that liability insurance is of no consequence until liability
has been established. 21 Other courts have refused to abrogate immunity because of the danger of collusion against the insurance
company.2 5
Defendant's contention in his third defense that parent-child
immunity barred the wrongful death action could have been disposed
of by the Court on the basis of precedent. The Court has held 21 that
a wrongful death action against one parent for the other parent's
death, the recovery from which will benefit the wrongdoer's children, does not come within the parent-child immunity rule. For
this purpose the action has been considered in the decedent's administrator rather than in the children-beneficiaries. The Court relied
in part on this rule to reject defendant's claim of immunity.
"'First Union Nat'l Bank v. Hackney, 266 N.C. 17, 22-23, 145 S.E.2d
352, 357 (1965).
22 Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C. 317, 139 S.E.2d 753 (1965); Small v.
Morrison,
185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923).
28
PRossER, TORTs 889 (3d ed. 1964).
"E.g., Schwenkhoff v. Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 6 Wis. 2d 44, 93
N.W.2d 867 (1959).
"E.g., Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
2 Cox v. Shaw, 263 N.C. 361, 139 S.E.2d 676 (1965).
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A second reason seems to have been relied on by the Court for
its decision. The Court quoted extensively from decisions of other
jurisdictions which hold that family immunity cases when the reasons for it are no longer present because of the death of the parent
or other cause. The opinion seems to follow these decisions and to
adopt the rule that parent-child immunity terminates with the death
of the parent from whom recovery is sought:
Here, by reason of the death of the mother and father, there
exists no child-parent or other family relationship that may be
disturbed by this action. In this factual situation, according to
the weight of authority and sound reason, the immunity doctrine
has no application....
Since the policy reasons on which the immunity doctrine rests
do not apply to the lactual situation under consideration, we are
of opinion, and so hold that the immunity doctrine is of no avail
to defendant in this action.27
Although in Hackney both the mother and father were dead at the
time the action was begun and such fact is recited in the quotation
set out above, neither the reasoning nor authority cited in support
of the decision seems to limit the rule terminating immunity to
situations where both parents are dead. The fact that seems significant to terminate immunity is the death of the parent against whom
the action is brought.
The significance of that portion of the Court's opinion dealing
directly with the question of parent-child immunity is difficult to
evaluate because the Court, before developing the termination of
immunity concept as an additional basis for its decision, expressly
stated that the suit was not one by a child against his parent. Its
impact is further clouded by earlier decisions which appear inconsistent with it but which were in no way mentioned by the Court.
In Cox v. Shaw,2" decided in 1964, the action was by the administrator of a deceased mother against the estate of her deceased
unemancipated child; in Capps v. Smith 9 also decided in 1964, the
suit was between the administrator of a deceased unemancipated
child and the child's living parent. In each the Court recognized
parent-child immunity as a bar to the action. Despite these factors,
"7First Union Nat'1 Bank v. Hackney, 266 N.C. 17, 27, 30, 145 S.E.2d
352, 360, 362 (1965).
28263 N.C. 361, 139 S.E.2d 676 (1965).
29263 N.C. 120, 139 S.E.2d 19 (1964).
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however, any fair interpretation of the opinion compels a-recognition of termination of immunity as one of the grounds for the
Court's decision. Otherwise, over six pages of the Court's opinion
must be discarded as idle ramblings. This portion of the opinion
is too thoroughly documented by authority from other jurisdictions
to be dismissed so lightly.
If termination of immunity is accepted as one of the grounds
for decision in Hackney, serious doubt arises as to whether either
Cox or Capps continues as authority, although neither was expressedly overruled by the Court. Neither Cocx nor Capps involves
an action against a deceased parent, but this factual distinction
seems unimportant as the disruption of family harmony is as unlikely in one case as the other. All who have considered the problem
apparently treat the death of either parent or child, without regard
to who brings the action, as sufficient to terminate immunity 0 when
the basic rule that death terminates immunity by destroying the
reason for it has been adopted. Thus, unless what would appear to
be artificial factual distinctions are made by the Court or unless the
Court later abandons the position taken in Hackney, Cox and Capps
should no longer be the law.

TORTS: PART TWO
Philip C. Thorpe*
FRAUD

Fox v. Southern Appliances, Inc.' was an action for specific performance of a contract to purchase land. The defendant refused
to purchase, claiming that it had been misled by plaintiff's representations that the property could be used for commercial purposes,
when in fact it was restricted to residential use. Although the zoning
ordinance permitted commercial structures, restrictive covenants
prohibited such a use. The contract provided that the sale was made
SoSee Harlan Nat'l Bank v. Gross, 346 S.W.2d 789 (Ky. 1961); Oliveria
v. Oliveria, 305 Mass. 297, 25 N.E.2d 766 (1940); Logan v. Reaves, 209
Tenn. 631, 354 S.W.2d 789 (1962). In all these cases, other grounds may
have been the primary basis for the decision.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill.1264 N.C. 267, 141 S.E.2d 522 (1965).
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subject to restrictions appearing as a matter of record title. Plaintiff demurred to the defense on the theory that defendant's neglect
in failing to check the record title made the defense of fraud insufficient. Despite the contract's provisions, the Court held that the
pleaded defense was sufficient.
To what extent must a person make an independent investigation
as to the truth or falsity of representations made to induce a sale?
In actions for fraud, plaintiff must not only have relied upon the
representations, but his reliance must have been reasonable. The
precise question raised by Fox is whether reliance is reasonable
when an investigation would have disclosed the falsity of the representations. In an earlier day the doctrine of caveat emptor prevailed.
The buyer was under an obligation to beware and was required to
investigate. Today there is little need to undertake an independent
investigation.2 Several reasons explain this change in attitude. First,
if the basis of the claim is an intentional misrepresentation, negligently failing to investigate would not defeat the claim.3 More importantly, courts have been moving away from strict caveat emptor
for many years. In 1906 our Court stated:
It seems plausible at first sight to contend that a man who does
not use obvious means of verifying the representations made to
him does not deserve to be compensated for any loss he may incur
by relying upon them without inquiry. But the ground of this
kind of redress is not the merit of the plaintiff, but the demerit of
the defendant; and it is now settled law that one who chooses to
make positive assertions without warrant, shall not excuse himself by saying that the other party need not have relied upon
them ....

4

In general, a person may reasonably rely upon representations
without investigating their truth.' A few cases have required some
investigation as to the truth of represented facts0 but they are not
PROSSER, TORTS § 103 (3d ed. 1964).
§ 7.12 (1956).
'Griffin v. Lumber Co., 140 N.C. 514, 520-21, 53 S.E. 307, 309 (1906).
' HARPER & JAMES, TORTS

reading a deed.
In Griffin the defendant prevented the plaintiff from 311
(1965); Currie v.
'Johnson v. Owens, 263 N.C. 754, 140 S.E.2d
206,
116
S.E.
564
(1923);
Blacknell
v. Rowland &
Mallory, 185 N.C.
Cooper, 108 N.C. 554, 13 S.E. 191 (1891); Stout v. Harper, 51 N.C. 347
(1859).
'Calloway v. Wyatt, 246 N.C. 129, 97 S.E.2d 881 (1957) (amount of
water in well); Harding v. Southern Loan & Ins. Co., 218 N.C. 129, 10
S.E.2d 599 (1940) (condition of hotel); Simmons v. Horton, 51 N.C. 278
(1859) (obvious defect on leg of horse).
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in conflict with the line of authority represented by Fo.x. In such
cases, an investigation was either simple to make,7 or the party
claiming to have relied was better equipped to determine the truth
or falsity of the representations than was the maker.' Clearly,
reliance on a statement is not reasonable in either situation. However, where an investigation would require an outlay of time, expense, or the hiring of special help, an independent investigation
will not and ought not be required. Thus, in Pox, a title search
would require an attorney's services. It follows that defendant did
not act unreasonably in relying upon the plaintiff's representations
of the permitted use of the property without obtaining the title
search.
STRICT LIABILITY

Since the 1963 decision in Guilford Realty & Ins. Co. v. Blythe
Bros.,' the Court has been committed to the modern strict liability
theory of the Restatement of Torts.' 0 We can anticipate decisions
from time to time clarifying the Court's position concerning the
application of the theory to a variety of situations." In Trull v.
Carolina-VirginiaWell Co.,' 2 plaintiff claimed that strict liability
should be applied where his house received damage from vibrations
caused by well-drilling on his land. Noting that the only similarity
between Guilford and Trull was the claimed damage by vibration,
the Supreme Court affirmed the granting of an involuntary nonsuit
in Trull.
The modern theory of strict liability rests upon the ultrahazardous nature of the injury-causing activity.'" Subsection 520(a) of
the Restatement of Torts defines an ultrahazardous activity as
one which "necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care. . . ." Plaintiffs who wish to make use of
Calloway v. Wyatt, 246 N.C. 129, 97 S.E.2d 881 (1957) ; Simmons v.
Horton, 51 N.C. 278 (1859).
'Harding v. Southern Loan & Ins. Co., 218 N.C. 129, 10 S.E.2d 599
(1940).
p260 N.C. 69, 131 S.E.2d 900 (1963).
10 REsTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 519-23 (1938).
" The Guilford case involved blasting, an area traditionally utilizing
some type of liability without fault. See Gregory, Trespass to Negligence
to Absolute Liability 37 VA. L. REv. 359 (1951). PRoSSER, TORTS § 77 (3d
ed. 1964).
1 264 N.C. 678, 142 S.E.2d 622 (1965).
1' See RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 519, 520 (1938).
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strict liability must be prepared to prove that the activity which
caused their injury was ultrahazardous within this definition. Not
only did plaintiff in Trull fail to do so, but his initial pleading was
based upon negligence. Furthermore, the way in which damages are
caused is irrelevant. The Supreme Court was clearly correct in disregarding this argument in Trull.
A more interesting question was presented in Trull, as well as
in the appeal, after trial below, of Guilford Realty & Ins. Co. v.
Blythe Bros.14 Modern liability for ultrahazardous activity is not
absolute. However the defenses which will defeat a claim of strict
liability are not clear. Trull and Guilford suggest defenses that can
be used. In Trull, the Court based its holding in part upon the fact
that plaintiff had contracted for the defendant's services and thus
could not rely upon strict liability to recover. The Court's position
is clearly in accord with section 523 of the Restatement, which
denies use of the theory to any person who "takes part in it" (i.e.,
the ultrahazardous activity). It seems clear that anyone who invites
such activities upon his land should be proscribed from recovery
without a showing of fault. This is akin to the assumption of
risk defense in negligence actions. Several cases have denied to
plaintiffs any reliance upon strict liability where the ultrahazardous
activities were carried on for their benefit." In Guilford, the defense was governmental immunity. The defendant argued that since
the city of High Point was supervising its activities, it was entitled
to the city's immunity. The Court held that since the city was not
immune from liability for inherently dangerous activities, the defense could not benefit defendant."8
Trull, Guilford, and a third case decided this year, Keith v.
United Cities Gas Co.,'" raised a problem for practitioners in North
Carolina. The term "inherently dangerous" has been used in the
past in several senses in the law of torts. For many years, it described those products to which privity of contract did not serve to
bar actions against the manufacturer. 8 In Guilford, it was used
both to justify imposing liability without fault and to limit munici" 266 N.C. 229, 145 S.E.2d 838 (1966).
"E.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Cudd, 176 F.2d 855 (10th Cir.
1949).

18 See 18 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATIoNs § 53.76(c)
1963).
"266 N.C. 119, 146 S.E.2d 7 (1966).
"PRossER, ToRTs § 96 (3d ed. 1964).

(3d ed.
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pal governmental immunity. The Keith case used "inherently dangerous" to describe standards of due care. Because of the multiple
usages, care should be taken to determine the correct use in a given
context before concluding that resort to liability regardless of fault
is warranted.
CONTRIBUTION, INDEMNITY AND SETTLEMENT

Prior to 1965, the Court took the position that an insurer of
one joint tort-feasor had no right to contribution from the other
joint tort-feasor.' 9 Two recent cases appear to overturn in part the
no-contribution rule. In Pittman v. Snedeke ° the plaintiff sued one
of two potential defendants. The original defendant filed a crossaction against the other potential defendant. The jury found both
defendants' fault contributed to plaintiff's injury. The original defendant's insurer satisfied plaintiff's judgment, and the original defendant, pursuant to the right of contribution granted by the
judgment in accordance with G.S. § 1-240, sought execution against
the third-party defendant. Although the third-party defendant
argued that Herring v. Jackson2 ' denied the right of contribution
against a joint tort-feasor to an insurer who paid the judgment
on behalf of another joint tort-feasor, the Court affirmed the lower
court's refusal to enjoin execution by the original defendant. In
Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. 22 the Court
allowed the original defendant's insurer to recover from the thirdparty defendants under substantially the same facts.
Since earlier authorities were not overruled by Pittman and
Safeco, the Court apparently has distinguished two situations.
Where a plaintiff sues and obtains judgment against all joint tortfeasors, the insurer of one of them cannot get contribution from the
others after satisfying plaintiff's judgment.2 3 However, where
plaintiff sues. one, or less than all joint tort-feasors, contribution is
possible if the defendant brings the other joint tort-feasors into
the suit by a cross-action. The, basis for this distinction seems to
E.g., Herring v. Jackson, 255 N.C. 537, 122 S.E.2d 366 (1961);
Squires v. Sorahan, 252 N.C. 589, 114 S.E.2d 277 (1960).
20264 N.C. 55, 140 S.E.2d 740 (1965), 44 N.C.L. Rnv. 142 (1965).
21255 N.C. 537, 122 S.E.2d 366 (1961), 41 N.C.L. REv. 882 (1963).
22264 N.C. 749, 142 S.E.2d 694 (1965) ; 44 N.C.L. REv. 142 (1965).
22 See cases cited in note 19 supra. The Court has very recently reaffirmed
this rule. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bynum, 267 N.C. 289, 148 S.E.2d
144 (1966).
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be the following. In the first situation, all tort-feasors have been
sued by the plaintiff. Because the defendants may not cross-claim
for contribution, 2 the right to contribution remains inchoate, pending a second action. In the second situation, the cross-claim is permitted, and the right to contribution is adjudicated prior to satisfaction by the insurer. Subrogation then occurs pro tanto when the
plaintiff's judgment is satisfied.
The situation is, of course, anomalous. Under present law, the
insurer's right to recover contribution depends upon plaintiff's
choice of defendants. In defense of the Court, it must be pointed
out that neither the contribution statute nor any other statutes
lend themselves to a construction which would solve this particular
hiatus.25 By ruling as it has in Pittinan and Safeco, the Court has
at least made it possible for the insurer to obtain contribution in
some cases. The obvious solution is an amendment to the contribution statute, making clear the insurer's right to contribution under
all circumstances upon satisfying its insured's obligation to the
plaintiff.
An additional aspect of contribution was before the Court in
1965. In Clemmons v. King26 contribution was denied because the
pleadings did not properly raise the question. The original defendant, although he brought in a third-party defendant by means of
a cross-action, at no time alleged that his own negligence concurred
with that of the third-party defendant to cause plaintiff's injury.
Careful counsel will make certain that concurrent negligence is
pleaded. This can be done as an alternative to other theories, with
27
the concurring negligence pleaded conditionally.
Gibbs v. Carolina Power & Light Co.2 s raised an interesting
question involving a claim for indemnity. Plaintiff's employer was
performing construction and maintenance work for defendant when
the plaintiff was injured because of the negligence of defendant's
employees. Defendant, claiming plaintiff's employer had agreed by
contract to indemnify defendant, sought to bring in the employer by
a cross-action for indemnity. The Court affirmed the trial court's
striking of the cross-action. It held that since the cross-action was
"Greene v. Charlotte Chem. Labs., Inc., 254 N.C. 680, 120 S.E.2d 82
(1961). See 40 N.C.L. Rv. 633 (1962).
See Greene v. Charlotte Chem. Labs., Inc., note 24 mipra.
"265 N.C. 199, 143 S.E.2d 83 (1965).
7Id. at 202, 143 S.E.2d at 86.
" 265 N.C. 459, 144 S.E.2d 393 (1965).
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29

Since the
not germane to plaintiff's claim, it was not proper.
30
Workmen's Compensation Act clearly indicates that neither the
employer nor the compensation insurer are to be joined in actions
by the employee against a third person, 3 there was no authorization
for the cross-action.
The significant thing to note here is that the problem is peculiar
to workmen's compensation situations. In other actions involving
indemnity claims plaintiff could assert his claim against either defendant. 2 The cross-action would then be "germane" to plaintiff's
action and would be permissible.
Two cases involving settlements need only brief comment. In
Sell v. Hotchkiss3 3 the Court construed a covenant not to sue which
had been obtained by one joint tort-feasor to permit plaintiff to
bring an action against the other joint tort-feasor. Although the
case was made difficult because of the complex and ambiguous language of the covenant, the Court found the intent of the parties was
to reserve to plaintiff his right of action against the joint tort-feasor
who had not settled. The second case, Bongardt v. Frink,34 presented to the Court a case understood best in contrast to its earlier
decision in Keith v. Glenn.3 5 In Keith, plaintiff's insurer had made
a settlement with defendant. Plaintiff brought an action for personal injuries, and defendant counterclaimed for his personal injuries. Plaintiff filed a reply, asserting the prior settlement, but
alleging it was made against his wishes and without his consent.
The Court held that plaintiff could either affirm the settlement, thus
barring defendant's counterclaim but also barring his own action;
or plaintiff could refuse to ratify the settlement, thus retaining his
claim, but permitting the counterclaim by defendant. This case follows a series of earlier decisions establishing the rules permitting
the insured's action, and the defendant's counterclaim. 6 The situa" See, e.g., Gaither Corp. v. Skinner, 238 N.C. 254, 77 S.E.2d 659 (1953).
"
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2(d), (e) (1965).
" Except, perhaps, in "extraordinary circumstances." Lovett v. Lloyd,
S.E.2d 886 (1953).
236 N.C. 663, 73Ingram
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 258 N.C. 632, 129
" See, e.g.,
S.E.2d 222 (1963) (primary-secondary liability situation).
264 N.C. 185, 141 S.E.2d 259 (1965).
"265 N.C. 130, 143 S.E.2d 286 (1965). See Brandis, Civil Procedure,44
N.C.L. REv. 897 (1966).
262 N.C. 284, 136 S.E.2d 665 (1964).
"See, e.g., Bradford v. Kelly, 260 N.C. 382, 132 S.E.2d 886 (1963);
Phillips v. Alston, 257 N.C. 255, 125 S.E.2d 580 (1962); Lampley v. Bell,
250 N.C. 713, 110 S.E.2d 316 (1959); Beauchamp v. Clark, 250 N.C. 132,
108 S.E.2d 535 (1959).
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tion in Bongardt was somewhat different. There the plaintiff filed
a reply to the defendant's counterclaim, setting forth the earlier
settlement between defendant and his insurer. The plaintiff then
was permitted to withdraw the reply and the case went to trial upon
both plaintiff's claim and defendant's counterclaim. The Court held
that defendant was not prejudiced by the withdrawal of the reply.
Thus, after a settlement by the insurer, the insured is permitted to
sue, and defendant is permitted to counterclaim despite the settlement. The plaintiff may rely either upon the settlement, or go to
trial upon his claim, and defend against the counterclaim without
insurance protection." Although it is best to be certain as to the
insured's choice before proceeding, the trial court, according to
Bongardt, has discretion to allow a withdrawal of a pleading which
acts as a ratification of the settlement. An ill-made choice may be
38
reversed, if done quickly.

TRIAL PRACTICE
Herbert Baer*
PROCESS
G.S. § 1-105.1 authorizes service of process by serving the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles in cases where the defendant at the
time of the accident in question was a resident of this state but has,
since the accident, established residence outside of this state or
departed from this state and remained absent for sixty days or
more continuously whether such absence is intended to be temporary
or permanent. G.S. § 1-98.2(6) authorizes service of process by
publication where the "defendant, a resident of this state, has departed therefrom or keeps himself concealed therein with intent to
defraud his creditors or to avoid the service of summons."
In Harrison v. HanveyL plaintiff passenger alleged that defen"' Since the insurer has satisfied its contractual obligations by settling,
the insured cannot insist upon further protection. See Bradford v. Kelly,
note 19 supra.
" In Bongardt, the reply was withdrawn about one month after it was
filed.
*Alumni Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
'265 N.C. 243, 143 S.E.2d 593 (1965).
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dant motorist was a resident of this state at the time of the accident,
Service of summons being returned unfound, plaintiff obtained an
order for service by publication predicating his right to the same on
G.S. § 1-98.2(6) aforesaid. In his affidavit, on which he obtained
such order, he alleged that the defendant could not be found in this
state, that at the time of the accident he was a resident of this
state, and that since then he "has departed the state, or keeps himself concealed in this state to avoid summons."
On motion made by defendant's insurer to quash alleged service
by publication thereafter made by plaintiff, the superior court judge
upheld the service. On appeal the Supreme Court reversed. Several
reasons for reversal were given by the Court. In the first place, the
Court held the affidavit on which the order of publication was made
was inadequate in that plaintiff did not .allege that defendant departed the state with intent to defraud his creditors.. Plaintiff, said
the Court, had "alleged that he [defendant] has departed the state
or, in the alternative, that-he keeps himself concealed here to avoid
his creditors; . . . [T]he mere departure of a .resident from the
state will not authorize seivice by publieation in an action such as
this."2
Consequently, the Court declared, the plaintiff's right to service
by publication must arise, if at all, "on the alternative allegation
that defendant keeps himself concealed herein to avoid service of
process." '3 If it be assumed that an averment of absconding or
concealment in the terms of the statute is sufficient to obtain an
order of publication, when a defendant moves to vacate the order
and quash the service based on it, "the court must hear evidence
[and] find the facts."" On review of the affidavits submitted before
the superior court judge on the motion to quash, the Court finds
that there was no evidence presented and no facts were found that
the defendant had departed or concealed himself in this state to
avoid service of process. There was no evidence that defendant
even knew of this action or that he owed any debts in North Carolina. Evidence that defendant could not be found in North Carolina is not sufficient to establish that he keeps himself concealed in
this state to avoid service of process.
The Court found other reasons why the service by publication
Id. at 253, 143 S.E.2d at 601. (Emphasis is the Court's.)
Ibid.
"Id. at 254, 143 S.E.2d at 601.
3

1056

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.44

in the instant case was ineffective. (1) The affidavit on which the
order was based contained no reference to the residence of the defendant, and "although it alleges that after due and diligent search defendant cannot be found within the state and service of process cannot be had on him within the state, there is no averment in the words
of the statute that diligent search and inquiry have been made to discover his residence and that it is set forth as particularly as is known
to plaintiff." 5 (2) A second defect in plaintiff's attempt to serve
by publication was that the published notice to defendant, had he
read it, would have informed him that he was required to make
defense not later than September 2, 1963, but "it omitted, however,
to inform him of the penalty for failing to make defense."' While
the Court notes that this defect alone "might not" have been fatal,
it was one of several. (3) The publication should have been made
in a paper in Mecklenburg County of which county it is alleged
defendant was a resident at the time of the institution of the suit.
The publication had been made in the Statesville Record and Landmark in Iredell County. This publication did not satisfy the requirements of the statute. "Publication in an obscure paper or one
far removed from any location with which defendant has ever had
7
any contact will not constitute service of summons by publication."
In the light of the ease with which publication might have been
made on the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles under G.S. § 1105.1, it is apparent that much grief may be avoided by utilizing
that statute instead of proceeding with the more exacting publication statute. That, at least, is one of the lessons to be learned from
Harrisonv. Hanvey and is indirectly suggested by the Court in its
comments that service was not attempted under G.S. § 1-105.1.8
DIscovERY
In Craddock v. Queen City Coach Co.' plaintiff was a passenger
in defendant's bus which had been involved in a collision. Plaintiff
desired to find out the contents of a report of the accident made by
defendant's driver and also the names and addresses of other
passengers on the bus known to defendant. On petition of plaintiff,
!d. at 255, 143 S.E.2d at 602.
"Id.at 256, 143 S.E.2d at 603.
7Id. at 257, 143 S.E.2d at 603.
8
Id.at 247, 143 S.E.2d at 597.
'264 N.C. 380, 141 S.E.2d 798 (1965).
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the assistant clerk of court issued an order authorizing the examination of Hal J. Love, vice-president and assistant general manager
of the defendant. The assistant clerk also issued a subpoena duces
tecum directing the said Love to bring with him a copy of the
accident report made by the driver.
At the time of the adverse examination, Love refused to permit
examination of the accident report and would not testify as to its
contents. On return of an order to show cause why Love should
not be held in contempt, Judge Patton entered an order directing
Love to appear before a commissioner for adverse examination and
at that time to have with him the original or copy of the accident
report and the names and addresses of all passengers on the bus.
From this order defendant petitioned for certiorari, which was allowed.
Chief Justice Denny, speaking for a unanimous Court, stated
that it appeared the only accident report made by the driver was
taken by counsel for the defendant for use in making up the report
required by the Interstate Commerce Commission on a specific form
furnished by the I.C.C. The Court referred to the federal statute,
49 U.S.C. § 320(f), which states that no report made pursuant to
the requirements of the I.C.C. shall be admitted as evidence, or used
for any other purpose, in any suit or action for damages growing
out of the matter mentioned in the report.
On the basis of this statute the Court held the defendant was
not required to produce the report or state its contents. But as to
the names and addresses of bus passengers known to defendant,
they were to be supplied to the plaintiff and were in no way privileged by reason of the attorney-client relationship."0
DISCOVERY-EXCLUSION OF ADVERSE PARTY EXAMINATION

IN RELATED CASE
In Glenn v. Smith" the plaintiff, Herbert V. Glenn, Sr., as administrator of the estate of Herbert V. Glenn, Jr., brought an
action for wrongful death against Brantley Smith and Herbert
Smith. The action arose out of a two-car collision. The deceased,
"0Although not cited by the Court, this aspect of the case was the subject matter of the famous decision in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495
(1947). See in this connection Baer, Discovery and Pre-Trial Examination
in the Federal Courts, 6 S.C.L.Q. 294 (1954); 37 A.L.R.2d 1152 (1954);
25 N.C.L. Rxv. 313 (1947).
':264 N.C. 706, 142 S.E.2d 596 (1965).
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Herbert V. Glenn, Jr., was the driver of one of the cars in which
his wife Jo Ann Lasater Glenn was a passenger. Jo Ann was also
killed in the accident. The defendant Brantley Smith was the driver
of the other car in which were riding Frances Carpenter, Carolyn
Carpenter, and John Slaughter.. ,
Prior to the trial of the instant action, Mrs. J. R. Lasater, as
administratrix of Jo Ann Lasater Glenn, deceased, had brought an
action against Brantley Smith, Frances Carpenter, .Carolyn Carpenter, and John Slaughter. In.that proceeding, plaintiff, Mrs. J. R.
Lasater; administratrix, had obtained an adverse examination of
accordance with. G.S. § 1-568.4
the defendant John Slaughter. infor the purpose of enabling her to prepare and file her complaint.
No -notice of that examination' was given to Herbert V. Glenn, Sr.,
administrator in the instant action, because he was not a party to
the action filed by Mrs. J. R. Lasater as administratrix.
At-the trial of the instant action, defendant offered in evidence
the aforesaid adverse examination, of, John Slaughter. Plaintiff,
Herbert V. Smith, Sr., administrator, objected and gave as a ground
for his objection that the deposition' of 'Slaughter was not admissible because he resided in Henderson, North Carolina, which was
within- forty miles, of Durham, the place of trial. He relied on the
deposition statute, G.S. § 8-83(9). The trial court overruled the
objection and admitted the adverse examination.
I On appeal the Court reversed. It cited G.S. § 1-568.24, which
provides that the deposition taken under the statute of an adverse
party shall not be used as evidence against any party not notified
of the taking thereof. Since no notice had been given to the plaintiff, Herbert V. Glenn, Sr., the deposition was barred by the statute
and had to be excluded. The fact that counsel did not urge G.S. §
1-568.24 as a basis for exclusion but relied on the deposition statute
was immaterial. Chief Justice Denny, for the Court said, "Ordinarily, an objection made upon certain grounds sfated, only those
stated can be made the subject 6f review upon appeal, except where
the evidence is excluded by statute. "' 12
MOTION TO NONSUIT-*

The generally accepted rule is that bn motion to nonsuit the
plaintiff's evidence must be taken as true. In Keith v. United Cities
Id. at 710, 142 S.E.2d at 600. •(Emphasis added.)
22
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Gas Co.'3 the Court held that this rule does not apply to an opinion
by a witness who was not present at the event that a condition
existed which is contrary to scientific truth so well established that
the Court will take judicial notice of it.
The scientific truth referred to is stated by the Court as follows:
"[I]t is established scientific truth that natural gas present in quantity will explode immediately in the presence of fire."' The Court
rejected' evidence of plaintiff's expert that in his opinion the explosion in question was caused by an electric spark getting in contact with natural gas when a finding, supported by the greater
weight of the evidence, established that a fire had been burning on
the interior of the premises in question ten minutes before the explosion was heard. In view of the character of the fire involved,
the Court found the expert's opinion testimony was contrary to
scientific fact and was not to be accepted as true on motion for
nonsuit.
NONSUIT BY COURT FOR LACK OF PROSECUTION
In Stanley v. Basinger & Co.'" the action was originally tried
in May 1961 and the trial judge set aside a verdict for the plaintiff
as against the weight of the evidence. Thereafter, neither plaintiff
nor defendant moved to calendar the case for trial. In March 1965
the case, with others, was put on a so-called "clean-up" calendar.
When defendant received notice of this calendar, his counsel wrote
the court to dismiss the case on the call of the said calendar.
When the case was called on March 18, 1965, neither the defendant nor his counsel was present, but plaintiff and his counsel were
in attendance and announced they were ready for trial. Thereupon
the court asked counsel for plaintiff why the case had been allowed
to remain dormant, and counsel replied that there was not much
involved and no one pushed it. Thereupon the judge nonsuited the
case on the ground that the plaintiff had been guilty of laches for
failure to prosecute.
On appeal from this nonsuit ruling the Supreme Court reversed.
It declared that if the plaintiff had not appeared on the call of the
"clean-up" calendar, or if he appeared and announced he was not
prepared to go on, the court could have dismissed the action as of
1a266 N.C. 119, 146 S.E.2d 7 (1966).
14
Id. at 130, 146 S.E.2d at 15.
16265 N.C. 718, 144 S.E.2d 861 (1965).
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nonsuit either under G.S. § 1-222(4) or its inherent power for
failure to prosecute. But when plaintiff announced his readiness to
go to trial on the call of the case, the judge was without authority
to dismiss the action.
REFERENCES

In Security Nat'l Bank v. EducatorsMut. Life Ins. Co."0 action
was brought to recover commission alleged to be due the estate of
a deceased agent of the defendant. A compulsory reference was had
and jury trial waived. One of the issues involved was whether the
plaintiffs' claim was covered by the three-year or the ten-year statute
of limitations. If by the former, the action was barred. If by the
latter, as an action on a contract under seal, it was not barred.
The referee concluded that the contract was under seal and the
action was not barred. The superior court affirmed the referee's
findings and entered judgment for plaintiffs. Defendant appealed
alleging as ground for reversal that the contract was not under
seal. The only seal appearing on the contract was that opposite
the name of the deceased agent.
The Supreme Court declared that the burden was on the plaintiffs to show that the corporate defendant had adopted the seal that
was opposite the name of the agent, or that the corporate seal had
been impressed on the original contract, or that there were other
facts that would preclude the application of the three-year limitation statute. No such facts had been found by either the referee or
the superior court.
Accordingly, the case was remanded to the superior court with
instructions to make the necessary findings of fact and conclusions
of law. To that end the superior court judge may recommit the
matter to the referee or may himself make the necessary findings.
EVIDENCE OF LIABILITY INSURANCE AND MISTRIAL

Is the defendant in an auto accident case entitled to a mistrial
when, in these days of compulsory insurance, plaintiff on crossexamination refers to the defendant's liability insurer? In Fincher
v. Rhyne'7 our Court divided five-to-two on the question with the
majority reversing the trial judge who had denied defendant's motion for mistrial after plaintiff had introduced evidence that defen10265 N.C. 86, 143 S.E.2d 270 (1965).
"'266N.C.

64, 145 S.E.2d 316 (1965).
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dant carried insurance for liability. The case is particularly interesting in view of another five-to-two decision of our Court in
Hoover v. Gregory" in which the majority refused to reverse a
verdict for the defendant when the trial judge charged the jury that
every motorist must have liability insurance or put up a bond under
our statutes and that premiums charged for such insurance are
determined by the amount of losses the insurers have to pay.
In the Fincher case, after plaintiff had mentioned defendant's
liability insurer, defendant moved for a mistrial. Before ruling on
the motion, the trial judge charged the jury at great length that
insurance had no bearing on the case and should not affect their
verdict. He then told the jurors that all who felt they could give
an impartial verdict, despite the evidence regarding insurance,
should raise their right hand. All jurors raised their right hands
and the judge then denied the motion. In his charge the court again
instructed the jury as to the element of insurance and commented
on the fact that everyone knows the law requires motorists to carry
liability insurance but that such insurance had nothing to do with
the jurors' verdict.
In reversing the trial judge, Justice Moore, speaking for the
majority, noted that in some jurisdictions, since the enactment of
compulsory insurance laws, it is not deemed error to mention the
existence of insurance. He also recognized what the Court had
held in Hoover v. Gregory9 and noted that in some decisions our
Court had held an instruction to the jury to disregard the reference
to insurance to be adequate.20 Nevertheless, he concludes that it is
best to adhere to the rule that introduction of evidence relating to
defendant's insurer requires a mistrial. Such rule he finds "is simple
to understand and administer."'"
As the Court recognizes, the critical problem is whether, in the
light of our compulsory insurance statutes, testimony relating to
defendant's liability insurer requires a mistrial. To the majority,
such evidence is prejudicial notwithstanding common knowledge of
compulsory insurance, and its introduction entitles defendant to a
mistrial. The "dismiss it from your mind and erase it from your
memory" instruction is deemed to be inadequate, even though prior
18253 N.C. 452, 117 S.E.2d 395 (1960), 39 N.C.L. REv. 409 (1961).
20 Ibid.
"0Citing, for example, Lane v. Paschall, 199 N.C. 364, 154 S.E. 626

(1930).

21266 N.C. at 71, 145 S.E.2d at 321.
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to compulsory insurance such instruction was held to dispel the
adverse affect of the insurance evidence.22
In his dissent, Justice Higgins, who is joined by Justice Sharp,
said,
We may rest assured Judge Huskins would not have signed
the judgment if he felt the jury had disregarded his instructions
and violated its pledge. In. order to justify a new trial it is necessary to assume the jurors failed to follow the instructions, failed
to keep their individual pledges, and gained their first information the defendant had insurance from the plaintiff's inadvertent
reference. May we not assume the jurors already had knowledge that the State law required a showing of financial responsibility?23

To the writer it appears that the majority has been too rigid.
It would be much better practice to leave the ruling in a case of this
sort to the discretion of the trial judge. If on appeal the Court
should conclude that under the specific facts the trial judge abused
his discretion in failing to declare a mistrial or in refusing to set
aside an obviously exorbitant verdict for the plaintiff, the Supreme
Court could then reverse.
ADMISSION OF NEW EVIDENCE AFTER SUMMATION
State v. Jackson24

reasserts the right of the trial judge, in his
discretion, to reopen the case for the admission of further evidence
after the attorneys have made their summations to the jury. On
such reopening, the scope of subsequent arguments to the jury by
counsel is also in the court's discretion. This same problem was
considered in State v. Harding25 where the court noted that if the
trial judge permits one counsel to introduce further evidence after
argument to the jury has begun, "the opposing party should be
'2
given opportunity to introduce evidence in rebuttal.
ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL-PROPRIETY OF PER DIEM,
OR OTHER UNIT-OF-TIME ARGUMENT RELATIVE TO
DAMAGES FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING

In recent years certain counsel for plaintiffs have been successful in obtaining large damage awards in personal injury cases by
" Lane v. Paschall, 199 N.C. 364, 367, 154 S.E. 626, 627 (1930).
23266 N.C. at 72, 145 S.E.2d at 321.

'265 N.C. 558, 144 S.E.2d 584 (1965).

"'263
N.C. 799, 140 S.E.2d 244 (1965).
26
Id. at 799, 140 S.E.2d at 245.
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using the suggestion, in final argument, that a modest allowance
be made for every minute, hour, or day plaintiff has and will suffer
pain. Then having perhaps suggested the sum of five dollars per
day, counsel multiplies on the blackboard the number of days plaintiff has already suffered by the five dollars and then does the same
with the number of days in the life expectancy of the plaintiff
during which testimony has established he will suffer pain. The
resultant figure is the answer to a plaintiff attorney's prayer and
has its desired effect on the jury.
Until 1965, the propriety of such argument had not been passed
upon by the North Carolina Supreme Court, although it has been
the subject of court decisions in other states. A clear-cut conflict
is present in the out-of-state decisions. Some jurisdictions permit the
argument, others do not. The leading authority disapproving such
27
a decision of the New Jersey Suargument is Botta v. Brunner,
preme Court. Typical of decisions permitting the argument is Newbury v. Vogel,2 8 a decision of the Colorado Supreme Court. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has just recently divided
two-to-one on the propriety of the unit-of-time argument, the
majority holding it improper and calling for reversal.2 9 Much has
been written for and against what has become known as the per
diem argument.30
In Jenkins v. Hines3 the North Carolina Supreme Court had
occasion to consider the matter. The argument had been permitted
at the trial, plaintiff's counsel suggesting that an allowance of one
cent per minute for the duration of plaintiff's expectancy would
total 86,100 dollars. On appeal, the Supreme Court referred to the
conflict of authorities and in particular to the Botta case. Although
it reversed the trial court for allowing the argument, it did so without finding it necessary to accept Botta without qualification. Rather,
it found that the evidence did not establish that plaintiff would
2726 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958), 60 A.L.R.2d 124. See later annotations to this case in 1964 A.L.R.2d Supplementary Service 1325.
" 379 P.2d 811 (Colo. 1963).
" Johnson v. Colglazier, 348 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1965).
so 38 N.C.L. Rnv. 289 (1960). See list of notes and monographs cited
in Newbury v. Vogel and set out in the quotation from that opinion in note
33 infra. For a still more exhaustive list of case law and law review
articles and comments see the dissenting opinion of judge Brown in Johnson
v. Colglazier, 348 F.2d 420, 428-29 (5th Cir. 1965).
03264 N.C. 83, 141 S.E.2d 1 (1965), also discussed in Navin, Damages,
North CarolinaCase Law, 44 N.C.L. Rlv. 993 (1966).
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suffer pain as had been assumed in plaintiff's argument. Thus the
Court said,
Disposition of this appeal in defendant's favor does not
require that we accept without qualification the decision and reasoning in Botta. Plaintiff testified: "Answering the question
whether at the present time my hand or finger pains me, it feels
like it is drawn up, or being drawn; it feels almost like it looks,
tight. It doesn't interfere with my rest at night now. It doesn't
give me any pain other than the feeling of being drawn. That
is a discomfort." In the light of plaintiff's testimony, it is our
opinion, and we so decide, that the argument of plaintiff's
counsel to which defendant objected was without factual or legal
justification and was prejudicial to defendant. Hence, for error
in overruling its objection to said argument, defendant is en32
titled to a new trial.
just what we are to draw from this decision is not clear. Would
our Supreme Court adopt Botta and rule out the per diem argument
if proof established pain for a specific period, past or present? Or
would the Court in such a situation adopt the rule of those jurisdictions that permit the per diem argument? Time will tell. Meanwhile decisions in other jurisdiction may establish a clear-cut
3
majority either in support of or against the per diem argument.1
CHARGE

During the course of his charge a judge may instruct a jury that
if they find certain facts by the greater weight of the evidence
(spelling out the precise facts), they shall answer the issue of
1"Id. at 91, 141 S.E.2d at 7.
" In Newbury v. Vogel, 379 P.2d 811, 813-14 (Colo. 1963), the court
commented on what it found to be the then (1963) state of authorities as
follows,
The question is not a novel one, however, and in recent years has
been the subject of decision in at least 27 jurisdictions. See 60 A.L.R.
2d 1347 (Supp. 1960, 1962, 1963), and of discussion in numerous
law review articles, for example, 23 Ohio St. L.J. 573; 62 W. Va. L.
Rev. 402; 43 Minn. L. Rev. 832; 28 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 138; 36 Dicta
373; 12 Rutgers L. Rev. 522; 1962 Duke L.J. 344; and has been the
subject of monographs prepared by both sides of the Negligence Bar.
See Damages: Pain and Suffering in Dollars on a Unit of Time Basis,
The Defense Research Institute, Inc., Nov. 1962; and 23 NACCA
L.J. 255 and 24 NACCA L.J. 252.
The authorities appear to be rather evenly divided among (1)
those who hold the argument is proper; (2) those who refuse to
allow it; and (3) those who declare it to be a matter in the discretion of the trial court.
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plaintiff's contributory negligence "yes." Assuming the evidence
supports such charge, he will not be reversed. But if the trial judge
continues in his charge and says, "If you fail so to find, you should
answer the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence 'no,' " he will
be reversed if the jury, on the evidence, could find the plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence even though they did not find the
precise facts set out by the judge in his charge.
This was well illustrated in Barber v. Heeden" where the trial
judge in his instruction referred to precise facts as to speed when
excessive speed was only one of the factors of negligence with
which the party was charged. Further, the trial judge, in referring
to speed as a factor of contributory negligence, had told the jury
that if they found the speed to be from seventy to eighty miles per
hour, they could find contributory negligence, but if the speed were
not that, they could not. Since even as to the factor of speed it
was not essential to a finding of contributory negligence that the
speed be from seventy to eighty miles per hour, the trial judge
clearly erred.
EXPRESSION OF OPINION BY TRIAL JUDGE

Many a judge has been reversed in this state because the Supreme Court found he had expressed an opinion in violation of
G.S. § 1-180. Galloway v. Lawrence85 presents an interesting situation in which the trial judge is reversed because the Court found
he had twice expressed an opinion in violation of the statute.
The action was against a physician and surgeon for malpractice
in the treatment of a child's legs which had suffered injury in an
automobile accident. It appeared that, while the child was under
the doctor's care and confined to a hospital, a nurse telephoned the
defendant at night telling him that the child's leg was discolored
and swollen. The defendant by phone told the nurse to pursue
certain treatment. The defendant testified that after receiving the
phone call he went to the hospital, entered by an emergency entrance, went to the child's room, observed what had been done
pursuant to his instructions, and determined there was nothing
further to do at that time. He left the hospital with no one seeing
him and did not see the hall nurse or night supervisor.
265 N.C. 682, 144 S.E.2d 886 (1965).
266 N.C. 245, 145 S.E.2d 861 (1966).
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In response to a hypothetical question, which incorporated the
fact that the defendant had gone to see the child after getting the
call from the nurse, a doctor called as an expert by the defendant
testified that the child had received the standard treatment. On
cross-examination he testified, "My opinion certainly would not have
been the same if that visit [defendant's visit after being called by
the nurse] had not been made."8 6
Defendant then called another doctor to testify as an expert in
his behalf. The same hypothetical question was put to him. On
cross-examination plaintiff's counsel asked, "And, if no visit at all
had been made to the hospital by the doctor in response to this call,
that would very definitely have affected your opinion, wouldn't it?"
Objection was interposed and the court, in the presence of the jury,
entered into a discussion with counsel and in the course of it said,
"Well, of course, now, the evidence with reference to the doctor
going to the hospital is that he went there. * * * There is no evidence that he did not go there, and the burden of proof is on you."",
On the question of whether the doctor went to the hospital in
response to the nurse's call, the Supreme Court points out that,
other than defendant's testimony that he went, the only evidence on
the point is that neither the nurse nor night supervisor saw the
defendant at the hospital and he did not communicate to them that
he was there. Whether the doctor did go was a question of fact
for the jury, and the Court held that the above quoted statement
of the trial judge was an expression of opinion prohibited by G.S.
§ 1-180.
The second occasion in which the Court found the trial judge
expressed an opinion arose in the following manner. Defense counsel called the defendant as a medical expert witness. Defense counsel then stated he did not wish to ask the defendant questions as
to his qualifications to express an opinion as a medical expert. The
trial judge then said, "Let the record show that the Court finds as
a fact that Dr. Lawrence [the defendant] is a medical expert, to
wit: an expert physician in surgery. ' 38 This statement was made
in the presence and hearing of the jury.
The Supreme Court held that the court's ruling that defendant
was an expert should have been placed in the record in the absence
88

Id. at 249, 145 S.E.2d at 865.
37 Ibid.
38266 N.C. at 250, 145 S.E.2d at 866.
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of the jury because it was an expression of opinion by the court
as to the professional qualifications of the defendant. While the
Court states there was no error in letting the defendant testify as
an expert, the statement of the trial judge declaring he finds as a
fact that defendant is a medical expert "might well have affected
the jury in reaching its decision that the child was not injured by
the negligence of the defendant." 39
Obviously, a cause of action against defendant would have been
established if the defendant, although a medical expert, had not used
that degree of care which his calling and relationship required to be
used under the circumstances. Nevertheless, the instant case shows
the care that must be taken by the trial judge if he is not to be
charged with having expressed an opinion. Plaintiff's counsel in
effect admitted the defendant's qualifications to testify as an expert
witness. The court found he was a medical expert, "an expert
physician in surgery."4 Perhaps if the trial judge had asked, "Does
plaintiff admit defendant's qualifications to testify as an expert
witness?", and counsel had replied, "Yes," there would not have
been a reversal, for then the trial court would not have made the
finding; it would have been conceded by counsel.
In State v. Hopson41 defendant was convicted of larceny. Reversal was sought on the ground that the trial judge by comment
had violated G.S. § 1-180 and disparaged the credibility of defendant.
It appeared that on cross-examination defendant admitted he
had been in prison in Florida but that he had not been guilty of anything, did not plead guilty and was not convicted. Thereupon the
cross-examiner proceeded by asking defendant, "How long did you
stay in prison for not doing anything?" Objection to this question
was overruled. Witness answered he did not know how to explain
it, but he had a retrial and was turned loose. The cross-examiner
proceeded, "I'll ask you if you didn't have guns and rings and
watches that you'd stolen up here in Buncombe County when you
were arrested down there in Florida?" Defense counsel then intervened and said, "I think it's unreasonable, the man wasn't found
guilty and I think it's unreasonable." The court then said, "Well,
Mr. Reagan [defense counsel], I think it's just as unreasonable for
:' Ibid.
S0 Ibid.
" 265 N.C. 341, 144 S.E.2d 32 (1965).
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a man to be sent to jail or prison in Florida for nothing. And I am
going to permit the witness to answer questions that are asked of
42
him.",
Despite the court's ruling counsel did not repeat the question
relating to guns, etc., and proceeded to other matters. In reversing
the trial judge because of his comment, the Court said, "While not
so intended, we think it probable the jury understood the court's
comment as an expression of opinion that defendant's testimony
concerning his Florida imprisonment was incredible and therefore
defendant should not be considered a credible witness. So considered, the court's inadvertent comment was a violation of G.S. §
'4 8
1-180 and numerous decisions of this Court.
G.S. § 18-11 provides that the possession of liquor by any person not legally permitted under the statute to possess liquor shall be
prima facie evidence that such liquor is kept for the purpose of
being sold, bartered, etc., in violation of the statute. In State v.
Tessnear4 4 defendant was charged with the possession of nontaxpaid liquor for the purpose of sale in violation of the statute. In
his charge the judge told the jury that possession of any quantity
of nontaxpaid liquor is unlawful and "raises a deep presumption
that it was had for the purpose of sale." 4 5
Conviction of defendant was reversed because of this language
in the court's charge. Referring to the statute the Supreme Court
said:
From the mere possession of nontaxpaid whiskey G.S. 18-11
authorizes, but does not compel, the jury to infer that the possessor intended to sell the whiskey. The statute raises a permissible
inference .... In characterizing it "a deep presumption" the trial
judge expressed an opinion as to the strength of the evidence.
Such an expression is prohibited by G.S. 1-180.4 3
JURORS-MISCONDUCT
In O'Berry v. Perry47 the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in an automobile accident case. Upon the coming in of the
verdict, defendant moved to set it aside because, during the noon
recess that day, a juror had walked with the plaintiff and one of
,2 Id.at 342, 144 S.E.2d at 33.
,3 Ibid.
'265 N.C. 319, 144 S.E.2d 43 (1965).
" Id. at 320, 144 S.E.2d at 45.
'Id. at 321, 144 S.E.2d at 45.
"4266 N.C. 77, 145 S.E.2d 321 (1965).
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his witnesses from the courtroom to a luncheon establishment. On
this motion having been made, the trial judge conducted an immediate inquiry, and from this it appeared that the plaintiff, his witness
and the juror had not discussed the case but talked about fishing and
corned herring. Several other jurors and the sheriff had eaten at
the same luncheon place. The sheriff testified the juror in question
was a truthful person and had a good reputation. The juror himself said that if he had not seen the plaintiff at the lunch hour, his
verdict would have been the same. On this evidence the trial judge
found the encounter had been a casual one and that it had not
affected the verdict. Motion of defendant was accordingly denied.
In affirming the action of the trial judge, Justice Sharp, for the
Court, declared that the granting or denial of defendant's motion
for a mistrial was in the discretion of the trial judge and under
the facts of this case there was no evidence indicating any abuse
of discretion.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Philip C. Thorpe*
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF JURISDICTIONAL
FACTS

The Court decided two cases that make clear the proper procedures respecting findings of jurisdictional facts by superior court
judges.' In Askew v. Leonard Tire Co.' the superior court judge
overruled the exceptions filed to the Industrial Commission's findings of jurisdictional facts,3 but without making independent findings of such facts. On appeal the defendant argued that prior
decisions in Beach v. McLean4 and Aylor v. Barnes5 necessitated
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill.
'Burns v. Riddle, 265 N.C. 705, 144 S.E.2d 847 (1965); Askew v.
Leonard Tire Co., 264 N.C. 168, 141 S.E.2d 280 (1965).
' See note 1 supra. Burns was based upon the decision in Askew. See
Hanft, Administrative Law, North Carolina Case Law, 44 N.C.L. REv. 889
(1966), for further discussion of this case.
'The jurisdictional question was whether an employment relationship
existed.
'219 N.C. 521, 14 S.E.2d 515 (1941).
'242 N.C. 223, 87 S.E.2d 269 (1955).
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independent finding. 0 The Court refused to so hold and established
guidelines for findings of jurisdictional facts.
At present, the following rules apply. The Court still holds that
the Industrial Commission's findings of jurisdictional facts are not
conclusive even though they are supported by competent evidence;7
thus the superior court judge may examine the record independently. The judge may refer to and affirm the Commission's findings
without making separate findings, at least as long as it is clear that
he examined the record independently and decided that the jurisdictional facts were as found by the Commission. The Court intimated
in Askew that if counsel had requested independent findings, the
superior court would have been under an obligation to file them.
STATUTORY EMPLOYER IN

"LOANED

SERVANT"

CASES

In Leggette v. J.D. McCotter, Inc.8 the Court held that an employee was employed by each of two employers. It affirmed a finding of the Industrial Commission, which had been reversed by the
superior court, requiring the employers to split the payment of compensation benefits between them. Leggette represents a departure
from prior decisions in "loaned servant" cases. It rests upon the
proposition that, in close cases, fairness requires both the general
and the special employer to be liable for compensation. It is clear
from the opinion that the Court does not mean to overrule earlier
cases in which the employee was clearly performing work solely for
the special employer.' Only where the employee's duties benefit both
employers, or arguably do so, will the Leggette rule apply.
"INJURY BY ACCIDENT"

In Lawrence v. Hatch Mill,"° the Court reaffirmed its recent
(since 1957) definition of the statutory term "injury by accident."'"
'In Pearson v. Peerless Flooring Co., 247 N.C. 434, 101 S.E.2d 301
(1958), the superior court specifically adopted the Industrial Commission's
findings as its own. This practice was approved, but was not followed in
Askew.
'Thus the Court has not moved away from the largely discredited jurisdictional facts theory. See 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §
80.41, at 324 (1952) [hereinafter cited as LARSON]. For criticism of the
rule on the ground that almost all findings of fact are "jurisdictional" in
the sense that an absence of such facts places the matter outside the range
of those cases to which the compensation act applies.
8265 N.C. 617, 144 S.E.2d 849 (1965).
'See, e.g., Shapiro v. City of Winston-Salem, 212 N.C. 751, 194 S.E.
479 (1938).
'0 265 N.C. 329, 144 S.E.2d 3 (1965).

IlN.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 97-2(6) (1965).

1966]

SURVEY OF NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW

1071

In Lawrence plaintiff was removing a heavy object from a tool box
when he felt pain in his back. There was no evidence of unusual
twisting, lifting, or any other unusual or fortuitous occurrence.
Relying on several recent cases, the Court applied a rule requiring proof of an external fortuitous incident before an injury may
3
be characterized as accidental.'
The "injury by accident" question has proved troublesome, particularly in cases involving hernias, heart attacks, and back injuries. 14 North Carolina decisions reflect the problems in deciding
what is a compensable accidental injury. Prior to 1940, the statute
was construed to require an external, fortuitous occurrence.' 5 In
1940, the Court apparently reversed itself in Smith v. Cabarrus
Creamery Co.,' holding that an injury was accidental (1) if caused
by an external, fortuitous event, or (2) if the result itself was
unexpected.1 7 This rule was altered in 1957,18 and since then the
Court has required a fortuitous external occurrence in order for the
injury to be compensable.' Although Hensley v. Farmers Fed'n
Co-op.2" distinguished rather than overruled Smith, a review of the
cases decided after Smith and prior to Hensley shows that the
Court did not require that the injury be induced by an unusual
external event. In several cases, the testimony indicated that the
claimant was doing his usual work in his usual way. 2 '
Hensley represented a return to a rule now in the minority in
"E.g., Pardue v. Blackburn Bros. Oil & Tire Co., 260 N.C. 413, 132
S.E.2d 747 (1963); Harding v. Thomas & Howard Co., 256 N.C. 427, 124
S.E.2d 109 (1962); Turner v. Burke Hosiery Mill, 251 N.C. 325, 111 S.E.2d
185 (1959).
" The test requires more than that the usual work was being done in
the usual way. Lawrence v. Hatch Mill, 265 N.C. 329, 330, 144 S.E.2d 3,
4 (1965).
1" See 1 LARSON § 37.30.
" E.g., Slade v. Willis Hosiery Mills, 209 N.C. 823, 184 S.E. 844 (1936);
Scott v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 208 N.C. 160, 179 S.E. 434 (1935).
217 N.C. 468, 8 S.E.2d 231 (1940).
"'E.g., Beaver v. Crawford Paint Co., 240 N.C. 328, 82 S.E.2d 113
(1954) ; Glace v. Pilot Throwing Co., 239 N.C. 668, 80 S.E.2d 759 (1954) ;
Rice v. Thomasville Chair Co., 238 N.C. 121, 76 S.E.2d 311 (1953); Edwards v. Piedmont Publishing Co., 227 N.C. 184, 41 S.E.2d 592 (1947).
18 Hensley v. Farmers Fed'n Co-op., 246 N.C. 274, 98 S.E.2d 289 (1957).
See 37 N.C.L. REv. 378 (1958); 41 N.C.L. REv. 410 (1963).
1" Compare Hensley v. Farmers Fed'n Co-op., smpra note 18, with Searcy
v. Branson, 253 N.C. 64, 116 S.E.2d 175 (1960), and Keller v. Electric
Wiring Co., 259 N.C. 222, 130 S.E.2d 342 (1963).
10246 N.C. 274, 98 S.E.2d 289 (1957).
"E.g., Beaver v. Crawford Paint Co., 240 N.C. 328, 82 S.E.2d 113
(1954); Glace v. Pilot Throwing Co., 239 N.C. 668, 80 S.E.2d 759 (1954).
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the United States. 2 ' However, since the statute does not require an
external occurrence, the Court has alternative interpretations available. The problem is one of distinguishing between sudden failures
of the body (accidental injuries) and those requiring time to develop (disease). By requiring proof of an external occurrence, the
Court has needlessly limited compensation coverage, overlooking its
own authorities to the contrary in the process.
MISCELLANEOUS

In Gibbs v. Carolina Power & Light Co.,13 plaintiff-employee

brought a third-party action against the defendant, pursuant to G.S.
§ 97-10.2. Defendant asserted a claim for indemnity or contribution against plaintiff's employer The Court held that such a claim
could not be joined in the employee's action.24 In Jones v. Myrtle
Desk Co. 25 the employee was injured while doing personal work
on company time. Although company rules permitted employees to
do personal work, the employee had not obtained permission from
his foreman as required. The Court affirmed the Industrial Commission's findings that plaintiff was not injured in the course of
his employment. This holding is clearly a proper result. It would
seem that the only situation in which compensation would be payable when the employee's injury occurred while doing personal work
is where the personal work benefits the employer. At times a benefit
can be found in the educational value of personal work when the
employer benefits from the employee's attempts at self-improvement. 28 No such showing was made in Jones.
1 LARsON § 38.00.
",See N.C.
459, 144 S.E.2d 393 (1965).
23265

" See discussion of Gibbs in Thorpe, Torts-Part II, North Carolina
Case Law, 44 N.C.L. REv. 1047 (1966).
' 264 N.C. 401, 141 S.E.2d 632 (1965).
'"See 1 LARSON § 27.31(b).

